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SCHISM IN A PREDOMINANT PARTY:
THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS IN 1969

by



Mahendra Prasad Singh

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitles "Schism in a Predominant Party: The Indian National Congress in 1969," submitted by Mahendra Prasad Singh in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science.

DEDICATION

To Munni without whose love,
understanding, and sacrifices
this would not have been
possible

ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes the 1969 split in the Indian National Congress from two perspectives. First, focusing at it as a macro phenomenon, a conceptual framework is developed to analyze schism in political parties, especially a predominant, pragmatic, success-oriented, mass party such as the Congress. Party schism in this analytical framework is explained as the outcome of interaction among three major factors: elite tensions within the party, changes in the level of political mobilization in the larger society, and institutionalization of the party system and the nature of the party concerned. The case of the 1969 Congress schism is used to illustrate the utility of this model.

The second perspective on party schism utilized in this study is cast at the micro level, and it seeks to analyze the various pressures on the decision of a segment of the Congress elites to align with one or the other of the two groups into which the Congress party split in 1969. An attempt is made to develop a paradigm of factional identification to facilitate the analysis of elite background pressures on the affiliation of the Congress Parliamentary (Lok Sabha) members with one of the two Congress splinters. The paradigm postulated basically two sets of independent variables--personal background variables of party leaders

and their constituency or district characteristics. The former are conceived as the more immediate socializing influences on the party elites and the latter as broader contexts serving as arenas of socialization as well as of felt pressures of local interest, socio-political characteristics, and so on. The combined effects of these two broad sets of factors on patterns of factional is also analyzed.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
<p>I. PARTY SCHISM AND ELITE TRANSFORMATION IN A PREDOMINANT PARTY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK</p>	1
Introduction	1
The Prdominant Party System	5
A Model of Party Schism	14
Intraparty Elite Conflicts	16
Social Mobilization	17
Party and Party System	21
Elite Displacement and Party System	27
Notes	35
<p>II. THE SPLIT IN THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS: THE BACKGROUND</p>	41
The Background	43
The Syndicate	44
The Kamaraj Plan	50
The Shastri Succession	53
The Indira Gandhi Succession	55
The 1967 Elections and Confirmation of Mrs. Gandhi's Succession	57
The Congress Presidential Succession, 1967	61
<p>III. THE SPLIT IN THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS: THE DYNAMICS</p>	73
The Dynamics	73
The First Round	73

CHAPTER	PAGE
The Second Round	87
The Third Round	111
The Final Round	138
The Impact	144
Notes	150
IV. THE CONGRESS SPLIT: AN ANALYTICAL SYNTHESIS . .	154
Elite Conflicts	154
Social Mobilization	162
The Party and the Party System	171
Notes	179
V. A PARADIGM OF FACTIONAL AFFILIATION	182
The Paradigm	182
Elite Backgrounds	183
The Contextual Variables	194
The Settings	207
The Methodology	209
Notes	213
VI. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ELITE BACKGROUNDS AND THE CONGRESS SPLIT	215
Socio-Economic Background	216
Age and Generation	216
Social Stratification	221
Religion	230
Organized Interest Group Activities . .	235
Attitudes and Orientations	239

CHAPTER

PAGE

Political Career Backgrounds	248
Past Party Affiliation	249
Mass Membership Party Organization	253
Parliamentary Party Career	259
Local-Level Experience	269
Personal Electoral Proficiency	273
Summary	278
Notes	280
VII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS AND FACTIONAL AFFILIATION	284
Socio-Economic Context	288
Ethnic Context	298
Mobilizational Context	302
Political Context	313
Summary	340
Notes	344
VIII. PERSONAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND AND FACTIONAL AFFILIATION	348
Social Stratification	349
Age	349
Religion	351
Caste	357
Education	363
Occupation	366
Organized Group Affiliation	371
Political Career Patterns	378

CHAPTER	PAGE
Career in External Party	380
Parliamentary Party Career	387
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION	401
BIBLIOGRAPHY	417
APPENDIX A	424
APPENDIX B	425

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		PAGE
2.1	Composition of CWC, 1968	67
3.1	Factional Affiliation in State Congress Parties During the Presidential Election	93
3.2	Line-Up in the CWC Meeting (August 25)	110
3.3	Factional Alignment in State Congress Parties on AICC Requisition Move	119
3.4	Line-Up in the CWC Meeting (November 1)	124
3.5	Delegates Attending Requisitioned Pro-Indira AICC Session (November, 1969)	134
3.6	The Two Congress Parties and Lok Sabha Elections, 1971	140
4.1	Pro-Indira Rallies in New Delhi	169
6.1	Factional Affiliation By Age	217
6.2	Factional Affiliation By Participation in National Movement	220
6.3	Factional Affiliation By Caste	223
6.4	Factional Affiliation By Education	224
6.5	Factional Affiliation By Occupation	225
6.6	Factional Affiliation By Occupation, Controlling for Type of University	228
6.7	Factional Affiliation By Caste, Controlling for Education	231
6.8	Factional Affiliation By Occupation, Controlling for Education	232
6.9	Factional Affiliation By Religion	234
6.10	Factional Affiliation By Organized Functional Interest Group Involvement	237
6.11	Factional Affiliation By Involvement in Organized Functional/Primordial Groups	238

TABLE	PAGE
6.12 Factional Affiliation By Involvement in Organized Specific Interest Groups	240
6.13 Factional Affiliation By Foreign Travel	245
6.14 Factional Affiliation By Publications	245
6.15 Factional Affiliation By Involvement in "Constructive" Politics	246
6.16 Factional Affiliation By Ideological Leaning	247
6.17 Factional Affiliation By Previous Party Affiliation	251
6.18 Factional Affiliation By Seniority in National, State, and District Party Organizations	254
6.19 Factional Affiliation By Position in External Party Organization at Various Levels (in Combination)	258
6.20 Factional Affiliation By Union Parliamentary Seniority	263
6.21 Factional Affiliation By Union Ministerial Status	263
6.22 Alignment with Mrs. Gandhi By Ministerial Status, Controlling for Parliamentary Seniority	264
6.23 Factional Affiliation By State-Level Legislative and Ministerial Experience	266
6.24 Factional Affiliation By Parliamentary Party Executive Committee Experience	267
6.25 Factional Affiliation By Presiding/ Parliamentary Committee Experience	267
6.26 Factional Affiliation By Position in Union Government and/or External Party Organization (National)	270
6.27 Factional Affiliation By Position in Local Self-Governing Institutions	273
6.28 Factional Affiliation By Association with Rural Local Self-Governing Institutions	274

TABLE	PAGE
6.29	Factional Affiliation By Electoral Proficiency . 277
7.1	Factional Affiliation By Selected Socio-Economic Features of Environment 289
7.2	Factional Affiliation By Indices of Ethnic Contextual Variables 300
7.3	Factional Affiliation By Developmental Contextual Variables 304
7.4	Summary Statistical Relationships Between Socio-Economic Contextual Variables and Alignment with Mrs. Gandhi 306
7.5	Factional Affiliation By Ethnic Contextual Variables, Controlling for Region 308
7.6	Factional Affiliation By Developmental Contextual Variables, Controlling for Region . . 311
7.7	Factional Affiliation By Aspects of Political Environment 315
7.8	Factional Affiliation By Constituency Congress Vote, 1967 324
7.9	Factional Affiliation By Source of Main Opposition to Congress (Constituency), 1967 . . 326
7.10	Factional Affiliation By Electoral Turnout (State), 1967 328
7.11	Factional Affiliation By Constituency Party System, 1967, Controlling for Social Mobilization 330
7.12	Factional Affiliation By Constituency Party System, 1967, Controlling for Region 333
7.13	Factional Affiliation By State Congress Vote, 1967 337
7.14	Factional Affiliation By Non-Congress Success Pattern (State), 1960s/1950s 339
7.15	Factional Affiliation By Source of Main Opposition to Congress (State), 1967 340
7.16	Factional Affiliation By Electoral Turnout (State), 1967 341

TABLE	PAGE
8.1 Factional Affiliation By Age, Controlling for Region	350
8.2 Factional Affiliation By Age, Controlling for Social Mibilization	352
8.3 Factional Affiliation By Age, Controlling for Source of Main Opposition to Congress (Constituency), 1967	353
8.4 Factional Affiliation By Religion, Controlling for Region, Indices of Hindu-Muslim, Hindu-Sikh, Depressed Hindu/Non-Hindu Population, and Social Mobilization	355
8.5 Factional Affiliation By Caste, Controlling for Region	358
8.6 Factional Affiliation By Caste, Controlling for Social Mobilization	360
8.7 Factional Affiliation By Caste, Controlling Simultaneously for Region and Social Mobilization	361
8.8 Factional Affiliation By Caste, Controlling to Source of Main Opposition to Congress (Constituency), 1967	364
8.9 Factional Affiliation By Education, Controlling for Region	365
8.10 Factional Affiliation By Education, Controlling for District Social Mobilization	367
8.11 Factional Affiliation By Education, Controlling Simultaneously for Social Mobilization	368
8.12 Factional Affiliation By Occupation, Controlling for Region	370
8.13 Factional Affiliation By Occupation, Controlling for Social Mobilization	372
8.14 Factional Affiliation By Occupation, Controlling Simultaneously for Region and Social Mobilization	373

TABLE

PAGE

8.15	Factional Affiliation By Organized Group Membership, Controlling for Region	376
8.16	Factional Affiliation By Organized Group Membership, Controlling for Social Mobilization	377
8.17	Factional Affiliation By Organized Group Membership, Controlling for Source of Main Opposition to Congress (Constituency), 1967	379
8.18	Factional Affiliation By Position in External Party, Controlling for Region	381
8.19	Factional Affiliation By Position in External Party, Controlling for Social Mobilization	383
8.20	Factional Affiliation By Position in External Party, Controlling Simultaneously for Region and Social Mobilization	384
8.21	Factional Affiliation in External Party Controlling for Source of Main Opposition to Congress (Constituency), 1967	388
8.22	Factional Affiliation By Position in External Party, Controlling for Non-Congress Success Trend (State	389
8.23	Factional Affiliation By Parliamentary Seniority, Controlling for Region	391
8.24	Factional Affiliation by Parliamentary Seniority, Controlling for Social Mobilization	392
8.25	Factional Affiliation By Parliamentary Seniority, Controlling Simultaneously for Region and Social Mobilization	393
8.26	Factional Affiliation By Parliamentary Seniority, Controlling for Non-Congress Success Pattern (State)	396
8.27	Factional Affiliation By Position in Party/Government, Controlling for Region	397

TABLE

PAGE

8.28	Factional Affiliation By Position in Party/Government, Cotnrolling for Social Mobilization	398
8.29	Factional Affiliation By Position in Party/Government, Controlling for Non- Congress Success Trend (State)	400

CHAPTER I

PARTY SCHISM AND ELITE TRANSFORMATION IN A PREDOMINANT PARTY: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

In the literature on political parties and party systems, when one begins to look for studies on party schisms or splits, one finds that, although case studies of splits in particular parties abound, there is an embarrassing lack of more abstract conceptual frameworks or theoretical models for analysing party splits generally. In what follows, an attempt is made to first state the problem and then provide a conceptual framework for analysing the split that occurred in the fall of 1969 in the Indian National Congress, the centrepiece of India's "predominant party system."¹

The split temporarily ended the predominant majority of the Congress party at the federal level for the first time since independence, forcing the minority government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to lean precariously on leftist and regional parties for its survival. These events seemed to portend erosion of India's predominant party system. Paradoxically, however, the split, which initially appeared to

presage the demise of the Congress party, ultimately helped the party to adapt to a new set of changes in the society such as increasing peripheral politicization. For, pushing the party to the left, Prime Minister Gandhi led the Congress back to its earlier predominance in the 1971 mid-term elections.

Despite its obvious significance for the Congress party, for the Indian political system, and for theories of maintenance and disintegration of predominant party systems generally, the 1969 Congress split has not received the systematic attention it deserves, presumably because of its recency.² This study will, hopefully, serve to fill this gap.

Basically the problem to be analysed relates to the bases of elite cohesion and division in this central political organization around the time of the 1969 split. The study focuses on the causes, processes, and consequences of the Congress split, the main issues, personalities, and groups involved in the conflicts, the general themes and ideologies invoked by the principal actors to justify their positions, and the various pressures on party leaders to join one or the other of the two groups into which the party split.

This study is organized into nine chapters. The present chapter is devoted to a discussion of conceptual and theoretical considerations pertaining to party schism and its consequences for leadership patterns in the party. Chapter II briefly lays out the background to the crisis that seized

the Congress party in 1969. Chapter III presents the empirical description of the 1969 Congress schism within the conceptual framework outlined in this chapter. Chapter IV draws some major analytical themes from the description of the party schism in the preceding chapter and attempts an analytical synthesis. Chapter V addresses itself to the problem that when a party does in fact split what factors affect the decision of the party leaders to affiliate with one of the splinter groups; to this end a paradigm is developed to facilitate systematic analysis of influences, on splinter party affiliation, of two broad sets of factors, i.e., the elite personal and contextual background variables. Chapter VI analyses the elite personal background variables and their relationships with alignment in the Congress split. Chapter VII analyses the influence of contextual or environmental variables on factional alignment of party leaders. Chapter VIII examines the combined effects of personal and contextual background variables on factional affiliation of the party elites. Chapter IX offers summary and conclusions of this study.

Party Schism in a Predominant Party

Party schism is affected by several major factors and their interactions. Utilizing the central dependent variable of party schism as a macro phenomenon, the framework here outlined seeks to untangle and describe the factors that seem

to be causally related to this phenomenon, with special reference to schism in a predominant party such as the Indian National Congress.

In putting together this conceptual framework, I have utilized a variety of theoretical perspectives, depending on their suitability for specific aspects of the problem at hand. Principally, however, I have sought to mesh the middle-range theories of political parties and elites with the more general system-centred theoretical perspectives of system-functionalism and political modernization.³

This chapter consists of three main parts. In order to establish a basis for our later discussion, the first part discusses the conceptual and theoretical considerations pertaining to the predominant party system, putting it in the context of typology of party systems. In the second part an attempt is made to outline a model which seeks to explain party schisms in terms of the causal effects of a combination of three sets of independent variables: intraparty elite conflicts, changing levels of social and political mobilization, and party system institutionalization and the nature of the party concerned. In the third part, the problem is approached from the perspective of theories of elite transformation, with special reference to revolutionary elites, to suggest theoretical expectations about elite transformations in the Congress, the party that led India's anti-colonial nationalist revolution.

The Predominant Party System

A "predominant party system" is defined by Giovanni Sartori (1970: 327) as

the type of party pluralism in which no alternation in office occurs over time, even though alternation is not ruled out and the political system provides all the opportunities of open and effective dissent, i.e., for opposing the predominance of the ruling party.

Thus, as a system, it is closer, in spirit, to the "polyparty system", but structurally it displays some apparent (but misleading) affinity to the "monoparty system", a term used by Sartori to subsume "one-party" and "hegemonic" party systems. The crucial difference between the predominant party system and the two forms of monoparty systems lies in the fact that while the former is actually a system of competitive dominance, the latter are non-competitive, de jure as well as de facto. The hegemonic party allows only satellite parties, which cannot compete in antagonistic terms; the ruling elites in the one-party system do not permit any other party at all (Sartori 1970).

Sartori defines the predominant party system and clearly delineates the structural features that separate it from other party systems. But he does not address himself to the task of explaining the conditions for its emergence. This problem is explored in the paragraphs that follow.

An important assumption of political sociology is that socioeconomic conditions of a political system shape the nature

of its politics. Myron Weiner and Joseph LaPalombara (1966: 3) offer the broad proposition that the political party is the product of modernization and it

emerges whenever the activities of a political system reach a certain degree of complexity, or whenever the notion of political power comes to include the idea that the mass public must participate or be controlled.

Political parties are thus "a creature of modern and modernizing political systems" (Weiner and LaPalombara 1966: 3).

There is, however, a wide range of variation in the type of party systems found in the set of "modern and modernizing" nations. How can these varying patterns be explained? Broadly dividing party systems at national or subnational (excluding constituency)⁴ levels into competitive and noncompetitive types, it is usually theorized that whereas the former are associated with complex, modern, and industrialized societies, the latter mostly occur in simpler and less modernized settings. The social mobilization theories of political mobilization and participation, for example, assign an important place to, among other factors, level of socioeconomic development in explaining political competitiveness and stability,⁵ and Samuel P. Huntington (1970: 4) regards the one-party system as the "principal modern form of authoritarianism".

However, we need to be more specific than the above propositions, for they obviously do not explain the

considerable variation in the socio-economic modernization found within countries having similar party systems. Focusing hereafter on some concrete cases of predominant party systems - our main concern - let us see if we can explain this anomaly.

Sartori's seminal paper on party system typology (1970: 327) gives four "notable examples" of predominant party systems: a number of state party systems in the southern United States since Reconstruction, following the civil war, Japan since the 1955 merger of the two conservative parties into the Liberal-Democratic Party, India since its independence, and Uruguay for all but eight years of the 20th century. If to these we add Mexico and the Canadian provinces of Alberta, Saskatchewan, Ontario, and Quebec, which have experienced fairly long periods of one-party dominance, we get a fairly exhaustive listing of predominant party systems.

The geographical distribution of these cases is revealing. A majority of these - I think we can reasonably treat the American and Canadian subnational cases as two units - occur in the so-called "transitional"⁶ societies. This suggests the generalization that, although other responses (e.g., military oligarchy, one-party system) are, on the whole more typical of "transitional" societies, predominant party systems are at least one characteristic response to the politics in societies launched on a transition from "tradition"

to "modernity" or a particular mix of the two.

There is another interesting fact about the actual distribution of predominant party systems within the subset designated as transitional or modernizing areas: they occur in countries that are exceptional rather than more typical of the late modernizing societies. As opposed to most other modernizing nations, Japan, India, Mexico, Uruguay, despite continuing prevalence of traditional social and political elements, present a relatively higher level of such socio-economic tendencies as urbanization, industrialization, education, mass media, etc. Though apparently at different levels of socio-economic development, these countries represent a differentiated social and political tradition made more complex by an ambivalent interaction with modern acculturative influences. All are late-modernizing societies and therefore susceptible to "ideologies of delayed industrialization" (Mary Matossian 1966), suggestive of the hypothesis that "the industrial revolution is conducive of more than one political expression, depending upon the timing and intensity of its development" (Robert A. Scalapino 1962: 397). However, despite streaks of authoritarianism in their national histories, alongside strands more conducive to democracy, these countries seem to have developed to a point where some balance is discernible in their politics between such forces in society as political parties, military, and bureaucracy. All in all, they stand out as deviant cases from

the general pattern of noncompetitive politics in late-modernizing societies, although their slipping into authoritarian politics cannot be ruled out with the same degree of confidence as in the case of the Western democracies.⁷

It follows then that socio-economic modernization must have produced a minimum degree of organized complexity to make the emergence of a party system of competitive predominance feasible. In the absence of such complexity, either a non-party polity or a "weak" one-party system (e.g., African one-party states) might be expected.⁸

A "strong" one-party system - either of "exclusionary" (e.g., the Republic of South Africa) or "revolutionary" (e.g., the USSR) variety⁹ - requires to sustain itself a certain higher level of modernization in the society. As Maurice Duverger (1972: 34-35) observes:

Dictatorships and one-party systems take different forms, depending upon the level of development. The distinction between Nazism (found in an advanced state of socio-economic development), and Italian or Spanish fascism (in a moderate state of development), and the feudal-type pseudo-fascism of underdeveloped countries, appears to be based on such socioeconomic factors.

The socioeconomic modernization must advance to a still higher threshold if a stable pluralistic party system is to emerge. To be sure, external intervention of other historical accidents may hasten or hinder these relationships; also a strong party system once established, tends to perpetuate itself. But, as Huntington (1970: 17-44)

shows, social and economic modernization in the long run tend to undermine the condition of social bifurcation from which it arises and, consequently, the exclusionary one-party system typically moves from monopoly to competition, and the revolutionary one changes into an "established" one-party system characterized by the emergence of a new technical managerial class, a complex group structure typical of industrial societies, the reappearance of a critical and alienated intelligentsia, and increased demands for political participation. The significant point Huntington makes in his discussion of established one-party systems is that both Friedrich and Brazinski's (1966) model of totalitarianism and Tucker's (1966) model of "movement-regime" are unsuitable for analysing one-party systems which

have evolved from the revolutionary phase reflecting the bifurcation to post-revolutionary phase based on a high degree of homogeneity in society (Huntington 1970: 23).

The remaining cases of predominant party systems are to be found, paradoxically, in "developed" North America: the so-called "solid South" in the United States and some Canadian provinces. These form parts of highly modernized national polities by most indicators of modernization, and one would therefore normally expect more competitive pluralistic party systems there. But it may be significant that, unlike their Asian and Latin American counterparts, none of the North American predominant party systems occur at the national level,

where more competitive two-party systems do in fact operate; they happen to be state or provincial party systems. Perhaps then they may be treated as produced by exceptional circumstances of less diversity of interests, etc., at sub-national levels. The Democratic party's predominance in the American South, for example, is the product of polarization between the southern states, on the one hand, and the rest of the federation, on the other, based on that region's resistance during Reconstruction that followed the civil war. The dominant white community of the region used restrictive suffrage to create a homogeneous, politically relevant public in an otherwise more diversified society, and used the Democratic party as its political vehicle against the Republican party which became synonymous with Negro rule. As the original conditions that gave rise to the predominance of the Democratic party have gradually changed, and as the conservatism of the national Republican party in recent years appeals to many southern voters, there has been a noticeable rise of Republican strength in a number of southern states.¹⁰

The Canadian provincial predominant party systems can be explained primarily in terms of the existence of pockets of regional, economic, ethnic, or religious homogeneity producing a variety of structural cleavages at the national level.¹¹ Examples of these structural cleavages are what C. B. Macpherson (1962, 2d ed.: 9) calls the quasi-colonial economic position of the western provinces in relation to the economic

institutions of central Canada and their dependence on federal economic policies often perceived by them as inimical to their interests; the perceived threat to French-Canadian culture in a predominantly English Canada, etc. To quote Maurice Pinard (1971: 68):

These cleavages can have particularly strong effects and leave residues for very long periods if they engender bitter contests At any rate, such cleavages strongly alienate a group from one of the two major parties and tie to a single party as the sole protector of its interests, hence leading to one-party dominance.

In case of a predominant party such as the Congress originating in a heroic nationalist movement, the hallowed past of the party and its charismatic nationalist leaders also play an important part in legitimizing the party in the context of electoral politics following independence and in maintaining its predominance. The departure of the nationalist generation of leaders, especially Jawaharlal Nehru's death in 1964, for example, vitally affected the internal conflict management capability of the Congress party. Kochanek (1968: 410) considers this factor as of primary importance in explaining the loss of two decades of Congress predominance in some states in 1967:

[T]he major failure of the Congress in 1967 was internal, for the post-Nehru leadership failed to perform what had become the central leadership's most vital function - the mediation of intra-party disputes and divisions.

In addition to hallowed history and availability of charismatic leadership, the predominant Congress party, once

in power with its control over large patronage, tended to depend increasingly on concrete material rewards to build an electoral coalition and adapt to the still largely traditional local social and political stratifications. As Weiner (1967: 480-81) remarks:

The success of Congress depends very much on its adaptive qualities. We have seen that the local Congress party would rather adapt to than change the local power structure. We have pointed out that in rural areas the party has sought and won the support of those who own land, have wealth, control village panchayats, manage the local cooperatives, and can lead large numbers of persons . . . The expansion of governmental functions and regulations and the close liaison between the party and local administration have made it necessary for those who want things from an expanding government to work through the party.

Moreover, another factor contributing to the pre-dominance of the Congress party is the social and regional pluralism of India, which, to be sure, requires the party to devise an immensely complicated electoral strategy, but given the political skill such a situation allows great maneuverability. To quote Weiner (1967: 480) again,

[T]he segmented character of the Indian social system has made it possible for Congress to lose overwhelmingly in a district - through party defections or otherwise - without having its position in a neighboring district similarly affected. Discontented castes or factions are often geographically confined, and it is unusual for an opposition party to build a coalition of all the discontented social groups within a state. If politics were organized on a class basis and issues did cut across the entire state, it would be difficult for Congress to confine discontent to small areas. The persistence of the parochial and segmented features of Indian life quarantines discontent and has made it possible for Congress to deal with each problem on a piecemeal basis.

In such a context, those trying to build and maintain opposition parties have to work against heavy odds. When opposition parties occasionally win at the constituency level, the predominant party still controls the national and state governments, with enough resources and will to "starve" the deviating constituencies. Social mobilization, particularly successive waves of mobilization, and dissatisfactions directed toward the Congress as the ruling party, of course, help those seeking to build opposition parties, but the Congress can always reorient its appeals to adjust to the changing level and tone of social mobilization and steal the thunder of opposition mobilizational strategies. In her perceptive study of important opposition parties in UP, Angela S. Burger (1969: 284) concludes:

[T]he most important function that opposition parties . . . play . . . is as "feeder" organizations to the dominant party. A dominant party is not necessarily an "open accordian". It may be that the dominant party can open its ranks to new groups only when they have become politically significant - which means previous to entry. Opposition parties in Uttar Pradesh could be perennial minority parties, serving to socialize, politicize, recruit, organize, integrate, and articulate the interests of groups only to see them incorporated into the dominant party.

A Model of Party Schism

The model sketched here is based in large part on my studies of the Indian National Congress; also since the primary concern of this study is with party elites, the model also reflects the same concern. Like any other model,

it must be evaluated initially by its internal logical coherence and its theoretical fruitfulness in organizing data and suggesting hypotheses applicable to the empirical case for which it is primarily developed. Its success in these respects will surely increase the prior probability of its applicability to other empirical cases, but until it is actually tested against other cases, claim for its wider utility must remain at best a hope, or at worst a flat assertion.

Party schism in this conceptual framework is explained as the outcome of three major factors: elite tensions within the party organization, changes in the level of political mobilization in the larger society, and institutionalization of the party system and the nature of the party concerned. The first factor thus refers to the party "withinputs",¹² while the remaining two draw our attention to the nature of the party (structure, ideology, and support) and the environment in which the party operates, each defining the social (i.e., social mobilization) and political (i.e., party system institutionalization) components of that environment, respectively. Intraparty elite conflicts and changes in the wider society are here construed as the primary causal variables in producing party schisms. The nature of the party concerned and the party system institutionalization are here used as mediating variables which affect the probability whether the party withinputs and environmental inputs will

be managed within the party itself or lead to an open split. In the following paragraphs I will discuss and elaborate each of these factors and suggest linkages among them.

Intraparty Elite Conflicts

Intraparty elite conflicts, typically expressed through factions, political tendencies, and nonaligned partisans,¹³ may arise from a variety of sources: social-regional cleavages, elite career ambition or ideological and tactical commitment, and horizontal (e.g., parliamentary/mass membership party organization) and stratarchical (e.g., national/state/local) dimensions of organizational differentiation within the party.¹⁴

However, it is useful to separate analytically, for the purposes of our model, the motivations of party elites, here conceived fundamentally in terms of career incentives, from the other bases of intraparty formations just mentioned. Social mobilization and organizational differentiation may, for example, be construed as handles used by party elites in internal competition among themselves and sometimes also in external competition with other parties. The relationship is truly reciprocal: on the one hand, the emergence of a new level of social mobilization may offer an opportunity for the dissident elements of the party elites to mount pressure on the dominant elements in the name of the newly mobilized social groups; on the other hand, the frustrations of the dissidents

may prompt them to take initiative in politicizing erstwhile-latent social forces as new bases of their support. The ensuing competition between the different elements of the established elites then induces them to seek support from the newly politicized groups by coopting the new political participants and raising them to elite status. Thus, intra-party conflicts in democratic societies help maintain an "open" elite system, facilitating the expansion of the social pool from which the political elites are recruited.

From this perspective, then, political parties perform, in the words of Joseph A. Schlesinger (1966: 3),

a major service in transforming private goals into public morality. [They] tie men's ambitions together linking their fates over time.

The same applies with equal force to intraparty formations such as factions, which serve as important channels of political recruitment and career advancement as well as of communication and policy-making.

Social Mobilization

Changes in the larger society in which the party operates may take a variety of forms. In a partly mobilized society, they may be reflected in the growing politicization of the hitherto-latent social groups and the consequently widening circles of political participants. In a fully mobilized society, the more important social changes to watch are the secular trends in the occupational structure of the

society or relative numerical proportion of the various social strata and classes. Also important for all societies, whether partly or fully mobilized, is the overall economic development or decline. Finally, there are some important historical events that profoundly affect the memories of different groups in society, producing durable partisan alignments or realignments in sizeable sections of the electorate.

These social changes can be expected to affect significantly both the structure and dynamics of parties and party systems of the societies in which they occur. We can identify at least three major related concerns of theory and research in the literature bearing on this problem. First, there is the general "decline of ideology" hypothesis, which, stated baldly, asserts that extremist ideologies are in a state of decline in Western countries due largely to the increasing economic affluence following World War II.¹⁵ Though critics have assailed the thesis, pointing out its conceptual ambiguities and operational problems,¹⁶ its defenders attribute

the confusion among the antidecline writers to two sources: (1) a failure to appreciate the substance of the decline thesis in terms of a relative attenuation of ideological politics; and (2) a failure to appreciate the significance of the decline thesis as an empirical proposition, not an ideological one (Rejai 1971: 241).

Second, there is a somewhat more restricted version of the same hypothesis, with its focus on the consequences of declining ideological style on political parties and

party systems. Typically, the argument is that the decline of ideology phenomenon and its socioeconomic correlates have led to perceptible changes in the post-war European party systems along the dimensions of styles of appeal, support structure, and perhaps organization. In this regard, the Western European party systems have, it is asserted, increasingly moved closer to the American party system, a phenomenon mainly attributed to the growing similarity in certain essential aspects between the American and European industrial societies.¹⁷

Finally, there are theories of party system stability and transformation based on similar assumptions as in the general and more specific versions of the decline of ideology thesis, but with a focus on the electorate rather than on the party elites. In these theories, party system transformations along the dimensions of interparty competitiveness are sought to be explained by reference to sizeable realignments among voters produced by broad changes in the larger society. Two variants of this shared theoretical concern - one typically focusing on past electoral behaviour and the other on the contemporary, but now often used in combination - may be identified as (1) theories of "critical" and "realigning" elections developed by aggregate electoral data analysts,¹⁸ and (2) the party identification theory and its implications for stability or change of party systems formulated by survey researchers.¹⁹

Drawing from these theoretical perspectives, the model here outlined seeks to locate an important causal source of party schisms in the political inputs into the party system from the larger society, arising from higher levels of social mobilization or serious changes in the level of economic performance. Such changes as these create tensions for the party system and parties comprising this system, and, failing a successful adaptation, the party system may undergo some transformations involving the emergence of new parties based either on splits in existing parties or a newly mobilized leadership, or both.

In response to environmental changes, the party elites seek to restructure the party and its ideology and in turn to effect changes in the environment. Party schism may be conceived as a byproduct of this ideological and organizational reappraisal within the party. This occurs when the societal changes and the tensions accompanying such changes get linked up with elite conflicts in the party. The dissident elite groups within the party, as indicated in the preceding section, seize upon these environmental changes and often partake in activating the resultant social forces in pursuit of their career aspirations. Speaking for the current social mobilization, the dissidents question and demand modifications in the party's ideological definition, often opposed by the party elites reflecting a previous level of social mobilization. Barring a successful reconciliation, the competing elites will

split the party, redefining its future path of ideological and organizational development.

Party System Institutionalization and the Nature of the Party

To the extent that party systems become "institutionalized"²⁰ as the central institution of a society linking social forces and individual ambitions to the political system, one can expect them to play an important role in mediating the effects of social mobilization and intraparty elite conflicts on prospects for the occurrence of party schisms. Both the party system and the party (that splits) are relevant here.

The institutionalization of a party system does not foreclose any changes in the system; what it does imply is a relative stability of the basic patterns of the system over time, or, more accurately, a gradual adaptation to its changing environment without major structural overhaul. So at the risk of appearing tautological, one may suggest that the greater the institutionalization of the party system, the lower the probability of major party splits in the system. This is so because in an institutionalized party system there is not much "space" available for a new party elite either on the ideological spectrum of the system or on the voters' cognitive map. So a splinter party must struggle hard to create a place for itself in the system and establish its identity. This creates a clear disincentive for the competing elites within a party to push their conflicts to

the brink where a schism becomes inevitable; they are encouraged to maintain an open elite system in which different elements in the party elite relate their individual ambitions to changing levels of social mobilization and thus enable the party to adapt to its changing environment without disruption of party unity.

Also relevant here, in addition to party system institutionalization, is the nature of the party concerned. For example, as a sociological phenomenon, the predominant party may be conceived as a group especially prone to factionalism and vulnerable to fission. First, though all parties perform interest aggregation functions, there are significant variations in the extent of actual performance of this function by various parties. Parties in a two-party system, for instance, are more comprehensive in their support structure than parties in a multiparty system with a more sectional base for each party. The predominant party is clearly the aggregator par excellence, for it aims at promiscuous accommodation and aspires to make its support structure coterminous with the entire politically relevant public. Thus, though all parties face the dilemma, posed by Eldersveld (1964: 5-6), of reconciling the conflicting requirements of maximum adaptation to its societal environment and maintenance of internal integration, for the predominant party it assumes a special importance. Not surprisingly, most predominant parties seek to meet this dilemma by either transcending social

cleavages by a charismatic leadership or by building coalitions of diverse social groups through skillful reconciliatory leadership. Or, in more favourable circumstances, the predominant party may well use both affective and instrumental leadership types in combination to maximize its goals.

Second, since typically predominant parties represent the central tendencies of the ideological spectrum of political systems in which they occur, they are ideologically pragmatic rather than doctrinaire. That is, they are, to use Neumann's (1956: 410) celebrated categories, parties emphasizing "day-by-day expediency interests" rather than representing "the fundamental principles of an all-inclusive "faith movement" (Weltanschauungs - or Glaubens-Parteien)." While pragmatism of its leaders helps the predominant party to make, with relative ease, compromises on policies and tactics, it works as a double-edged sword. For if the loyalty of party activists to the party organization comes under strain in times of crisis (e.g., loss of predominance in electoral competition), members do not feel constrained by the ideological bonds to the party, at any rate to the same extent as members of more doctrinaire parties. Consequently, in such circumstances the party becomes vulnerable to massive defections and schisms, as is illustrated by the experience of the Congress party in the North Indian states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Haryana and Punjab following its defeat in the 1967 general elections (Kashyap 1969 and

1970; Brass 1968; and Singh 1975).

Third, organizationally, the predominant parties typically operate with a "branch-type" mass party organization rather than a "caucus-type", with fairly strongly "articulated" structures, i.e., more tightly knit relationships between the party and its basic units and more reliance on vertical rather than horizontal linkages among them.²¹ These mass party structural features in predominant parties are often found to coexist with a generally elitist decision-making in practice. All this theoretically should help the predominant party leadership to check and deal effectively with the development of dissidence, factionalism, and schism within the party. However, this structural ideal - originally an invention of socialist parties - and its assumed consequences are not always approximated to the same degree in predominant parties. This may be because predominant parties often operate for a wider constituency than the narrower class-defined constituency of earlier socialist parties, with the result that the former have to work with a larger variety of orientations in their leadership and rank and file. In the Indian Congress party, for example, while the national and state party organizations seem to reflect a fair degree of branch-type structural formalization and articulation, the district and subdistrict local party organizations fall closer to the "machine-type" party organizations (Kochanek 1968; Weiner 1967; and Roy 1966).

Fourth, the greater propensity of predominant parties toward factionalism and schism stems from yet another characteristic of the predominant party, viz., the lack of formidable inter-party competition. A positive correlation between external threat and pressure for conformity is a well-established generalization in the study of groups and collectivities. This proposition easily leads to the prediction that the higher the degree of interparty competition, the greater the compulsion for conformity within the party. For the element of external threat induces the authoritative party elite to emphasize unity and the rank and file to close its ranks against a common enemy. In a less competitive situation the predominant party becomes the holding company of competing factions.²²

Finally, as predominant parties most often arise in transitional societies they also become vulnerable to the conflicts and tensions inherent in such societies, especially if such conflicts are not - and they are not always - polarized into an ingroup-versus-outgroup fashion. The process of modernization in its early stages often intensifies group conflicts, as many groups are brought out of their splendid isolation in the traditional society and made to interact with each other in various emerging modern arenas. The predominant party, as it frequently seeks to aggregate a maximum number of groups and interests in traditional as well as modern arenas, inevitably becomes a complex system of

conflict and consensus. The Indian National Congress, for example, confronted enormous integrative problems, with varying success, stemming from the centrifugal political mobilization of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Dravidians, and Scheduled Castes during its nationalist movement phase.²³ Following independence, though some of these integrative problems had subsided, others were added to them. Probably most important among these were linguistic-regional agitations for reorganization of states along linguistic lines during the 1950s and early '60s (carried over to the early '70s in the case of hill tribes of Northwest India) and some more recent regional agitations for autonomous states within the same linguistic regions (e.g., Telengana in Andhra Pradesh, Vishal Haryana, etc.).²⁴ The state Congress parties in agitating states have often virtually split from the national party for the duration of these protests, vitally affecting the electoral fortunes of the party. It must be said, however, to the credit of the accommodative capability of the predominant Congress party, that once the national party elite acceded to the demands of the protesting linguistic groups, state Congress splinter elements, along with the new political participants mobilized during the agitation, came back to the Congress, making its predominance still more formidable.

Elite Displacement and Party Schism

The conceptual framework outlined in the preceding section enables us to describe and explain the phenomenon of party schism as a macro event; it does not, however, aid us in specifying theoretical expectations as to the type of party personnel likely to exit in the event of a party split. It is to this problem that we now turn.

However, as this is a rather slippery problem on which there is little by way of more general theoretical guidelines in the literature, the subsequent discussion is frankly tied to the experience of the Indian National Congress. In addition to this inductive attempt to draw generalizations from a single case, I also lean on the theories of revolutionary elites and examine their utility and relevance for elite circulation in the Congress party.

Basically, the revolutionary elite studies, with some marginal conceptual and terminological variations among them, hypothesize that the dominant leadership of revolutionary mass movements undergoes transformation over time in response to the changed leadership needs of the different stages of the movement or revolution and particularly of the phases following its success.²⁵ For instance, in a comprehensive review of the works of the early sociologists of revolution focusing mostly on the French, Russian, American, and English (Puritan) revolutions, Daly (1972: 15) concludes that

the evidence available in the descriptive literature (admittedly very thin in spots) indicates four stages in the life cycle of those revolutionary movements in which power is retained by the members of the original militant leadership: (1) the muted militance of the reformer, (2) the full pattern of militant behaviour characteristic of the revolutionary, (3) a sharp increase in militance after the movement has defeated its organized opposition and restored order, and (4) a tapering off of the militance and the reemergence of nonrevolutionary patterns of political behaviour when the men who made the revolution are displaced.

A similar theoretical perspective has appeared in studies of contemporary communist and anticolonial nationalist revolutions and mass movements. Eric Hoffer (1951: 119-138), for example, distinguishes three types of revolutionary leaderships: the "men of words" to prepare the ground for revolution by articulating popular grievances and undermining the legitimacy of existing institutions, the "fanatic" to hatch the actual movement, and the "practical men of action" to consolidate it. Similarly, Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (1966: 199) hypothesize that revolutionary movements in their early phases are usually led by alienated intellectuals, but in the post-revolutionary phase the intellectuals are generally replaced by technocratic managers and party bureaucrats. In the same vein Kautsky (1969: 441) advances the hypothesis that

in underdeveloped countries generally there is some link between industrialization, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the replacement of the leadership of revolutionary modernizers by that of managerial modernizers. Depending on which of the two variables one regards as the independent and which the dependent one, one may suggest either

that if the industrialization is to proceed, the replacement of elites must take place or that if and when industrialization does proceed, the replacement of elites will take place.

Finally, Huntington's (1970: 40-41) analysis of revolutionary one-party system shows that it gradually tends to change, through a three-phase evolutionary process labelled as "transformation," "consolidation," and "adaptation," into what he calls an "established" one-party system; the latter differs from the former in the following six ways:

- (1) Ideology is less important in shaping its goals and the decisions of its leaders; pragmatic considerations are more important.
- (2) The political leadership tends to be oligarchical, bureaucratic, and institutionalized rather than personalistic, charismatic, and autocratic.
- (3) The sources of initiative are dispersed among technocratic and managerial elites instead of concentrated in the party elite; the party apparatus becomes the mediator between change and stability.
- (4) A plurality of important interest groups exist, giving rise to a corporate social structure, with the party apparatus becoming the aggregator and regulator of competing special interests.
- (5) The intellectuals criticize the system instead of ruling it.
- (6) Popular participation in the system is less the product of mobilization by the party and more the result of competition through elections within the party.

The present study seeks to utilize this central theoretical perspective of elite transformation literature to analyse the consequences of the 1969 split in the Indian National Congress for the leadership patterns in the party. To the extent that

the nationalist movement led by the Congress developed under relatively non-clandestine conditions and without a strong Marxist revolutionary or religious revivalist component, and to the extent that after the success of the movement the ruling Congress elite managed to keep providing opportunities for free electoral contestation, one might expect that the elite circulation and displacement in the Indian Congress party would follow a somewhat different pattern from that in a, say, one-party Communist system. For the logic of an autonomous electoral system and the need to ensure electoral success create necessities that significantly shape the party's strategies and political recruitment.

The one most frequently used word to characterize the nature of the leadership of the Indian National Congress during its nationalist movement phase is "intellectual". Although this characterization is applied to nationalist movement elites in new states generally, its empirical fit is probably nowhere more forceful than in India, a new nation "with the largest and most differentiated modern intelligentsia" (Edward Shils 1962: 225). Writing about the early Congress sessions, historian Anil Seal (1968: 278) observes:

One delegate in four was a graduate. Over half the delegates at the first Congress were lawyers, and for decades to come more than a third of the delegates at every Congress belonged to that profession. Journalists, doctors and teachers mingled with the lawyers. Government servants, who were discouraged and later formally prohibited from taking an active part in politics, came to the Congress only as amici curiae.

As the Congress movement graduated from the initial "moderate" or constitutional-liberal phase to the "extremist" or militant nationalist phase around the first decade of this century, there occurred a shift in its objectives, its elite political culture, and the means of its political action, even though the social background of its top-level leadership remained unchanged.²⁶ The objective of the Congress changed from self-government within the framework of British empire to full national independence; its method changed from constitutional agitation to unconstitutional mass agitation; and its elite political culture tended to acquire a new Indian self-consciousness through revival of traditional Indian culture. Despite these changes, however, most scholars have felt safe to describe the national leadership of the Congress which inherited power after the British withdrawal in 1947 as "modernizing intellectuals". Not until after independence was this leadership pattern significantly altered.

During the nearly three decades since independence, the elite recruitment patterns in the Congress seem to have undergone significant changes. It will facilitate our understanding of this problem if we divide this period into two phases. The first of these may be called "the ruralizing election" phase, borrowing this concept from Huntington (1968: 459-60) and dating roughly from independence to the third general elections in 1962. The dominant theme of this phase was a "conservatizing" trend in the Congress necessitated

by the need for the party to adapt to the Indian society in the context of the new electoral politics based on universal adult franchise introduced by the 1950 constitution. In a highly stratified society where political mobilization had affected only the upper strata of the society, and where universal franchise came earlier than there was conscious demand for it from the lower strata, this meant adaptation of the Congress with a style of patron-client pattern of politics. Thus as Congress' electoral penetration in the countryside advanced, party organizations were increasingly captured by conservative rural influentials, who posed a challenge to the dominance within the party of less conservative urban middle and professional classes and intellectuals. Not surprisingly, the Congress during this phase suffered several schisms which marked the departure from the party of more ideologically oriented left-wing groups to form separate parties of their own (e.g., the Socialist Party and Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party from which were later formed Praja Socialist Party and Samyukta Socialist Party).

The second period, which for want of a better term I call the "cultural revolution" phase, can be dated to begin with the fourth general elections in 1967, or, more accurately, with the Congress split in 1969. The significance of the 1967 general elections lies in the fact that it indicated that the process of political mobilization had gradually come to affect the lower strata of society, and this posed problems for, if

it did not fully disrupt, the pattern of clientelist politics to which the Congress had so successfully adapted. The contours of this second phase became clearer in 1969 when the party split between the left-wing faction headed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the right-wing Syndicate. In a bid to adapt to a new level of political mobilization, Mrs. Gandhi pushed the party to the left of center, forced the top Syndicate leaders to split off from the party, and finally brought the party back to its predominance in the 1971 election after a precarious minority rule following the split.

I call this phase a "cultural revolution" for the attack mounted in the name of the "people" on the alleged advocates of "vested interests" was clearly carried on by a leading member of the Congress "establishment" who was very much in it but not of it, and who could invoke a direct charismatic inheritance from the romantic socialist Nehru (i.e., Mrs. Gandhi). Also, since the split there has been increased emphasis on the "politics of commitment" and on reorganization of party structure in order to base even the lowest units on trained activist cadres.

This study is concerned with the impact of this so-called cultural revolution phase on leadership patterns in the Congress party. For reasons of manageability of research and availability of data, it focuses on factional affiliation and the split in 1969 in the Congress Parliamentary

Party (CPP), more specifically, among the Congress members of the Lok Sabha (lower house of the Indian parliament). The universe of parliamentarians to be analyzed will consist of all Congress and Syndicate Congress members of the fourth Lok Sabha (1967-71).

Notes to Chapter I

¹For elaboration of the concept of "predominant party system" (discussed in some detail later in this chapter), see Giovanni Sartori (1970: 327). For empirical application of the concept to the Indian party system, although not necessarily using the same terminology, see Rajni Kothari (1964, and 1970: ch. V) and W. H. Morris-Jones (1964a: ch. V, 1964b, and 1966).

²A few works published so far have not gone beyond a simple chronology of events leading to the split; see, for example, Hardgrave (1970), Rao (1971), Chatterjee (1971), and Rahman (1970).

³For excellent reviews of general system-centered theoretical perspectives of system-functionalism and political modernization, see Samuel P. Huntington (1971) and Gabriel A. Almond (1973).

A satisfactory exhaustive review of the political party literature is not available, though the two pieces by Joseph A. Schlesinger and Harry Eckstein in the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (1968: 453), nearly approach this task.

The literature on elites likewise is vast and varied; in particular, see the computerized bibliography by Carl Beck and Thomas Mackechnie (1968) and the review and synthesis of this literature in Suzanne Keller (1963, and 1968) and William B. Quandt (1970).

⁴Competitive party systems at national and subnational levels conceal a number of noncompetitive, "safe" constituencies. But in analyzing party systems at a more aggregate level, this matter is usually excluded from consideration. For failure to distinguish the two levels of analysis is likely to confound rather than clarify the phenomenon of party system competitiveness.

⁵Some of the more influential and significant works using the social mobilization theoretical perspective are Karl W. Deutsch (1963); Daniel Lerner (1963); S. M. Lipset (1959; and 1960, ch. 2); Philip Cutright (1963); Deane Neubauer (1967); D. McCrone and C. Cnudde (1967); Ronald D. Brunner and Garry D. Brewer (1971). See also Robert A. Dahl (1971).

⁶For elaboration of this concept, see Lerner (1958) and Pye (1962: ch. 2).

⁷For a comprehensive analyses of party politics in these countries, see Morris-Jones (1967) and Rajni Kothari (1970) on India; Robert Scalapino and Junnosuki Masumi (1964) and Frank Langdon (1967) on Japan; Ronald McDonald (1971) on Uruguay; and

⁸The concepts of "strong" and "weak" party systems are suggested by Samuel P. Huntington (1970: 6): "Strong party systems can be distinguished from weak party systems by, among other things, the extent to which the party or parties monopolize: (1) the legitimation of the political system; (2) the recruitment of political leadership; and (3) interest aggregation and policy-making."

See also Henry Bienen (1967) who argues that the ease with which military coups succeeded in overthrowing one-party African States directs attention to political forces other than parties in these societies, and makes one wonder whether these supposedly all-powerful one-party states are, in fact, no-party states!

⁹The distinction between "revolutionary" and "exclusionary" one-party systems is suggested by Samuel P. Huntington (1970: 15): "Successful one-party systems have their origins in bifurcation; the party is the means by which the leaders of one social force dominate the other social force. The party monopolizes or tries to monopolize all political activity. With respect to the cleavage and the subordinate social force, however, the political leaders can follow one or a combination of two policies. On the one hand, they can accept the bifurcation of the society and use the party as a means of mobilizing support from their constituency while at the same time suppressing or restricting political activity by the subordinate social force. In effect, the party maintains its monopoly over political participation by limiting the scope of political participation. Systems in which this policy is followed are exclusionary one-party systems. Alternatively, the party leadership can attempt to eradicate the bifurcation of society by shrinking society to correspond to its constituency through liquidation of the subordinate social force or by expanding its constituency to correspond to society by the assimilation of the subordinate social force. These systems are revolutionary one-party systems."

¹⁰See Thomas R. Dye (1969, 2d ed. 1973: 100-110).

¹¹For a good discussion and summary of Canadian provincial party systems, see Maurice Pinard (1971: ch. 3) and Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz (1967).

¹²The concept of "withinput" is a contribution of David Easton (1965: 55): "These demands [withinputs] do not arise from the experience of persons who have acted in roles outside the political sector of society. They emerge directly out of political roles themselves, that is, from within the system Demands such as these differ from the inputs we have been discussing in that the latter are shaped by such parameters as culture, economy, social structure, and the like, whereas withinputs are politically determined."

¹³These three types of intraparty formations - factions, political tendencies, and nonaligned partisans - are suggested by Richard Rose (1967: 106-108). Factions are defined as groups of members within a party bound together by a modicum of attitudinal and behavioral unity and continuity of closer interaction among faction members through formal or informal procedures. Political tendency is "a stable set of attitudes rather than a stable group of politicians" (Rose 1967: 107). Nonaligned partisanship "is identification with position established by the whole of the electoral party, rather than with factions or tendencies" (Rose 1967: 108).

For a theoretically oriented review and synthesis of the literature on factionalism, see Raphael Zariski (1960) and Norman K. Nicholson (1972).

¹⁴For social/regional and personality/ideological bases of intraparty faction formations, see Robert Michels (1959: 164-184); Raphael Zariski (1960: 34-36); and Kenneth Janda (1970: 110-111).

The analysis of relationship between the parliamentary party and the mass membership party organization outside parliament is best reviewed and summarized in Malcolm E. Jewell (1962).

The now classic theoretical and empirical exposition (with American data) of the problem of relationship between party stratarchies is to be found in Samuel J. Eldersveld (1964: ch. 5).

¹⁵The most representative statements of the decline of ideology hypothesis are Daniel Bell (1960: 369-375) and S. M. Lipset (1960: 403-417).

¹⁶Probably the best critique of the end of ideology thesis is Joseph LaPalombara (1966).

¹⁷The most insightful works enunciating this hypothesis in a wider comparative perspective are Leon D. Epstein (1967) and Otto Kirchheimer (1967).

For works systematically applying this hypothesis to particular countries and suggesting greater appreciation of the complexity of relationship between economic development and transformation of parties and party systems, see Douglas A. Chambers (1964); Sidney Tarrow (1969); and Vincent E. McHale and John E. McLaughlin (1974).

¹⁸Among the notable works in this tradition are V. O. Key (1955); William N. Chambers and Walter D. Burnham, eds. (1967); Walter D. Burnham (1970); and James F. Ward (1973).

¹⁹One can identify two types of studies in this theoretical persuasion: (1) nation-wide sample surveys, e.g., Angus Campbell *et al.* (1954), Angus Campbell *et al.* (1960); and Angus Campbell *et al.* (1966) and (2) community panel studies, e.g., Paul Lazarsfeld *et al.* (1948); Bernard Berelson *et al.* (1954). The data base of these studies is the American voter.

For a wider empirical application of this theoretical perspective, covering more than one Western democracy, see Philip Converse and Georges Dupeux (1962) and Jack Dennis and Donald J. McCrone (1970). Dennis and McCrone (1970: 259) write: "Mass partisanship is important to scholarship not simply as a means of establishing the outcomes of elections, but also as a perspective upon the growth and decay of the party institutions of postindustrial society."

For extensions of the party identification theory to non-Western settings, see Samuel Eldersveld (1970); Akira Kubota and Robert E. Ward (1970); Samuel Eldersveld and Akira Kubota (1973); and Samuel Eldersveld (1973).

²⁰"Institutionalization: is here defined, with Samuel Huntington (1968: 12) as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability." "The level of institutionalization of any political system," Huntington continues, "can be defined by the adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence of its organizations and procedures,"

²¹For elaboration of these now well-known concepts pertaining to party structure, see Maurice Duverger (1963: 4-60).

²²The literature on factionalism in predominant parties is vast and continuously expanding. A good work on factions in the Japanese Liberal-Democratic Party is Nathaniel B. Thayer (1969). Thayer (p. 17) writes: "Through the factions,

five essential party and national goals are achieved. First, the party chooses its leader through the factions. Second, through the factions the party raises and distributes most of its operating funds. Third, posts both in the government and in the party are determined by and through the factions. Fourth, through the factions comes most of the aid an individual candidate gets for the election campaigns. Fifth, the factions serve several profound psychological needs [e.g., the need for identity] of the Dietmen, for which at present at least, there are no substitutes."

For factionalism in the Indian Congress party at national, state, and local levels and linkages among the factions at different levels, see especially Paul R. Brass (1965); Ramashray Roy (1966, 1967, 1968); Mary C. Carras (1970 and 1972); and B. D. Graham (1968).

V. O. Key (1949) still seems to be the most comprehensive analysis of factionalism in the one-party predominant American Southern Politics.

Sublemas or factions in the Uruguan "Colorado" party operate and compete so openly that one wonders whether to treat sublemas as lemas (parties). See Sartori (1970: 383, note 13) and Ronald H. McDonald (1971: 203-207).

²³On communal mobilization of Hindus, see Myron Weiner (1957: ch. 8). On communal mobilization of Muslims, see I. H. Qureshi (1962). On communal mobilization of Sikhs, see Baldev Raj Nayar (1966) and Stephen Oren (1974). For a good work that concerns all these communities and systematically examines the problem of India as a secular state, see Donald E. Smith (1963).

²⁴The literature on political expressions of regionalism in India is too vast to list in detail. See particularly Selig Harrison (1960); Eugene F. Irschick (1969); J. Das Gupta (1970); contributions in Robert I. Crane, ed. (1967); and Hugh Gray (1971).

²⁵This hypothesis, in fact, is not only limited to revolutionary mass movements; it can be expanded to apply to less dramatic, evolutionary social changes and their impact on leadership patterns. As Suzanne Keller (1973: 126) remarks: "Societies successful in the achievement of the goals they have set may either formulate new objectives or settle back and enjoy their achievements. Success may provide the impetus to social change, as there are ever new goals to be realized, new means to be devised, new conflicts and contradictions to be resolved, and new tensions to be released. Under these conditions, one would anticipate a corresponding rotation of elites."

²⁶The fundamental differences between the Moderates and Extremists in the Indian National Congress, which eventually led to the historic Surat split in 1906, are best summarized by Daniel Argov (1966: 20-21): "Both the Moderates and the Extremists came from the middle class, both were reacting towards British rule, and both voiced Indian grievances. The Extremists demanded social equality and political emancipation as their birthright. They drew sustenance from India's heritage and appealed to Indians by invoking religious patriotism, they disparaged the constitutional agitation of the Moderates as "mendicancy" and their stress on apprenticeship as an acceptance of ceaseless political servitude. Instead they called for self-reliance and self-apprenticeship through swadeshi, boycott and passive resistance. For the Extremists Indian patriotism and loyalty to British rule were two diametrically conflicting entities. While the Moderates tenaciously sought gradual reform and could see no halfway-house between order and revolution, the Extremists held that revolution was but rapid evolution, and that peace and order under British rule amounted to national stagnation".

For in-depth "paired" comparative political biographies focusing on one each of the leading Moderates and Extremists, see Stanley A. Wolpert (1962) and Daniel Argov (1967); the former studies Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Gopal Krishna Gokhale, and the latter Surendranath Banerjea and Lala Lajpat Rai.

CHAPTER II

THE SPLIT IN THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS:

THE BACKGROUND

In the fall of 1969, the Indian National Congress suffered a major split; it was clearly the most serious crisis the Congress had suffered in its post-independence history as the ruling party. The significance of the Congress split for the Indian political system stemmed from the centrality to the political process of the Congress-led predominant party system - a system in which a broad-based and inclusive "party of consensus" (the Congress) occupied the dominant, central position, with a multiplicity of legally legitimate, if electorally ineffectual (singly or in combination), opposition parties on the margins. The minor opposition parties, conversing with factions and ideological tendencies of their preference in the ruling Congress party, operated primarily as "parties of pressure" and occasionally, at the state level, as ruling parties - alone or in coalition, but mostly the latter.¹

When straws indicating its possibility first appeared in the wind, the split seemed destined to bring about the end of the predominance of the catch-all centrist Congress party.² During the previous decade, the Congress had already suffered a two-way erosion of electoral support, to more militant

parties both to its right and left, apparently presaging the politics of confrontation between the extremes.³ This led to misgivings and speculations regarding the unstabilizing consequences of the impending Congress schism, as the Congress-centred predominant party system was widely regarded as a major political explanation for the continuance of competitive politics in India (Coleman 1960; and Huntington 1968: ch. 7).

For the most part, these misgivings did not materialize. True, the split temporarily reduced the Congress government at the federal level to an unprecedented minority position, forcing Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to lean precariously and embarrassingly on some opposition parties for survival. It also made louder the expressions of hopes - and fears - of the inevitability of a coalition government at the centre, and musings among leaders of various parties, including some elements in the Congress, about possible and desirable "like-minded" partners. However, the schism paradoxically turned out to be a source of revitalization to the decaying Congress party. For, capitalizing on the new radical leftist image acquired by the party as a result of the split from it of the right-wing Syndicate faction, Mrs. Gandhi prematurely dissolved the Lok Sabha in 1970, and, after a vigorous electoral campaign early in the next year, brought the party back to a predominant position even more formidable than before.

The Background

The immediate sources of the Congress split must be seen against the backdrop of political changes following the demise in 1964 of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1946-1964). After the death in December 1950 of Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhabhai Patel (1946-1950), who along with Nehru constituted the ruling duumvirate,⁴ and after battling with two Congress Presidents (J. B. Kripalani and Purushottam Das Tandon, both of whom resigned in 1950 and 1951, respectively),⁵ Nehru was able to establish a very effective centralization of power within the party and the country under his undisputed leadership as Prime Minister.⁶ This he achieved by himself assuming both the government leadership and the party presidency (1951-1954) and then by turning over the party leadership to his personal nominees over the next decade (U. N. Dhebar, Indira Gandhi, Sanjiva Reddy, and D. Sanjivayya).⁷

However, toward the last year of Nehru's premiership, and more specially after his death, a decentralizing trend in the power structure of the party was discernible, first evidenced by the emergence of an autonomous party presidency under Kumarsamy Kamaraj (1963-1968) and later by the significant role played by a large number of central and state party leaders in selecting Nehru's successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and then the successor to Shastri, Mrs. Indira Gandhi.⁸

For a successful laying out of this background to the 1969 Congress split, at least six major events must be briefly summarized: (1) the emergence in the early 1960s of a powerful faction - the Syndicate - within the party, (2) the "Kamaraj Plan" (1963), (3) the Shastri succession (1964), (4) the Indira Gandhi succession (1966), (5) Mrs. Gandhi's re-election as the Congress Parliamentary Party (CPP) leader following the 1967 general elections, and (6) S. Nijalingappa's succession to Kamaraj as Congress President in early 1968.

The Syndicate

The Syndicate, an informal party caucus, consisting of some powerful state and central leaders, first took shape at the Tirupathi conclave in October 1963 under the shadow of Nehru's declining years. It included, to begin with, Tamil Nadu⁹ Chief Minister Kamaraj, Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister N. Sanjiva Reddy, Karnataka¹⁰ Chief Minister S. Nijalingappa, Bengal's party boss Atylya Ghosh and Bombay city party manager and union Minister S. K. Patil; and although several other prominent Congress leaders later came close to or moved away from it at different time periods, the original Tirupathi group retained its stable nucleus. This informal political club, meeting frequently and taking a more or less concerted position on all important all-India matters, was to play a very significant role in the post-Nehru era.¹¹

Two characteristics of the Syndicate immediately become clear. First, in terms of its regional composition, it was originally a coalition of leaders from the Bengali, Marathi, and Dravidian linguistic regions on the coastal margins of the Hindi heartland, although it later did come to include some strong adherents in the Hindi region (e.g., Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister C. B. Gupta, Bihar's senior parliamentarians, Ram Subhag Singh and Mrs. Tarkeshwari Sinha, and Bihar Pradesh (state) Congress factional leaders, M. P. Sinha, S. N. Sinha, and K. B. Sahay).

Second, although basically pragmatic, the Syndicate was mainly conservative in temperament consisting of prominent Congress right-wingers - S. K. Patil, Atulya Ghosh, Nijalingappa, and Sanjiva Reddy - with only the socialist Kamaraj to counterbalance its public image. Others who moved closer to it around the time of the party split - Morarji Desai with his economic conservatism, C. B. Gupta and K. B. Sahay with their close links with business interest groups, and Dr. Ram Subhag Singh and the three Sinhas (S. N., M. P., and Tarkeshwari) with their ties to the upper-caste (Rajput and Bhumi-har Brahman), prosperous farm interests - further reinforced the conservative public image of the Syndicate. Among these later Syndicate leaders, the socialist Asoka Mehta was the lone prominent Congress left winger to join the group. Kamaraj and Mehta, though sarcastically ridiculed by other Congress leftists, stood the Syndicate in good stead

as symbols of its socialist credentials in the context of India's "politics of scarcity", which makes at least some measure of socialist rhetoric inescapable.

The emergence of the Syndicate in the early 1960s can be linked with the gradual changes in politics that had been taking place since independence at the state and local level. At these levels party organizations were gradually captured by a new type of politician, less educated and less cosmopolitan than the national movement elite which inherited power at the centre from the British, but more at home simultaneously with both the traditional society and the modern political system.

The entrè of these local and mid-level elites into the Congress party can be seen as the product of a dual necessity, both on the part of the party and its newly found adherents. First, the party needed the support of these local influentials for winning elections after universal mass enfranchisement in 1950. After one or two elections, it also became apparent that the expanding rural base of the Congress tended to provide a cushion to a party gradually losing support in urban areas to more radically leftist or rightist parties.¹²

Second, the traditionally privileged rural influentials also needed the new ruling party for the chances it offered for nomination to political offices and for access to the administration which made decisions on licences, permits,

quotas, and loans. This prompted many social groups which had either more or less kept aloof from or had only marginally been mobilized by the national movement - the big landlords, traders, and many other rural communities - to make their way into the party. Taking off from the traditional bases of influence at the local level, this new generation of rural politicians moved into the Congress party, using it as a new vehicle of influence; and they were greatly aided in their move by the democratic legitimization of the traditional dominance through the officially sanctioned Panchayati Raj and cooperative societies, which were soon captured by the relatively prosperous landowners and village merchants.¹³

Third, there was the policy of the Congress Working Committee, especially its powerful subcommittee, the Central Parliamentary Board (the so-called "High Command" of the party), to allow party organizations outside legislatures to compete with Congress ministries at the state level - a phenomenon Prime Minister Nehru did not permit to occur at the national level - resulting in a greater turnover and displacement of the old national movement elite in state politics as compared to the federal. The typical pattern of displacement followed the route of the consolidation of the new leadership, first, in district and state party organizations through demonstrated skills as organizers and balancers of interest, and then by putting up a challenge to the old leadership governing in the state legislatures

(Kothari 1970: 117-18).

The rise of this new leadership had significant consequences for the patterns of politics at the local and state levels, and indirectly at the national. First, the Congress party was forced to deal with the electorate through the intermediaries of patron-brokers, mainly traditionally privileged "dominant" and "entrenched" caste leaders,¹⁴ who naturally had no motivation to jeopardize their positions by radical social change and therefore exerted an effective "deradicalizing" influence on the party. Weiner (1967: 177), in his study of local Congress organization in five districts in five states, concludes:

It is not that Congress has taken control of the district, but that those who had control of the district have taken over Congress.

Consistent with the theorization of James C. Scott (1972: 145), this led to the development of "machine-style" politics, the typical response of oligarchic elite groups to democratic pressures designed

to manage the problem of rapidly expanding political participation while at the same time retaining their control over state policy.

The Congress thus cultivated a machine-like, opportunistic clientele tied to the party and its leaders largely by the flow of material benefits, though it was a machine politics without a cohesive machine, partly because of endemic factionalism inherent in the Indian social structure and partly because of the scarcity of resources available for patronage.

Second, although the new leaders came to play important roles in the larger political system, such as of "gap-closers" between "modern" and "traditional" sectors of society (Morris-Jones 1963:150), of "brokers" between local society and administration (Baily (1963: 60), and of "linkages" between centre and periphery (Kothari 1970: 364-65), the nature of the new leadership of the party contributed to the alienation or defection of many ideologically oriented politicians from the Congress and to the prevalence of issueless factionalism in most state Congress parties.¹⁵

The Syndicate can be regarded as the national manifestation of the transformations at local and state politics outlined above. Indicative of this relationship are the career profiles of the most "visible" Syndicate leaders - Kamaraj, Atulya Ghosh, Sanjiva Reddy, Nijalingappa, S. K. Patil, and Morarji Desai - all of whom stand out in clear contrast to the old national leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Nehru, Rajendra Prasad, and C. Rajagopalachari. First, unlike the old national leaders who had generally entered the national political arena more or less directly, these Syndicate leaders rose to national politics usually after very long experience as state Chief Ministers or party bosses. Second, as compared to the intellectual stature of Gandhi, Nehru, Prasad, and Rajagopalachari, these top Syndicate leaders were generally slightly less well educated and not known for their intellectual calibre (in fact, the most

prominent and powerful among them, Kamaraj, did not go beyond high school).¹⁶

The Kamaraj Plan

The Kamaraj Plan is an interesting link between the Nehru and post-Nehru eras. It reveals the complex political forces at work at the time the Congress party was preparing for the transition from domination by two charismatic leaders in a row - Mahatma Gandhi¹⁷ and Nehru¹⁸ - to a pedestrian collective leadership. The plan marked the final demonstration of Nehru's hold over the party, for he had been lately under fire for India's debacle in the Sino-Indian war (1962); it was also the first manifestation of the emergence within the party of the new power block, the so-called Syndicate.

The "party-before-the-post" resolution was moved, with Nehru's consent, by Kamaraj and dutifully endorsed by the All-India Congress Committee (AICC) in 1963 with the ostensible objective of revitalizing the Congress. The party, as revealed by the 1962 elections and more so by three important Lok Sabha by-elections in the spring of 1963, seemed to be decaying at an incredible pace almost everywhere in the country, including Kamaraj's native Tamil Nadu (where it was engaged in a losing battle for popular support against the regional Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam).

All union Ministers and all Chief Ministers offered to resign from government to make themselves available for party work under the Kamaraj Plan. Nehru was, however, promptly requested by the Congress Working Committee (CWC) to stay on - and was authorized to act as the executioner of the Plan. After careful deliberation, he recommended the acceptance of resignations of six union cabinet Ministers - Morarji Desai (Finance), Jagjivan Ram (Transport and Communications), Lal Bahadur Shastri (Home), S. K. Patil (Food and Agriculture), B. Gopala Reddy (Information and Broadcasting), K. L. Shrimali (Education) - and six Chief Ministers (Kamaraj of Tamil Nadu, Biju Patnaik of Orissa, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad of Jammu and Kashmir, Binodananda Jha of Bihar, C. B. Gupta of Uttar Pradesh, and B. A. Mandloi of Madhya Pradesh).

The Plan, though orginially a brain-child of the Syndicate, was not an unmixed success for it. Nehru, to whom the idea was proposed for his approval, seized upon it and used it to purge, among others, some powerful right-wing colleagues (Morarji Desai and S. K. Patil), one of whom (Patil) was a prominent Syndicate member. This seemed to balance the earlier departures from the cabinet, under pressure from the public and the party, of two principal left-wing figures (Defence Minister V. K. Krishna Menon in 1962 for his alleged mishandling of India's China war and Industrial Development Minister K. D. Malaviya in 1963 for an alleged licence scandal pending inquiry).

The most important accomplishment of the Kamaraj Plan from the Syndicate's perspective was to isolate the right wing, especially rigid, domineering, self-righteous, and puritanical Morarji Desai, who because of his style and policies had made himself a highly controversial figure. At the time of his "resignation", Desai was made to relinquish No. 2 position in the cabinet, and later, when he sought to compensate this loss by taking over the Congress presidency, the Syndicate frustrated him by getting Kamaraj inducted into that office.

The impact of the Kamaraj Plan on the shape of things to come was fundamental. As Michael Brecher (1966: 13) succinctly observes:

The leading candidates [for succession to Nehru], Morarji and Shastri, and a lesser contestant, Jagivan Ram, were deprived of direct power and patronage; indeed, they were removed from that political organ (the cabinet) which would almost certainly furnish the next Prime Minister; so too was Patil, a key figure in the ensuing struggle; all four were relegated to the party's enlarged Central Parliamentary Board, in accordance with the stated aims of the plan. Moreover, Morarji's tactical advantage, as the second-ranking member of the cabinet, was eliminated; but for the plan, he would have become Prime Minister on 27 May 1964 and would have been strategically placed in the battle of "the six days"; certainly there would have been a much higher probability of his confirmation as Head of Government than was the case with G. L. Nanda, who replaced Morarji as No. 2 in the cabinet and became the interim successor to Nehru for almost a fortnight.

The Shastri Succession

On January 8, 1964, Nehru was taken ill with a serious stroke. During his illness an ad hoc duumvirate consisting of Home Minister Nanda and Finance Minister T. T. Krishnamachari emerged in the union cabinet, to which was added two weeks later Lal Bahadur Shastri as a Minister without portfolio. Shastri's return to the government - his resignation under the Kamaraj Plan was widely considered as a precaution by Nehru not to let the list of "Kamarajed" ministers appear partisan - was interpreted as Nehru's preference for Shastri to inherit his mantle. This uneasy ministerial triumvirate, along with Congress President Kamaraj, shared the effective power at the summit of the Indian political system during the last four months of Nehru's premiership.

Four serious aspirants for succession to Nehru originally in the field - Shastri, Desai, Nanda and Jagjivan Ram - eventually narrowed into a choice between Shastri and Desai, in which the former finally emerged as the choice by "consensus". Eclipsing the constitutional prerogative of the CPP in this matter, the succession was largely decided by what Michael Brecher (1966: 59) describes as the "Grand Council of the Republic", an ad hoc federal institutional innovation, consisting of the CWC members (19), all Congress state Chief Ministers (13, excluding two Chief Ministers on the CWC), the deputy Leader and the Chief Whip of the CPP,

and eight special invitees for the occasion (a total of 42 persons).

It would probably be inaccurate to attribute Shastri's success to the Syndicate leaders alone on the CWC (with followers in other party organs), but they undoubtedly played, through Kamaraj, the pivotal role as the managing agents of the succession, and their preference for Shastri did contribute to the cumulative pressure in his favour. In the words of Brecher (1966: 88):

In the last analysis, the outcome was determined by peaceful competition among various interest groups. The decisive factor was the clear majority for Shastri in the three key institutional groups, the Working Committee [CWC], the state party machines, and the CPP, superimposed on the relatively inarticulate but known choice of Shastri by the mass public. The role of the caucus [Syndicate] was to give political form to that real national preference.

The patterns of decision-making and power-sharing under Prime Minister Shastri marked a clear departure from that under his predecessor, Nehru, who was the supreme arbitrator in the government, party, and federal affairs; his role after independence was comparable to that of another charismatic leader, Mahatma Mohandas K. Gandhi, during the late nationalist movement phase of the Congress (from 1920 to 1947). Under Nehru, the CWC, consisting of prominent union cabinet Ministers and most powerful Chief Ministers, functioned as

the sounding board by which the Prime Minister could test the acceptability of new policies as well as an important feedback mechanism by which to assess the reactions of party and state leaders (Kochanek 1968: 307).

A much more complex power structure emerged during Shastri's brief premiership. In the three principal areas of government, party, and all-India affairs, the effective authority came respectively to rest with the Shastri-Kamaraj duumvirate (in that order) in the first, with the Kamaraj-Shastri duumvirate (in that order) in the second, and with the Grand Council in the third (Brecher 1966: ch. 5).

The Indira Gandhi Succession

Only 19 months after his accession to premiership, Shastri's sudden death on January 11, 1966, shook the emergent patterns of power in the post-Nehru era. Nanda was again promptly sworn in as the acting Prime Minister and the politicking for the second succession began.

During the search for Shastri's successor, in all seven candidacies - those of Desai, Mrs. Gandhi, Nanda, Kamaraj, Y. B. Chavan (then the union Defence Minister), S. K. Patil, and Jagjivan Ram - were considered and discussed with varying degrees of seriousness. Reluctance (Kamaraj considered party presidency as the most important political office in a pre-election year) or indications of lack of sufficient support (Chavan, Ram, Reddy, Patil, and Nijalingappa) finally restricted the contest to one between Mrs. Gandhi and Morarji Desai, which the former eventually won by 355 votes to 169 in the CPP.

There were many new variables in the situation surrounding the second succession as compared to the first. These included the suddenness of Shastri's death in contrast to Nehru's prolonged illness, lack of a preeminent leader with the status of the departed leader, Kamaraj's moving above his Syndicate colleagues after his elevation to the party presidency (though not exactly away from them), lack of enthusiasm about any of the candidates among most Syndicate leaders except for unanimity against Desai, and Desai's absolute refusal to be "duped" again by the consensus procedure. In a comprehensive comparison of the two successions Brecher (1966: 228) finds that, as opposed to only two "circles of decision" - the Syndicate, including Kamaraj, and the Grand Council - in 1964, in 1966 one can discern four circles of decision:

the core was Kamaraj himself, with a clear and firm choice [in favour of Mrs. Gandhi], though he may have wavered in the direction of Chavan when unanimity still seemed possible; the second circle was the disunited Syndicate which could not agree on any candidate and only did so when faced with a fait accompli [by Kamaraj and the Chief Ministers]; the third power group was the Chief Ministers' club which, partly on its own and partly under Kamaraj's gentle prodding, played an autonomous role in the process; and finally, the Congress Parliamentary Party had to be convinced in a secret ballot. In numbers these four circles followed an ascending order, 1, 4, 12, and 526.

As to the choice of Mrs. Gandhi, though she lacked administrative experience and was independent and accessible to the left, her assets that weighed with the winning coalition

were quite impressive:

certainty that she could defeat Morarji in the pending contest; wide popular appeal, enhanced by the Nehru name and mantle; the best possible public image of the Congress in the general election, heightened by her association with UP, the largest state in the Union (Brecher 1966: 204).

The impact of the second succession on the power structure within the party and government was marginal, inasmuch as it left unaltered the patterns established after the first succession; all it did was to replace Shastri by Mrs. Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi as Prime Minister kept her primacy in the government decision-making, Kamaraj continued to preside over an autonomous Congress organization, and the Grand Council was left to have the last say in the all-India affairs.

The 1967 Elections and Mrs. Gandhi's Election as CPP Leader

The 1967 general elections opened again the CPP leadership issue barely 14 months after Mrs. Gandhi's succession to Shastri. Even though the Congress Parliamentary Party follows the practice of designating its leader following, rather than preceding, the general elections, the outcome in the previous three elections, with Nehru at the helm of affairs, was never in doubt. A similar certainty was definitely lacking in 1967 regarding Mrs. Gandhi's automatic re-election as CPP leader - and Prime Minister. At least four major factors having bearing on this question may here be

identified. First, the Congress party suffered unprecedented electoral reverses in 1967; not only was its majority considerably reduced in the Lok Sabha, but it also lost its majority in seven states. Though Mrs. Gandhi had vigorously campaigned for the party and was "at least heard, if not heeded, everywhere she went"¹⁹ at a time when an "anti-Congress wave" swept through many states, her critics within the party were prompt to point out that she could not disclaim responsibility for the governmental performance allegedly leading to the electoral debacle.

The second new variable in the situation since the last succession was a definite cooling in the relations between Mrs. Gandhi and Congress President Kamaraj, her principal backer along with his Syndicate colleagues, in 1966. Since then Mrs. Gandhi as Prime Minister had offended the Syndicate by acting independently in the formation of her cabinet as well as in some governmental decisions (e.g., the devaluation of the rupee).²⁰ Kamaraj and his Syndicate colleagues, with their greater influence over the party organization, had quietly ignored the Prime Minister in the selection of party candidates in some states for the 1967 elections.²¹ The net result of this development was the transformation of Kamaraj from an enthusiastic backer of Mrs. Gandhi in 1966 to a "neutral" in 1967.

Thirdly, the Syndicate itself had, however, suffered progressive diminution of its influence since 1964. In 1964

it had virtually determined Shastri's succession to Nehru; by 1966 it had been reduced to being merely one of several principal factors affecting Mrs. Gandhi's succession to Shastri; and by 1967 as a group (except for Kamaraj personally) it played even more insubstantial role in Mrs. Gandhi's re-election as Prime Minister. Apart from Mrs. Gandhi's consolidation of her position during the 14 months of her Prime Ministership, the immediate reason for the Syndicate's weakness in 1967 was that the electoral reverses of that year had been harsher to it than to the pro-Indira faction. Not only did most Syndicate stalwarts such as Kamaraj, Atulya Ghosh and S. K. Patil suffer personal electoral defeats, but the Tamil Nadu (Kamaraj's home state) Congress contingent in the Lok Sabha was reduced from 30 to 3 in the wake of the DMK electoral upsurge there. The only prominent Syndicate leader to be returned to the Lok Sabha was union Transport Minister Sanjiva Reddy, who too was engaged in a losing battle in his native Andhra Pradesh against Chief Minister K. Brahmananda Reddy, a powerful supporter of Mrs. Gandhi.

If the electoral debacle of the Congress party as a whole and the apparent coolness in the relations between Mrs. Gandhi and Kamaraj contributed to the uncertainty regarding Mrs. Gandhi's re-election as the CPP leader, the weakening of the Syndicate as a powerful factor in federal politics tended

to strengthen her position. To this may be added the curious fact that Mrs. Gandhi was the only Congress leader who escaped unscathed from the 1967 party reverses. Reporting on an elite opinion survey carried on in 1967, Michael Brecher (1969: 62), for example, writes:

[T]he attitude of rank-and-file Congressmen to Mrs. Gandhi as PM remained unaffected by the election setbacks - as it had been by specific stimuli (acts or decisions) during the turbulent year, 1966. By contrast, others, notably, university professors and opinion leaders [journalists] were acutely sensitive to the verdict at the polls, many interpreting it as a call for new leadership.

After intense bargaining, the imminent contest between Mrs. Gandhi and Morarji Desai for the Congress Parliamentary Party leadership was averted by a compromise formula, which elevated Desai to the position of Deputy Prime Ministership²² - a move initially strongly resisted by Mrs. Gandhi's "kitchen cabinet" (Dinesh Singh, Asoka Mehta, U. S. Dikshit, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, and Y. B. Chavan) - without, however, the powerful Home portfolio demanded by Desai, who finally had to be content with Finance.

As contrasted to the first two successions, which were virtually decided by the Congress President in league with the Congress Working Committee and the Syndicate in the case of the Shastri succession, and by the Congress President supported by Chief Ministers in the case of Mrs. Gandhi's first succession, the confirmation of her leadership in 1967 was determined by the "Congress President plus few Chief Ministers

plus Working Committee plus pressure group in CPP" (Brecher 1967: 438). The emergence of a powerful pressure group in the CPP, which Brecher (1966: 429) regards "the most significant innovation of Succession III", was, as we will see later, to stand Mrs. Gandhi in good stead in her struggle against the Syndicate, entrenched in the party's Working Committee (CWC).

The behavior pattern of the party's top strategic elite in the 1967 CPP leadership tussle is succinctly summarized by Brecher (1967: 440) as follows:

This time the initial posture of the candidates was reversed: it was Morarji who awaited the call, and Mrs. Gandhi who announced her candidacy from the outset, indeed long before the game began. She did not leave matters to chance, but initiated a vigorous pressure group to ensure a majority in the CPP. Kamaraj was hesitant and non-committal until the last 72 hours. It may well be that his real choice for PM was Morarji - at no point was it exclusively Mrs. Gandhi - but there were three good reasons not to press Morarji's cause: even if he won, it would be by a bare majority, and that would jeopardize the stability of government, as well as that of Congress rule; secondly, partisan behaviour by the Congress President would undermine the party organization; and if he plunged and lost he would be irrevocably discredited, for Kamaraj was now a "stateless person". National, party, and personal interests pointed the way to a compromise consensus, and Kamaraj pursued this with the mastery of crisis politics displayed in Succession I and II.

The Congress Presidential Succession, 1967

In the fall of 1967, Kamaraj was succeeded as Congress President by S. Nijalingappa, the Karnataka Chief Minister. The prolonged and tough negotiations among party stalwarts

over the succession issue, ranging over a month, and the widespread rank and file interest shown in the matter were good indices of the enhanced prestige and authority Kamaraj had imparted to the party presidency during his four-year incumbency.

The succession issue came to a head in late October and early November, 1967, at the Jabalpur AICC session, where a great deal of behind-the-scenes activity was reported in the press throughout the session. However, the party's high command in the CWC, which usually recommends a candidate by consensus (who is invariably elected by the AICC), postponed the matter by a fortnight until its next meeting in New Delhi for lack of unanimity among the top party leaders, as well as in order to enable the Pradesh Congress units to complete election of the delegates for the ensuing Congress session.

The Jabalpur parleys revealed five major configurations among the party's top leaders on the issue of Congress Presidential succession; in addition to the Prime Minister's "kitchen cabinet" and the Syndicate, three party stalwarts, Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai and Union Ministers Y. B. Chavan and Jagjivan Ram, were reported canvassing support of one or the other possible nominees of their preference. While some followers of Mrs. Gandhi put forward the suggestion that the Prime Minister be requested to assume the party presidency as well, she herself was sounding out her top colleagues about nominating G. L. Nanda, a former union

Minister and Congress trade unionist. The Syndicate's S. K. Patil, Atulya Ghosh, and C. B. Gupta, party bosses of Bombay and West Bengal and Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, respectively, opposed both these proposals originating from the Prime Minister's supporters, though they indicated that if Mrs. Gandhi relinquished the prime ministership for the party presidency, there would not be any objection. This was, however, highly unlikely.

The Syndicate strongly advocated extending Kamaraj's term by another year, which Mrs. Gandhi opposed with equal determination. The Syndicate also made it clear that, failing to get the status quo maintained, it would field a candidate of its own choice. After briefly canvassing the nomination of the relatively young right-leaning centrist, Dr. Ram Subhag Singh, the union Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, the Syndicate eventually settled on the extreme right-winger, S. K. Patil. Singh categorically stated that he would not run if Kamaraj was in the field, and later, when Patil himself decided to enter the fray, Singh apparently concurred with Paril's decision.

Opposed to both Nanda's and Singh's nomination, Morarji Desai favoured the nomination of either Patil or Rajasthan Chief Minister M. L. Sukhadia. The Maharashtra's strong man, Chavan, threw his weight behind Patil, and the leader of Congress Harijans (scheduled castes), Jaghjivan Ram, opposed Patil and indicated his preference for Sukhadia.

Kamaraj, true to his characteristic image as a man of few words and a lot of behind-the-scenes activity, waited and watched.

Around the time of the next CWC meeting on November 16, the party's rank and file also joined the search for Kamaraj's successor. Thirty-eight Congress MPs, mostly younger and second-echelon leaders, including the left-wing Young Turks, sent a joint memorandum to the CWC, urging that, while striving for a consensus candidate for party presidency, the CWC must not lose sight of the fact that the candidate recommended should be young, dynamic, and of untarnished public image, as "the Congress has not only to revitalize itself but also to regain the confidence of the people in several states".²³

At the November 16 CWC meeting, Kamaraj, unyielding to Patil's pleadings to continue, finally announced his firm decision to step down. Morarji Desai suggested that the Prime Minister and the Congress President be requested to name a three-member subcommittee of the CWC to ascertain the views of party leaders and sort out a generally acceptable candidate. The majority of the CWC members, however, instead authorized Mrs. Gandhi and Kamaraj themselves to work out a consensus and report to the CWC for approval.

Kamaraj and Mrs. Gandhi separately held several rounds of discussion with party leaders, followed by an inconclusive bilateral meeting between themselves on November 19, at which

Kamaraj canvassed the nomination of Patil while Mrs. Gandhi opposed it, expressing her preference for either Nanda or someone else who could be equally acceptable to both of them.

Meanwhile, the Young Turks in the Congress Parliamentary Party opposed both Patil and Nanda - the former for ideological and the latter presumably for generational reasons. They were inclined to favour Ram Subhag Singh, but when his candidature receded into the background after Patil's entry into the field, they briefly seemed to veer toward supporting Nanda, until they declared a candidate of their own, Mohan Dharja. The Young Turks withdrew Dharja's candidature when Kamaraj and Mrs. Gandhi eventually came up with a unanimous candidate.

By the end of November, after marathon negotiations between themselves and other top party leaders, Mrs. Gandhi and Kamaraj reached a consensus on the question of the party's presidency; they agreed on two names - S. Nijalingappa and M. L. Sukhadia, Chief Ministers of Karnataka and Rajasthan, respectively - both of whom were summoned to New Delhi on November 29 for consultations. On Patil's objection, Sukhadia too was eliminated, and a seemingly reluctant Nijalingappa, one of Syndicate's "inner circle"; was persuaded to assume the party's presidency.

Mrs. Gandhi apparently accepted Nijalingappa as a less unpalatable choice than Patil, who, with the assured backing of the Syndicate as well as of Morarji Desai and Chavan,

appeared poised for success by a comfortable margin, if it came to an open contest. The episode was indicative of the fact that despite Mrs. Gandhi's superior popularity with the masses, the Syndicate and its allies enjoyed a greater hold over the party organization, a point further underlined early next year at the Hyderabad AICC session, where the Syndicate effectively stage-managed the election of all seven elective membership positions on the CWC by sponsoring a slate of candidates either directly belonging to or else aligned with the Syndicate. Among the remaining 13 members of the CWC too, who under the party constitution are nominated by the President, the Syndicate enjoyed a preponderance of nine to five (see Table 2.1).

TABLE 2.1

THE COMPOSITION OF CWC^a CONSTITUTED

IN JANUARY 1968

President:

S. Nijalingappa ^e	Syndicate
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Treasurer:

S. K. Patil ⁿ	Syndicate
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General Secretaries:

Sadiq Ali ⁿ	Syndicate Nominee
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M. V. Rama Rao ⁿ	Syndicate Nominee
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S. D. Sharma ⁿ	Syndicate Nominee
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Members:

Indira Gandhi ⁿ	PM's faction
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K. Kamaraj ⁿ	Syndicate
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Morarji Desai ⁿ	Syndicate's Ally
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Jagjivan Ram ⁿ	PM's Ally
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Y. B. Chavan ⁿ	Syndicate's Ally
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Atulya Ghosh ⁿ	Syndicate
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Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed ⁿ	PM's Ally
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Ram Subhag Singh ^e	Syndicate's Ally
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TABLE 2.1 (Continued)

<u>Members:</u>	
C. B. Gupta ^e	Syndicate
Hitendra Desai ^e	Syndicate's Ally
C. Subramaniam ^e	Non-aligned
M. L. Sukhadia ^e	Syndicate's Ally
V. P. Naik ^e	Syndicate's Ally
K. Brahamananda Reddy ⁿ	PM's Ally
U. S. Dikshit ⁿ	PM's Ally
K. C. Abraham ⁿ	Syndicate's Ally

NOTES:

^aThe following CWC members were nominated by the Congress President to the powerful subcommittee of the CWC, the Central Congress Parliamentary Board (CPB) entrusted with the supervision of the working of Congress governments at the federal and state levels: Nijalingappa, Mrs. Gandhi, Ram, Kamaraj, Morarji Desai, Patil, Chavan, and Ahmed.

Another powerful subcommittee of the CWC, the Central Election Committee (CEC), invested with the final authority in the matter of selection of party candidates for the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabha elections, consists of all members of the CPB plus five more members elected by the party's general body, the AICC. The following members were elected to the CEC at the AICC's New Delhi session in June, 1968: Atulya Ghosh, Ram Subhag Singh, C. B. Gupta, K. Brahamananda Reddy, and D. P. Mishra. Of these, Ghosh, Singh, and Gupta were pro-Syndicate, and Reddy and Mishra pro-Prime Minister.

^eElected by the AICC.

ⁿNominated by the Congress President.

Notes to Chapter II

¹This aspect of the structural features and internal dynamics of the Indian party system are most insightfully outlined in Kothari (1964a, 1964b, 1970: Ch. 5, 1973, 1974); and Morris-Jones (1967 2d ed.: ch. 5, 1964b, and 1966).

²The split created a veritable confusion regarding the proper name to distinguish the two Congress splinters, claiming the same official label of the pre-split party. The Lok Sabha Speaker and his secretariat solved the problem by calling them Congress (Ruling) and Congress (Opposition); the problem with these labels is that the ruling and opposition statuses of the two splinters were not always consistent at various levels of government. The Election Commission chose to differentiate them by labeling them as Congress and C-ngress (Organization); this gives an impression, not wholly true, that the schism was a neat parliamentary party versus mass membership party organization affair. The political pundits of the press generally tended to distinguish them by adding the adjectives Old and New to the common name Congress; this again seems to be a less than satisfactory solution, based as it is on an assumption as yet systematically untested, that the split strictly followed a generational line. My suggested solution is to call one splinter Syndicate in order to distinguish it from the other. But it is not wholly satisfactory. For, although the journalists, who first used the word "Syndicate" to describe a certain power configuration in the Congress, and political scientists (e.g., Brecher 1966) employ it neutrally, the left wing opposition usage of the term betrays a certain degree of ill-concealed derision.

The two Congress splinters also clashed over "the yoked bullocks", the electoral symbol of the undivided party (used to help illiterate voters, unable to read ballot papers, in voting). The Election Commission awarded the Symbol to the Congress led by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, on the ground that her faction had carried the majority in the party. The Syndicate challenged this award in the Supreme Court, which denied the symbol to either contestants. Thereupon new symbols were adopted by both - "cow and calf" by the Congress and "a woman plying a spinning wheel" (charkha) by the Syndicate.

³On the loss of electoral support by the Congress 'middle band' to the militant right and left parties, see Brass (1968: 1177, Note 12); and Kothari, "The politics of confrontation", Times of India, June 29 and 30, 1970.

⁴See Brecher (1959: ch. 15).

⁵See Kochanek (1968: ch. 2-3).

⁶This federal centralization of power was more pronounced in the case of the states with highly factionalized Pradesh Congress organizations (e.g., Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, etc.) than those with relatively cohesive Pradesh Congress parties led by towering personalities of the nationalist movement (e.g., B.C. Roy in West Bengal, C. Rajogopalchari in Madras (now Tamil Nadu), etc.). See Franda (1968) and contributions to Weiner, ed., (1968).

⁷See Kochanek (1968: ch. 3).

⁸See Kochanek (1968: ch. 4) and Brecher (1966).

9 and 10

Tamil Nadu and Karnataka are the new regionally satisfying names of the states previously known as Madras and Mysore, respectively; the change took place in 1968 in the case of Madras and in 1971 in that of Mysore. To avoid confusion, I have used the new names even while referring to the pre-switchover period.

¹¹See Brecher (1966: 18-21); and Kuldip Nayar (1969: ch. 1). For the major part, unless otherwise specified, the descriptions of the Syndicate's origin, the Kamaraj Plan, and the three Prime Ministerial successions are based on Brecher's works cited at appropriate points.

¹²The decline of Congress strength in metropolitan governments in India's million-plus cities, with the possible exception of the relatively new entrants to that category (Ahmedabad, Kanpur, Hyderabad, and Bangalore), is a notable feature of the post-independence period; Calcutta became a Communist stronghold, Delhi became a Jana Sangh bulwark, Madras fell to the regional DMK, and Bombay drifted toward the Maharashtrian parochialist Shiv Sena.

¹³See Carrass (1972); Potter (1964); Narain (1964); Shrader and Joshi (1963), to cite only a few works from the fast growing body of literature on the local level leadership in India.

¹⁴The concepts of "dominant" and "entrenched" castes are the contributions of MN Srinivas (1969: 10-11) and RAjni Kothari (1970: 234-35), respectively. To quote Srinivas, "For a caste to be dominant, it should own a sizeable amount of the arable land locally available, have strength of numbers, and occupy a high place in the local hierarchy. When a caste has all the attributes of dominance, it may be said to enjoy a decisive dominance. Occasionally there may be more than one dominant caste in a village, and over a period of time one dominant caste may give way to another." An entrenched caste, on the other hand, while it meets the chief criteria of high ritual status and economic and political power, may be numerically small, and more often than not it is.

¹⁵This theme repeatedly comes up in the studies of Congress politics in states; see, in particular, Brass (1965); Roy (1967 and 1968); Sisson (1972); and the contributions to the two volumes on Indian state politics edited by Weiner (1968) and Narain and others (1967).

¹⁶See Kochanek (1968: 402).

¹⁷ and ¹⁸

For excellent analyses of the charismatic aspects of Gandhi's and Nehru's leadership, see Erikson (1968) Brecher (1959) and Dettman (1974).

¹⁹Inder Malhotra, "Political Commentary", The Statesman Weekly, February 11, 1967, p. 2.

²⁰The rupee devaluation decision is described by Kuldip Nayer (1969: ch. 3).

²¹Mrs. Gandhi's dissatisfaction with the selection of Congress candidates is noted by the UNI news agency in its interview with Morarji Desai; see the Times of India, January 2, 1967, p. 4.

²²The only other Congress leader to enjoy the position of Deputy Prime Ministership was Sardar Patel (also, like Desai, a native Gujarati) during the period of Nehru-Patel duumvirate.

²³The Times of India, November 16, 1967, p. 1. The description of Congress Presidential succession in this section and that of the party schism in the following chapter are primarily based, unless otherwise specified, on the The Times of India (New Delhi), with full citations restricted, in the interest of economy, to direct quotes and quantitative data.

CHAPTER III

THE SPLIT IN THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS:

THE DYNAMICS AND IMPACT

The Dynamics

The six-month crisis that rocked and eventually split the Congress in 1969 can be conveniently divided into four phases: (1) from the AICC session in Bangalore in the second week of July, 1969, where the conflict between the Prime Minister and the Syndicate first flared up, to the CWC meeting in New Delhi on July 21, where the two factions worked out a compromise; (2) the reappearance of open conflict and its seemingly deceptive reconciliation at another meeting of the CWC on August 25; (3) the failure of the August 25 unity resolution of the CWC and the formal split in the party toward the end of the year; and (4) the finale to the Congress civil war in the mid-term elections of 1971. Each successive phase escalated the factional conflicts among the top party elites to an increasingly larger part of the party until the Prime Minister decided to make a final appeal to the electorate.

The First Round

This initial phase was marked by the first public appearance of the factional confrontation over the nomination

of the party candidate for the Indian Presidency, which had been a bone of factional contention for nearly two months then, and Mrs. Gandhi went to the crucial AICC session in Bangalore with a previous knowledge of the Syndicate's determination to nominate, through a majority decision, a party candidate for the ensuing Presidential election in disregard of her objections.

Mrs. Gandhi's "Stray Thoughts". The drama began in Bangalore. The CWC was having a pre-session meeting on the evening of July 9 to finalize a draft resolution on the economic situation to be presented to the AICC, beginning its session next day, and was half way through when Industrial Development Minister Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed arrived from New Delhi with a note on economic policy from Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi for the CWC's consideration. The Prime Minister, who arrived in Bangalore next morning, later explained that she had "rather hurriedly dictated" and sent her "stray thoughts" on the party's economic policy to her top party colleagues, as it had appeared for a while that she might not be able to attend the party session on account of indisposition.

Mrs. Gandhi's note referred to a recent policy memorandum submitted to the CWC by a noisy band of party Young Turks such as Chandra Shekhar, Mohan Dharia, and a few others, who had virtually made a political career out of regular rehearsal of leftist rhetoric and personal attacks

on the right-leaning Finance Minister Morarji Desai at party and extra party forums during the last three or four years; Mrs. Gandhi went on to point out that "it seems to me that full or partial action is possible on the following suggestions": a ceiling on unproductive expenditure and conspicuous consumption by corporate bodies; nationalization of private commercial banks and a change in their credit policy to make it more favourable to new entrepreneurs, especially in less developed regions; expeditious appointment of a monopolies commission, more autonomy and professionalization of the public sector enterprises, reserving consumer industries for the small-scale private sector and banning the entry of big business into this field; providing more avenues of employment to the young and educated; disallowing foreign capital in areas in which local technical know-how is available; special assistance to small agriculturists and farm cooperatives, and the legislation and implementation of a more vigorous scheme of land reforms aimed at protecting the rights of tenants, distribution of surplus land yielded by ceiling on land holdings and of government wastelands among the landless, prevention of the alienation of landholdings belonging to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and a wage review for agricultural labourers to give them a share in the increased agricultural yields in areas where the "green revolution" had made some headway.¹

Mrs. Gandhi's note, since it stipulated a departure from the policy adopted at the Jabalpur AICC session (1968), sharply divided the CWC. Bank nationalization proved to be an especially contentious item in the note, presumably because, being a central subject under the constitution, it had a direct policy implication for the union government; items such as land reforms and a ceiling on urban property fell under the state list and could be tackled by the usual tactics of the state Congress governments to deradicalize central party resolutions at the stages of legislation and implementation.

It is interesting to examine the reaction of some prominent CWC members to bank nationalization. Mrs. Gandhi's proposal received full support from Ram and Ahmed. Kamaraj too approved her note and suggested, not without a trace of annoyance, that it be straightaway referred back to the government for implementation. Morarji Desai and the Syndicate (minus Kamaraj Patil, Ghosh, and Nijalingappa) offered strong opposition; Patil indicated that the party might split if the Prime Minister insisted on her note, and Desai impliedly threatened to resign as Finance Minister, saying that it would not be for him to implement the nationalization scheme if approved. Chavan, although supporting the move in principle, assumed the role of a mediator and finally managed to get the CWC to unanimously accept a draft resolution, welcoming the Prime Minister's note and calling upon the union and state governments "to take necessary steps expeditiously to implement

the various points mentioned in the note.²

This miraculous unanimity, most characteristic of the Congress-style politics, may be accounted for by reference to a number of factors. For one thing, the Prime Minister herself helped by telling the meeting that she did not mean to insist on an immediate and outright nationalization, but she did feel that it must be kept as a long-term goal of the party. For another, apart from playing upon the general desire to avoid an open split, Chavan pointed out a via media for compromise in the Prime Minister's note itself, which partly read: "either we can consider the nationalization of the top five or six banks or issue directions that the resources of banks should be reserved for public purposes". It was on the basis of the second alternative that an understanding was reached in the CWC to accept the principle of nationalization, but let the CWC "decide when to do it after taking all factors into consideration" (Morarji Desai 1974b: 285). Desai, who was then persuaded to move the resolution in the AICC, vigorously defended, in his accompanying speech, his scheme of "social control of banks", now in force for about six months, as an alternative to nationalization.

The Presidential Nomination. Also to come up for consideration in Bangalore was the nomination of the party's candidate for the Indian presidency, following the death, in May 1969, of the incumbent, Dr. Zakir Hussain. Several rounds

of talk among the top party and government leaders during the past two months had failed to produce a consensus. Mrs. Gandhi had at various stages supported the nomination of either Vice-President V. V. Giri or union Food and Agriculture Minister Jagjivan Ram or union Defence Minister Swaran Singh, claiming a wide measure of support for them, especially for Giri, among opposition parties and non-Congress Chief Ministers. None of these were, however, acceptable to the Congress President Nijalingappa and his top Syndicate colleagues. By mid-June the Syndicate settled on Sanjiva Reddy, a former Syndicate leader now temporarily "depoliticalized" as the Lok Sabha Speaker (since 1967), and went ahead in Bangalore to officially nominate him, disregarding the Prime Minister's wishes in the matter, by a majority decision in the Congress Central Parliamentary Board (CPB), a sub-committee of the CWC. Mrs. Gandhi, backed by Ahmed, proposed Ram - and lost. The balance in the eight-member CPB was tilted in favour of Reddy by Chavan and Desai, who voted with Syndicate's Kamaraj and Patil. Nijalingappa, being the President, and Ram, being himself a candidate, abstained. While it was generally known that Desai would side with the Syndicate, the stand taken by Chavan apparently took the Prime Minister by surprise; she later complained that "some" members of the CPB had misled her regarding their voting intention.

The Prime Minister warned the CPB of "serious consequences" of its majority decision, and expressed herself in favour of a decision by consensus, arguing that the President had to work in close cooperation with her in the government. Thereupon, as Desai (1974b: 287) recollects:

a suggestion was made by some members that Shri [i.e., Mr.] Sanjiva Reddy's candidature should not be declared immediately and that the Prime Minister and Shri Nijalingappa should discuss the matter. We all said that if they agreed on a name, we should all support it.

With agreement still eluding them at a meeting between the two the following day, Mrs. Gandhi later sent word to Nijalingappa that he could announce Reddy's candidature.

Desai's Resignation and Bank Nationalization. The Prime Minister came back to New Delhi on July 13 in a sullen mood. She took a day off from her South Block office the following day, and had a stream of visitors, including cabinet colleagues, party leaders, and some state Chief Ministers. With insufficient information on motives of each visitor, which might have ranged from seeking to mollify Mrs. Gandhi's feelings through expression of support to collusion in what she was up to, it is difficult to make any analytical sense out of the jungle of names of those who called on the Prime Minister. What can be safely assumed is collusion between Mrs. Gandhi and Ahmed, and possibly Ram, in the blow she was about to strike at the Syndicate. Desai (1974b: 288) claims in his autobiography that as early as on the night of

July 14 he was informed by a civil servant that the latter had learned from an officer close to Ahmed that "it had been decided to drop me from the cabinet". Indicative of the Prime Minister's mood was the directive to her cabinet colleagues to cancel trips, if any, and her meeting on July 15 - at her instance - with D. Sanjivayya, a Harijan factional leader and Reddy's adversary in the Andhra Pradesh Congress.

Mrs. Gandhi struck the blow on July 16. Without prior consultation with him, she summarily took away the Finance portfolio from Desai for his "reservations" about "the direction as well as the pace of change" and in order to expedite "an early and effective implementation" of the party's Bangalore resolutions.³ Though Mrs. Gandhi requested Desai to continue as Deputy Prime Minister, the latter immediately resigned to save his "self-respect".

The next two days were marked by endless consultations among top leaders and streams of calls by junior leaders on the Prime Minister or the Congress President either to express support or show concern at the turn of events.

In the midst of mounting tensions, the two overt appeals to reason the following day were a mediation attempt initiated by Chavan, aided by the Chief Ministers of Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Uttar Pradesh, and a neutral appeal by the CPP office-bearers - Lok Sabha Deputy Leader Bibhuti Mishra and Secretaries S. D. Mishra and S. S. Deshmukh - urging the leaders and rank and file to avoid precipitating the crisis.

Chavan's bid to persuade the Prime Minister to restore the Finance portfolio to Desai was unfruitful, as Mrs. Gandhi was not agreeable to anything more than discussing reallocation of some other portfolio to Desai.

On July 18, a direct 65-minute parley between Mrs. Gandhi and Morarji Desai was arranged, largely through the efforts of Gujarat Chief Minister Hitendra Desai,⁴ followed by a 15-minute meeting between Mrs. Gandhi and Congress President Nijalingappa. Under maximum pressure for the restoration of Finance to Desai at both these meetings, the Prime Minister, while willing to discuss new responsibilities to be assigned to him, stood firm in her refusal to give Finance back to him. The day ended with evidence of growing sympathy in the party for the widely respected, if controversial, Desai for the summary treatment meted out to him; even some close supporters of Mrs. Gandhi, like Uttar Pradesh Congress President Kamalapati Tripathi, advised her to retract her action. Also, late that night the Syndicate met at Chavan's house, apparently to decide upon its strategy; and rumour had it that if Desai were to leave the cabinet four other senior ministers - Chavan, Ram Subhag Singh, C. M. Poonacha, and Jaisukhlal Hathi - would also resign.

The Prime Minister responded in a dramatic way to the mounting pressure for compromise; on July 19, simultaneously with her acceptance of Desai's resignation, she got the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Ordinance⁵

promulgated by V. V. Giri, the Vice President acting as President. The ordinance, which nationalized 14 major Indian banks holding some 70% of the country's known bank assets, not only provided an immediate ideological justification for Desai's virtual dismissal from the government, but also effectively relegated the whole affair into the background. The Prime Minister went on the All-India Radio (AIR) to explain the bank nationalization ordinance and its purpose to the nation:

An institution such as the banking system, which touches - and should touch - the lives of millions, has necessarily to be inspired by a larger social purpose and has to subserve national priorities and objectives.

She listed these objectives as:

(1) the removal of control by a few, (2) the provision of adequate credit for agriculture and small industry and exports, (3) giving of a professional bent to bank management, (4) the encouragement of new classes of entrepreneurs, (5) provision of adequate training as well as reasonable terms of service for bank staff.⁶

Mrs. Gandhi's lightning move was a tremendous success within the Congress party; the bank nationalization decision, based as it was on the recent Bangalore AICC resolution, was generally welcomed by all sections, though the extent of this welcome varied. Predictably, Ram and Ahmed, Mrs. Gandhi's "kitchen cabinet" colleagues, gave the decision a big hand; support was also universal among other ministers (the ordinance itself was issued after unanimous approval of the cabinet).

The Syndicate was divided in its reaction. Kamaraj, an old advocate of bank nationalization, and Atulya Ghosh, who had in the past supported the move in principle but had opposed it at the Bangalore AICC, expressed "satisfaction"; Patil and Nijalingappa, strong opponents of the policy in the past, were either tight-lipped (Nijalingappa) or expressed only procedural disagreement, deprecating the "hasty manner" in which Mrs. Gandhi had gone about it to take the sole credit for the measure (Patil did, however, subsequently come out with substantive criticism of the decision). Syndicate ally Chaven, an old advocate of bank nationalization, hailed the measure as an "historic step" towards socialism. Among the junior central leaders, while the Young Turks and some other Congress left-wingers (e.g., K. D. Malaviya, the chairman of the Congress Socialist Forum) were jubilant, the reaction of the so-called "Ginger Group" leaders (e.g., S. N. Mishra, Mrs. Tarkeshwari Sinha, and Mrs. Sharada Mukherjee) was one of guarded satisfaction.

The opposition parties also joined in the controversey from the margins. The right-wing Jana Sangh and Swatantra party expressed opposition to the measure both substantively and procedurally, claiming that the ruling party neither had an electoral mandate to nationalize banks nor was there any justification for an ordinance on the eve of the weekend before the regular Parliamentary session. The Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD) and the Sikh Akali Dal, two other right-wing parties

tied to the support of the Jat farmers and peasants in western Uttar Pradesh and Punjab, respectively, supported the bank nationalization decision. The support for the decision was more solid among the left-wing parties; in addition to the Communist Party of India (CPI), Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M), Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), and Praja Socialist Party (PSP), the left-leaning populist Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) of Tamil Nadu also fully supported the decision to nationalize banks.

Among the major interest groups, while the business and industrial circles showed concern about the "crippling effect" on the economy of recent government utterances and decisions, Gulzarilal Nanda, the President of the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC), welcomed the measure.

The bank nationalization also proved to be popular with the mass public. It triggered off a series of solidary rallies at the Prime Minister's residence in New Delhi, and later when she undertook country-wide tours to mobilize support, she was greeted by big crowds everywhere she went. From then on, the struggle within the party was carried on with actively cheering mass public support from the galleries for Mrs. Gandhi's faction. A metropolitan mass survey, for example, conducted among the adult literates in November 1969 by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion showed:

The Congress split, it appears, has been the beginning of the end of the political fortunes of almost all the Congress leaders of national standing. Not only they

lost one political battle after another to Indira Gandhi, the decline in their standing in popular estimation too has been remarkably rapid. Even the Prime Minister's two senior colleagues, Mr. Jagjivan Ram and Mr. Y. B. Chavan, have not escaped this process of slumping popular stocks.⁷

The popular enthusiasm accompanying bank nationalization improved the fortunes of the Prime Minister in the major party organs, in which the factional conflict was fought and sought to be resolved during this round. The pre-Parliamentary session meetings, on July 20, of the executive committee of the CPP in the morning and that of the CPP general body in the evening revealed a massive upsurge of support for Mrs. Gandhi. In the CPP executive the Prime Minister firmly defended her right to reallocate portfolios among colleagues under the accepted operating norms of the cabinet system. A move by some Ginger Group leaders (S. N. Mishra, Manubhai Patel, Mrs. Tarkeshwari Sinha, Srirama Reddy, C. D. Pandey, and others) to move a resolution requesting the Prime Minister to take Morarji Desai back in the cabinet and restore Finance to him was undermined by the general feeling that the matter should be left to the CWC meeting the next day. At the policy level, the executive backed the Prime Minister on the bank takeover. The CPP general body meeting too was promptly adjourned, in deference to the CWC meeting, after statements by Mrs. Gandhi and Desai, explaining their respective positions.

The CWC meeting on July 21, especially called to deal with the current crisis in the party, revealed the dominant concern in this body to avoid an open split. Congress

President Nijalingappa set the tone of the meeting by a reconciliatory speech, which made it clear that the Syndicate preferred a compromise rather than a confrontation with the Prime Minister. Kamaraj, backed by Atulya Ghosh, was instrumental in scotching a move planned earlier by some members to bring a resolution requesting Mrs. Gandhi to invite Desai back in the cabinet with the Finance portfolio. Chavan's suggestion for leaving the entire matter to the Prime Minister and the Congress President received general acceptance in the meeting. The Syndicate thus abandoned its earlier demand for Desai's reinstatement, leaving Desai, stoically watching rather than participating in the proceedings, with the feeling that he had been left in the lurch by his backers.⁸

Three explanations may be suggested for this anti-climax at the CWC meeting. First, Chavan, an ally of the Syndicate, was now slowly but surely moving towards the Prime Minister's camp after the bank nationalization. Being the leader of one of the most cohesive state contingents of MPs in New Delhi as well as of an equally cohesive Maharashtra Pradesh Congress, his move greatly weakened the Syndicate. Second, the Prime Minister herself took the precaution to soften the Syndicate's attitude by writing to the Congress President that she stood by the CPB decision on the Presidential nomination as also by confiding to Chavan and Kamaraj before the meeting that some compromise could be possible if the CWC did not pass any formal resolution of disapproval on

the Desai affair.⁹ Thirdly, the Syndicate was possibly deterred by the generally favourable response to the bank nationalization decision of the Prime Minister from within the party as well as from the mass public.

The Second Round

The compromise reached at the CWC meeting on July 21 proved to be abortive. The presidential election that soon followed not only revived the old tensions within the party but also enlarged the arena of these conflicts from the top party organs (CWC and CPP executive) to the entire Presidential electoral college (the Parliament and all state legislatures).

Presidential election and factionalism in the Congress. The intra-party conflict made a major reappearance at the CPP meeting on August 6, called by its executive committee to mobilize electoral support for the Congress candidate for the Indian presidency. Both Mrs. Gandhi, who presided, and Congress President Nijalingappa, who attended as a special invitee, addressed the members, but while the latter made a specific appeal for Sanjiva Reddy, the Congress candidate, Mrs. Gandhi talked in general terms, though she did say that she stood by the CPB decision of the Presidential nomination. The meeting was, however, soon seized by a stormy controversy over the question of growing indiscipline within the party. The storm broke out when Nitiraj Singh, an

affiliate of a Madhya Pradesh Congress faction led by the former Chief Minister, D. P. Mishra, referred to a "derogatory" article in a Bihar English daily by Mrs. Tarkeshwari Sinha, charging the Prime Minister with an attempt to split the party. He was backed by the Young Turks and other supporters of the Prime Minister. Mrs. Sinha and other opponents of the Prime Minister reacted sharply, asserting that the article described the true state of affairs in the party. They pointed out that the Prime Minister had done nothing to restrain the unbridled attacks by Chandra Shekhar and other Young Turks on the erstwhile Deputy Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, not only on party forums but outside as well.

As the Presidential election gathered momentum, the air became thick with the rumour that the Syndicate's strategy was to "lie low" until it got its candidate elected as the President of the Republic and then use the untested Presidential powers against Mrs. Gandhi's government.¹⁰

The Syndicate's unusual caution not to provoke the Prime Minister revealed in some of its recent actions seemed to add substance to these speculations. For one thing, contrary to the misgivings surrounding the lack of explicit appeal for Sanjiva Reddy in the Prime Minister's recent CPP speech, Nijalingappa declared on August 7 that he was quite satisfied with the support extended by Mrs. Gandhi to the party candidates. For another, in contrast to the earlier reports that the Syndicate intended to set up Mrs. Sucheta

Kripalani for the Lok Sabha speakership (that fell vacant after Sanjiva Reddy resigned to campaign in the Presidential election), it later sat idle and let the Prime Minister have her nominee, Gurdial Singh Dhillon, a Congress MP from Punjab, installed as the new Speaker. In any case, according to evidence now available, long before the party split the Syndicate leaders had actually toyed with the idea of replacing Mrs. Gandhi as Prime Minister through the drastic measure of a parliamentary vote of non-confidence.¹¹

Despite intra-party conflicts, the Congress, with its majority in the electoral college, still appeared poised for victory in the Presidential election, as most party units, including rival factions at various levels, stood committed to the party candidate. A drastic change occurred on August 11, however, when two Congress backbenchers - Arjun Arora and Shashi Bhushan, both Congress trade unionists - took strong exception to the appeal made by the Congress President to the Jana Sangh and Swatantra electors in favour of the Congress candidate, and asked to be allowed to follow their conscience in the Presidential election. This shocked the majority of CPP members, some of whom, including some Young Turks, asked for disciplinary measure against Arora and Bhushan. However, on August 13, Mrs. Gandhi's two top cabinet colleagues - Ram and Ahmed - came out in favour of conscience voting in the Presidential election, strongly protesting against the Congress President's "sustained negotiation" with "the leaders of the

Jana Sangh and the Swantantra when these parties:

- (1) had set up their own candidate against Mr. Sanjiva Reddy;
- (2) had openly demanded the removal of the Prime Minister;
- (3) had openly characterized the Prime Minister as a person having communist leaning;
- (4) had openly opposed our socialist policies, including the nationalization of banks; and
- (5) had written to the President to withhold consent to the Bank Nationalization Bill thus seeking to propound a new and extraordinary theory of the powers of the President in respect of a Bill duly passed by Parliament.¹²

By August 13, 250 (out of 438) MPs, including 36 ministers (out of 51) had reportedly signed a petition demanding a free vote. At a meeting of the union cabinet called on August 13 by Mrs. Gandhi to explain her position, only two ministers, Chavan and Ram Subhag Singh, expressed themselves against a free vote, saying that the party was committed to Sanjiva Reddy's candidature.

On August 15 the Prime Minister herself lent her authority to the free vote demand. Calling the attention of the Congress President to the sad departure from decision-making by consensus in the matter of the nomination of the Presidential candidate in Bangalore and to his dubious negotiations with the Jana Sangh and Swatantra leaders for support in the Presidential election, Mrs. Gandhi wrote him that "my worst fears are coming true" in the form of a free vote demand by a large number of party members, and that acceptance of this demand "would rejuvenate the party, restore confidence and strengthen unity". She added finally that:

The Congress cannot be merely a machinery for winning the election of candidates chosen by a small group, and by making alliances divorced from policies. It has to be a live political organization of the masses, pulsating with activity at every level. This can be brought about only by our adherence to the ideals and programmes of the party.¹³

The free vote virtually meant "vote for V. V. Giri", the former Vice President who on being denied the Congress party's nomination for the presidency, was contesting as an independent candidate. One of her earlier choices for the office, dropped because of the Syndicate's opposition, Giri now became the unofficial candidate of the rebel Congressmen led by Mrs. Gandhi.

The Congress President vainly sought to keep the party united in the presidential election. As a token disciplinary measure, he suspended from the party Arjun Arora, the first Congress elector to write to the party chief for a free vote. The deviance was, however, apparently too widespread by now to be checked by usual control mechanisms. Personal appeals by Nijalingappa and Desai to the party legislators to vote for Reddy did not cut much ice because of the close identification of these leaders with a particular faction. A similar appeal, issued by the CPP executive by a majority after an acrimonious debate and in disregard of the Prime Minister's objection, aggravated rather than moderated the tension in the party. The Prime Minister's supporters in that body later contradicted the majority claim of the other faction.

Indicative of the mounting acrimony within the party were the Independence Day (August 15) messages of the Prime Minister and the Congress President. The Prime Minister devoted her entire half-hour public speech at the historic Red Fort pledging to serve the "common man" "wherever I am."¹⁴ The Congress President in his message sarcastically wondered whether the new policy of the party was that of "stabbing in the back" the party's presidential candidate! In an obvious reference to the Prime Minister's attempt to bypass the party organization, he concluded with the adage that the eagle, however high it roams in the sky, does not destroy its nest.¹⁵

Links between factionalism in the National and Pradesh Congress Parties. As the factional conflict spread to the states, it became evident that even among the presidential electors in the state Congress Legislature Parties (CLPs), where support for Sanjiva Reddy had so far been secure, chances for cross-voting were increasing. In the final stage of the presidential campaign, the patterns of support for Reddy or Giri in various state Congress parties, as reported in the press, are summarized in Table 3.1.

One obvious point that clearly stands out from Table 3.1 is the preponderant support for the Syndicate's position in the presidential election in most of the state Congress machines. The nearly solid support for Sanjiva Reddy in Pradesh Congress units in Kamaraj's native Tamil

TABLE 3.1
SUPPORT FOR REDDY OR GIRI IN
STATE CONGRESS PARTIES

Strongly Pro-Syndicate ^a	Strongly Pro-Indira ^b	Divided ^c
Assam	Jammu and Kashmir	Bihar
Andhra Pradesh	Punjab	Orissa
Bombay ^d	Himachal Pradesh	Uttar Pradesh
Gujarat		West Bengal
Haryana		
Kerala		
Madhya Pradesh		
Maharashtra		
Rajasthan		
Tamil Nadu		

NOTES:

^aBoth Chief Minister/Congress Legislature Party leader and Pradesh Congress President for whipped voting in the Presidential election.

^bBoth Chief Minister/Congress Legislature Party leader and Pradesh Congress President for free voting in the Presidential election.

^cThe two key functionaries in the Pradesh Congress take contradictory position on the issue of whipped/free voting in the Presidential election.

^dThe Congress Party in Metropolitan Bombay is given the status of a "Pradesh" Congress.

Information about the Pradesh Congress units in the union territories could not be ascertained, except for Delhi, which fell in the "strongly pro-Syndicate's" cell.

Nadu, Desai's Gujarat, Chavan's Maharashtra, Nijalingappa's Karnataka, and Patil's Bombay may be largely attributed to the linkages these top Syndicate leaders and their allies had assiduously established and maintained with party stratarchies in their respective states. Though all these leaders had now come to the centre (New Delhi) - Kamaraj in 1963, Desai in 1956, Chavan in 1962, Nijalingappa in 1968, and Patil in 1962 - they had still managed to maintain their unchallenged positions in the politics of their respective states, effectively arbitrating in the state-level Congress factionalism as "super" regional leaders and as champions of the entire state party in the councils of the party and government in New Delhi.

The picture in other "strongly pro-Syndicate" states, so defined on the basis of the pro-whip stand taken by the heads of the legislative and organizational wings of the state party, needs some specific qualifications to take account of slight variations in this broad category. In Andhra Pradesh, Sanjiva Reddy's home state, though both the Chief Minister K. Brahamananda Reddy and the Pradesh Congress President K. Venkataratnam joined in issuing a "vote-Reddy" whip, two factors tended to reduce its effectiveness. First, charges were made that the Chief Minister, with his close relations with both Mrs. Gandhi and some top Syndicate leaders, got lukewarm after the issuance of the whip and did nothing to restrain some state Congress leaders from canvassing for

Giri, who, like Sanjiva Reddy, was also an Andhran born in Orissa (but not as effective in state politics). Second, the rival Telengana region Congressmen, who, in pursuance of their agitation for an autonomous state separate from Andhra, had recently broken away from the Andhra Pradesh Congress and formed a Telengana Pradesh Congress in defiance of both the state and national party leadership, took a pro-Giri stand.

In Assam, the dominant "ministerialist" faction led by Chief Minister B. P. Chaliha and his associate, B. C. Bhagwati, the Pradesh Congress President, decided to back up Reddy, while the minority "dissident" faction, including the Muslim followers of the union Industrial Development Minister Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, supported Mrs. Gandhi's free vote stand.

In Haryana, with the defection from the party of the factions led by Bhagwat Dayal Sharma (Brahman) and Rao Birendra Singh (Ahir) during the period since the 1967 elections, Chief Minister Bansilal (Jat) was placed, with the help of the Congress high command, in firm control over the state Congress. With friends in New Delhi in the Prime Minister's faction (G. L. Nanda) as well as in the Syndicate (Nijalingappa), the Chief Minister found himself in a dilemma; after joining the Pradesh Congress President P. C. Mittal in issuing a whip in favour of the party candidate, he was reportedly of two minds, with indications that the whip was

unlikely to be effectively enforced.

In Madhya Pradesh, Chief Minister S. C. Shukla and Pradesh Congress President M. L. Gangwal, both leaders of the "ministerialist" faction, issued a vote-Reddy whip, but the "dissident" faction, led by former Chief Minister D. P. Mishra, and about 60 Harijan (Scheduled Castes) and Adivasi (Scheduled Tribes) Congress Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) were reportedly predisposed to defy the whip.

In Rajasthan, the dominant faction of Chief Minister M. L. Sukhadia stayed committed to Reddy's candidature and issued a whip in his favour, while the Finance Minister and deputy leader of the Congress Legislature Party, Mathuradas Mathur, joined in the Prime Minister's criticism of the Congress President's "deal" with the Jana Sangh and Swatantra party in the presidential election. The Harijans and Adivasis, constituting one third of the total Congress Legislature Party membership, were reportedly being influenced by the pro-Indira stand taken by Bihar's Harijan stalwart, union Minister Jagjivan Ram, though the extent of this influence remains indeterminate in precise terms.

In Kerala, though the entire nine-member Congress Legislature Party, along with the five-member rebel Kerala "Congress" stood cohesively behind Sanjiva Reddy's candidacy, this 14-member support in the 133-member Kerala legislature for the Congress candidate should be discounted due to the weakness of the Congress organization as such in this

non-Congress state.

Coming now to the "strongly pro-Indira" Pradesh Congress units, there are only three cases in this category: Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and Himachal Pradesh. In Punjab the Pradesh Congress President Giani Zail Singh came out in support of a free vote, and the Congress Legislature Party Leader Harinder Singh, though he sent out a "vote Reddy" circular, did not issue a formal whip as suggested by the national Congress President Nijalingappa. The Punjab Congress, which like the Kerala Pradesh Congress was out of power at the time, though not as weak organizationally, subsequently fell in solidly behind Mrs. Gandhi.

In Jammu and Kashmir, both the major Congress factions, led respectively by Chief Minister G. M. Sadiq and erstwhile Pradesh Congress President Mir Qasim, supported the free vote stand in the Presidential election. This was not surprising in the light of the past affiliation of both rivalrous Congress factions in the state having a common affiliation at the national level with the Prime Minister, herself a Kashmiri Brahman domiciled in Uttar Pradesh. However, a small group of Congress defectors organized under former Chief Minister Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad in the National Conference (having 3 legislative seats) announced its decision to vote for Sanjiva Reddy. Subsequent to the formal split in the Congress, though, the Bakshi group merged with the Congress led by Mrs. Gandhi.

In Himachal Pradesh, Chief Minister Y. S. Parmar, a widely respected state leader credited with leading this small erstwhile union territory to statehood, managed to get the entire state Congress machine to fall in line with the pro-Indira Congress faction at the national level.

In addition to the remarkably small number of "strongly pro-Indira" state Congress parties at this stage of the factional conflict, a notable point about these states is that two out of the three are characterized by "inconsistent" religious majority/minority status; Jammua and Kashmir and Punjab are Muslim- and Sikh-majority states respectively in an otherwise Hindu-majority federation. The Muslim- or Sikh-diminated Pradesh Congress parties in these two states are basically non-ideological but clearly right-wing and yet they aligned with the left-wing faction of the federal-level party at a stage of the factional conflict when it was not expedient to do so.

Coming now to the "divided" Pradesh Congress units, we find four cases in this category: Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa. In Uttar Pradesh, of the two major Congress factions, led respectively by Chief Minister C. B. Gupta and Pradesh Congress President and Deputy Chief Minister Kamalapati Tripathi, the former aligned with the Syndicate and the latter with the Prime Minister. However, a large number of Gupta's camp followers were reportedly in a mood to cross the state factional lines to support the Prime Minister,

herself an Uttar Pradesh, in her struggle against the Syndicate in New Delhi. A small "centrist" (in the sense of neutrality between the two major state Congress factions) faction led by Pradesh Congress General Secretary Banarsi Das also took a pro-Indira stand.

In Bihar, the three major Congress factions, led respectively by S. N. Sinha, K. B. Sahay, and M. P. Sinha - the so-called "big three" Pradesh Congress oldguards - agreed to get a pro-Reddy whip issued through their commonly agreed-upon protege, the Congress Legislature Party leader Harihar Singh. However, A. P. Sharma, the Pradesh Congress President by common agreement among the "big three", revolted against the state Congress bosses and declared his support for the Prime Minister. So did a sizeable group of younger legislators such as D. P. Rai, L. N. Jha, Dharma Vir Sinha, and others.

The two major Congress factions of West Bengal - the dominant one led by the longstanding state party boss Atulya Ghosh, and the dissident one organized under Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee in the breakaway Bangla Congress participating in the non-Congress, Communist-dominated United Front governments since 1967 - took, not unexpectedly, opposite stands, the former supporting Sanjiva Reddy's and the latter Giri's candidature in the Presidential election. A newly emergent group of younger Congressmen led by the Congress Legislature Party leader Sidhartha Shankar Ray also revolted against the leadership of Atulya Ghosh and aligned with Mrs. Gandhi.

In Orissa, the dominant Congress faction leader, Biju Patnaik, backed by his camp-following Pradesh Congress President, Nilmony Routray, toed the pro-Syndicate line in the Presidential election. However, the Congress Legislature Party leader, Binayak Acharya, rose against Patnaik and took the free-vote stand championed by Mrs. Gandhi. The breakaway Orissa Jana Congress, led by H. K. Mahtab and participating in the Swatantra-dominated governing coalition in the state since 1967, decided to allow its members the freedom to vote according to their conscience in the presidential election.

Congress Factionalism and Opposition Parties. As the polling date for the Presidential election drew close, Congress President Nijalingappa and his Syndicate colleagues were gradually driven to the realization - confirmed by the estimates of the extent of the cross-voting by the Congress electors on the day of polling (August 16) - that there was nothing they could do to prevent a large-scale deviation from party voting in the presidential election. Still, the Syndicate was apparently counting on the offsetting of the free vote within the Congress by support for Reddy from some non-Congress parties. The election results announced on August 20 sadly belied the expectations of the Syndicate; defeating the Congress candidate, Giri was elected as the President of India with the support of the Socialists, Communists,

DMK, Akali Dal, and the Congress rebels. Mrs. Gandhi's success in this round of factional conflict was crucial, as Sanjiva Reddy was clearly "the instrument of Syndicate's new plan to destroy the dominance of the Prime Minister and to elevate the President to a position of decisive arbitrator."¹⁶ The outcome of the Presidential election evidently produced a bandwagon effect within the party in favour of the pro-Indira faction.

The presidential election also provides an interesting illustration of the interplay between the factions within the ruling Congress party and the opposition parties factions as well as the impact of exclusively regional and state parties on the national politics. Soon after Sanjiva Reddy's nomination as Congress candidate for the presidential election and Giri's announcement within hours of that decision to contest as an independent, some Jana Sangh and Swatantra leaders welcomed the choice of Sanjiva Reddy - even though they were in the process of selecting a candidate of their own (C. D. Deshmukh, a former member of the Indian Civil Service and a former union Finance Minister who had resigned due to differences with Prime Minister Nehru). On the other hand, Bhupesh Gupta of the CPI promptly indicated that his party would back Giri (a veteran Congress Trade Unionist) - a lead that finally came to be followed by most leftist parties (the regionalist DMK and Akali Dal also supported Giri). In addition, almost all breakaway "Congress" parties

in various states formed in the recent past by some prominent dissident Congressmen - Bangla Congress (West Bengal), the BKD (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Maharashtra), the Kerala Congress (Kerala), Jana Congress (Orissa), Loktantrik Congress Dal (Bihar), and the Janata Paksha (Karnataka) - joined the pro-Indira Congress rebels in supporting Giri.

Giri's success in the Presidential election was thus determined by the combination of political forces represented by the leftist and regional opposition parties, the pro-Indira "conscience-voters" in the Congress, and some dissident Congress defectors waiting on the sidelines to come back to the Congress mainstream when the factional balance of forces changed in their favour. In the first count, the overwhelming vote Giri received in the non-Congress states of Tamil Nadu (ruled by the DMK), West Bengal and Kerala (under communist-dominated governing coalitions), and Punjab (under the Akali-Jana Sangh coalition government) laid the solid foundation for his large but short-of-requisite majority. In the second count, it was the second-preference votes for Giri by the BKD in Uttar Pradesh that offset the massive second-preference votes for Sanjiva Reddy by the Jana Sangh and Swatantra Party. Thus, in addition to illustrating the intervention of various all-India parties in support of factions within the Congress party, the presidential election also revealed that under certain specific conditions, the purely regional or state

parties like the DMK, Akali Dal, and BKD may decisively intervene in national politics.¹⁷

Party Discipline, Conscience, and Unity. On August 18, Congress President Nijalingappa, after consultations with Desai, Kamaraj, Ghosh, Patil, and Asoka Mehta, addressed separate letters to the Prime Minister and her two colleagues Ram and Ahmed, charging them with having worked against the party candidate in the presidential election and asking them to explain their conduct. This prompted two parallel activities: (1) pressure tactics by the rivalrous factions, the Syndicate insisting on disciplinary action against party deviants in the presidential election and the Prime Minister's faction defending its right to conscience voting, given the extraordinary situation surrounding this election; and (2) unity attempts by intermediaries.

The Prime Minister made her contribution to the war of nerves by issuing an open letter to the Congress MPs on August 18, asserting again that the differences over the presidential election arose neither from a clash of personalities nor from a struggle for political power but from differing approaches and ideologies. She was joined by two senior Congress leaders - G. L. Nanda, the President of the Indian National Trade Union Congress, and C. Subramaniam, the leader of the anti-Kamaraj dissident faction in the Tamil Nadu Pradesh Congress - who wrote separately to the Congress

President, both urging him against treating the free vote demand as a "routine" issue of discipline. At the state level, the D. P. Mishra faction in Madhya Pradesh and some other supporters of the Prime Minister elsewhere (both at the national and state levels) initiated a move to call a special AICC session to censure the Congress President.

The Syndicate's cause was advanced by Mrs. Sharada Mukherjee and Mrs. Tarkeshwari Sinha, both senior Congress MPs; they wrote to the Congress President, demanding a change in the leadership of the Congress Parliamentary Party. Support from the state level came in the form of a unanimous resolution by the Tamil Nadu Congress legislature Party, recommending disciplinary action against the Prime Minister and other violators of party discipline in the Presidential election.

The unity move was initiated on August 18 by union Home Minister Chavan, who, being "ideologically" closer to the Prime Minister and until recently aligned with the Syndicate, became the self-styled intermediary. He met the Prime Minister and the Congress President and suggested,

as a first step, a meeting between them, to be followed by discussion with other senior party leaders. The formula favoured by Chavan consisted of the dropping of disciplinary action against the Prime Minister's faction by the Congress President, and the withdrawal of the move by the Prime Minister's supporters to call for a special AICC session to censure the Congress President.

Chavan's unity bid received support from sources as diverse as the left-wing Young Turks and the generally conservative senior Bihar MPs, Bibhuti Mishra and K. N. Tiwari, indicating, as The Times of India News Service reported, a broad "urge among Congress MPs for preserving the party as an effective instrument of power."¹⁸ The need to find a way to maintain the unity of the party was also voiced by several state party leaders (B. C. Bhagwati, the Assam Pradesh Congress President; K. Brahamananda Reddy, the Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister; the "unity Marchers" of the Delhi Pradesh Congress; C. B. Gupta, the UP Chief Minister).

However, despite this growing desire for unity among the MPs and mid-level party elites, the prospects for peace between the warring Congress factions appeared dim because of the intransigence of the top leaders involved. Congress President Nijalingappa, backed particularly by Desai and

Kamaraj, stood adamant on "disciplining" the violators of the party norm, and ruled out any meeting with the Prime Minister unless she made amends for her allegations of the Syndicate-Jana Sangh-Swatantra conspiracy to oust her from power. Mrs. Gandhi, on the other hand, refused to withdraw her allegation and questioned the right of the Congress President to take disciplinary action against party MPs "over the head" of the leader of the CPP.

The continuing cleavage among the top party leaders again tended to work downward and dissipate the widespread desire for unity among the lower-echelon leaders, forcing them to take sides in the conflict. The supporters of the Prime Minister, assembled at the residence of D. Sanjivayya on August 23, unanimously passed a resolution, saying that they felt that:

the Prime Minister has given new dimensions to the Congress and has brought it closer to the people on the basis of our accepted socioeconomic programme. We therefore urge that no move which may harm the unity of the party should be made and a new atmosphere be created for implementation of the Congress programme.¹⁹

The following day, the Young Turks, in an even more strongly worded press release, warned that, in taking disciplinary action against the free voters in the presidential election, the CWC would act on its own peril.

On the other hand, 70 pro-Syndicate MPs called on the Congress President on August 21 and demanded immediate suspension of Mrs. Gandhi and her two senior cabinet colleagues,

Ram and Ahmed, from the party for leading the free-vote campaign in the presidential election and thereby getting the party candidate defeated. This was followed up by a strongly worded letter to the Congress President signed by 62 Congress MPs, calling for an emergency meeting of the CPP to elect a new leader to replace Mrs. Gandhi; in addition to repeating the charge of the breach of party discipline by her in the presidential election, it accused Mrs. Gandhi and her three minority community lieutenants, Ram (a Harijan), Ahmed (a Muslim), and Sardar Swaran Singh (a Sikh) of having employed caste and communal (religious) appeals in the factional feud.

The pressure tactics were carried on with an eye on the expected showdown between the two factions at the CWC meeting called by the Congress President on August 25 to deal with the crisis in the party. To the surprise of all, and in the best tradition of the Congress-style politics, the crucial two-and-half hour meeting "unanimously" passed a unity resolution, averting the impending split in the party. The resolution was moved by Y. B. Chavan, who earlier had been unsuccessful in his attempt to arrange a direct meeting between the Prime Minister and the Congress President prior to the CWC meeting. Now fully aligned with the pro-Indira faction, Chavan gave his erstwhile allies in the Syndicate a face-saving device in the form of this unity resolution, to bow to the demonstrated strength of the Prime Minister in the CPP and the country. The resolution, drafted in close

consultation with the Prime Minister and her close associates (Ram, Ahmed, C. Subramaniam, and K. Brahmananda Reddy), was a clear rebuff to the Syndicate. Not only did it completely bypass the issue of disciplinary action raised by the Syndicate with token references to "mistakes made on all sides," the "painful and unfortunate" episode of cross-voting against the party's presidential candidate, and to the need for the party President and the Prime Minister "to work harmoniously and with mutual understanding", but it also recognized that the leader of the Parliamentary Party, as the head of the federal government, has "wider responsibilities", in addition to the implementation of party policies, "to the country as a whole in the national as well international sphere."²⁰ By another resolution, the allegations against the Congress President of collusion with the Jana Sangh and Swatantra against the Prime Minister were now stated to have been based on "wrong assumptions . . . [and] information available at the time, and, therefore, . . . untenable."²¹

The Syndicate had, by the time of the CWC meeting, become reconciled to the futility and ridiculousness of disciplinary action against such a large number of free voters in the presidential election; all they probably wanted now was an amicable settlement honourable to them. At the CWC meeting, Kamaraj, Desai, Patil, and Ghosh reacted sharply to the "biased" resolution moved by Chavan, and vainly tried to have the resolution "dissapprove" the conduct of the free voters

in the presidential election (with suspended disciplinary action); Nijalingappa supported them, but "he spoke more in anguish than in anger."²²

But the Syndicate failed to have its way, as the majority of CWC members strongly supported the unity resolution, apparently under the apprehension of "incalculable consequences" of a split in the party. As is evident from Table 3.2, two significant developments, both resulting from the bandwagon effect following the outcome of the presidential election, determined this unqualified success of the pro-Indira faction against the Syndicate. First, the defection to the pro-Indira faction of erstwhile Syndicate-supporters Chavan and Maharashtra Chief Minister V. P. Naik greatly weakened the Syndicate. Secondly, some pro-Syndicate members, though they did not fully shift their loyalties, took a reconciliatory stand at the CWC meeting. These included the union Railway Minister Ram Subhag Singh; UP, Gujarat, and Rajasthan Chief Ministers C. B. Gupta, Hitendra Desai, and M. L. Sukhadia, respectively; Kerela leader K. C. Abraham and AICC General Secretaries P. Venkatasubbiah, Sadiq Ali, and S. D. Sharma. These soft-liners were apparently responding (1) to the anxiety to keep themselves from falling from power on account of a split in the party (the union Minister Singh and the Chief Ministers of UP, Gujarat, and Rajasthan), (2) to the desire to keep a federal political outlet in a United Congress party ruling in New Delhi for Congress politicians

TABLE 3.2

LINE-UP IN THE AUGUST 25 CWC MEETINGS

Hard Core Syndicate, wanting CWC to disapprove conduct of free voters in Presidential election	Pro-Syndicate, but supporting the CWC unity resolution	Earlier pro-Syndicate, but now pro-Indira and supporting the CWC unity resolution	Hard-core pro-Indira faction
Nijaplingappa	Ram Subhag Singh	Chavan	Indira Gandhi
Kamaraj	K. C. Abraham	V. P. Naik	Ram
Morarji Desai	C. B. Gupta		Ahmed
S. K. Patil	M. L. Sukhadia		U. S. Dixit
Ghosh	P. Venkatasubbiah		C. Subramaniam
Hitendra Desai	S. D. Sharma		K. B. Reddy
	Sadiq Ali		

in a state now under a non-Congress governing coalition (K. C. Abraham of Kerala), or (3) to the vested interest of the party bureaucrat-politicians in the continuity of the Congress (the three AICC General Secretaries).

The Third Round

The CWC unity resolution of August 25 merely papered over a deep sense of hostility between the two factions. The controversies, which had sharply divided the Congress elite since July, were soon reopened with a greater vehemence than ever and factional intransigence was carried to such a high pitch as to eventually split the party. Also, in addition to the CWC and CPP at the national level and the corresponding bodies in the state Congress parties that constituted the major arenas of factional feud in the previous round, the conflict in this terminal phase escalated to one more party body, the AICC. True, the sparks leading to the current conflict had first appeared at the Bangalore AICC in July, but it was then restricted to the party oligarchs in the CWC and CPB, with the AICC rank and file looking on. During this round, the showdown between the two warring factions in three institutional organs - the CWC, the CPP, and the AICC - finally revealed the patterns of the party split at the national level; the situation in the party rank and file in the states remained fluid for some time, though it was easy to discern the alignment patterns of the leading institutional and factional leaders.

The Reopening of the Conflict. Hardly had the ink on the August 25 unity resolution dried up when fallouts from the previous rounds of conflict started appearing and kept building up the tension throughout the remainder of August and September. In early September the Prime Minister began an intensive tour of different states, with the obvious intention of mobilizing grass-roots and mass support in the party and the country in her favour. She separately addressed party workers and mass public rallies wherever she went, and typical of the themes emphasized by her was her speech at Unnao (UP), in which she pointed out that two generations before Mahatma Gandhi's "revolutionization" of the Congress had provoked some people to leave the organization, but instead of getting weaker the Congress had become much more reflective of the popular aspirations. The same thing might happen now, but she would not relent in her "bitter fight" against the "vested and reactionary" elements.

The Syndicate leaders first indulged in a bit of self-pity and self-reproach, and then revengefully began, slowly but surely, to move towards a final confrontation with the Prime Minister. Sanjiva Reddy wondered aloud how his name had come to be associated with the "wretched" Syndicate, and S. K. Patil complained about the "soft line" taken by his Syndicate colleagues at the August 25 CWC meeting, saying that he was the only person who had "roared like a lion" in the meeting. To this, Nijalingappa replied that but for the

unexpectedly mild stand taken by Patil and Ghosh, the outcome of the meeting would have been entirely different.

It also dawned upon the Syndicate leaders that they had to act in unison to salvage their position in a last-ditch battle against the Prime Minister or else write off their leadership in the party. Partly acting with an injured conscience for having earlier left Desai in the lurch and perhaps also motivated by the desire to enlist his active support, Congress President Nijalingappa reopened the Desai affair which had virtually lapsed subsequent to the August 25 unity resolution. On August 27, on his way to Karnataka, he told press reporters in Hyderabad that the question of Desai's reinstatement in the cabinet was still alive and that he would have to report to the CWC about the outcome of his negotiations with the Prime Minister under the terms of the July 21 CWC resolution. The Prime Minister's reaction to this came in her speech to the valedictory meeting of the CPP on August 29, at the end of the Parliament's monsoon session. Citing the Attlee-Laski episode in the British Labour Party, Mrs. Gandhi asserted the "unchallengeable" discretion of the Prime Minister in regard to the composition and the policy of the government under the operating norms of the parliamentary system of government. Other top leaders also joined in the issue; in a speech in Ahmedabad on September 6, Morarji Desai exhorted Mrs. Gandhi to admit her "mistakes" in the interests of the party, to which Jagjivan Ram replied in a speech in

Patna the next day that the questions of "mistakes" did not arise. The Prime Minister firmly stuck to her position when Nijalingappa met her on September 8 and sought to formally reopen the Desai affair.

The lower-echelon leaders also followed the top leaders in reopening the conflict. On September 19, 13 pro-Syndicate MPs filed a petition in the Supreme Court, coinciding with a similar petition by some opposition parties, alleging irregularities in the presidential election campaign and challenging the validity of Giri's victory. The rumblings at the state level appeared in Tamil Nadu, where the supporters of Kamaraj, with their firm control over the Pradesh and all District Congress organizations, forced the Pradesh Congress President C. Subramaniam, who had chosen to support Mrs. Gandhi in the current factional conflict, to resign and make room for Pujari Kakhan, a strong supporter of Kamaraj. As if in reply to this, the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress, acting under Chavan's prodding, held a party shivir (camp) in Bombay (September 18) in support of the Prime Minister's policies.

By October, to the prevailing atmosphere of hostility was added a strong conspiratorial element. In the second week of October, the information leaked out of the party headquarters at 7, Jantar Mantar Road, New Delhi, that the Congress President was just about to inform Subramaniam that he had ceased to be a CWC member concurrent with his ouster from the

presidency of the Tamil Nadu Pradesh Congress, which was the base for his ex-officio membership of the AICC (and subsequently his appointment to the CWC). It was also rumoured that the Congress President planned to direct the Pradesh Congress organizations in Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh to elect new Presidents, as the incumbents - Kamalapati Tripathi and K. Venkataratnam, both owing allegiance to the pro-Indira faction - had since joined the respective state governments as Ministers. (There was a 1951 CWC resolution, relaxable in special cases at the discretion of the Congress President, against the simultaneous assumption of both party organizational and governmental offices by the same person). Moreover, within the parliamentary party itself some pro-Syndicate elements, including as senior a leader as Desai, expressed their "fear" (read threat) that Mrs. Gandhi's government might be toppled in the ensuing winter session of the Parliament; this betrayed their determination to embarrass Mrs. Gandhi by either abstaining or perhaps even voting against her government in Parliamentary divisions. Finally, the Syndicate leaders were planning to indict the government in the next CWC meeting for its alleged "failure" to implement policies other than bank nationalization contained in the party's ten-point programme.

To these challenges within the parliamentary party and the party organization outside the Parliament, Mrs. Gandhi responded by seeking support from some opposition parties

to keep her government from being toppled and by mobilizing support among the AICC rank and file in order to cut short Nijalingappa's tenure as Congress President. Because the Parliament was currently in recess and the winter session did not commence until mid-November, the problem of getting some opposition parties to support the government in parliamentary divisions was not of utmost urgency. However, the Prime Minister and her supporters were sure that in case of 50 or 60 pro-Syndicate congress MPs voting against the government, an equal number or more of opposition MPs would be willing to prop her government up.

On October 8, the Prime Minister and five other CWC members supporting her - Chavan, Ram, Ahmed, Dikshit, and Subramaniam - addressed a letter to the Congress President, protesting against his "arbitrary orders removing Mr. C. Subramaniam from the Congress Working Committee and Mr. Kamalapati Tripathi and Mr. K. Venkataratnam and some others from various offices in the organization." They also called upon the Congress President to call in early CWC, as well as an AICC meeting "to consider the entire political situation."²³ In his reply, the Congress President explained the untenability of the continuance of Subramaniam, Tripathi, and Venkataratnam in their positions in the party in accordance with a 1951 CWC resolution and brushed aside the demand for the CWC and AICC meetings, saying "what new developments you have in mind that necessitates urgent consideration of the entire political situation is not clear to me."²⁴

On October 15, the Prime Minister simultaneously took two drastic steps in her fight against the Syndicate. First, she asked four junior ministers in her government - M. S. Gurupadaswamy, Parimal Ghosh, J. B. Muthyal Rao, and Jagannath Pahadia - to resign in order to enable her "to bring about certain changes which are necessary for a more cohesive and positive direction of work of the council of Ministers."²⁵ Since all the four junior ministers thus dropped were either closely associated with some top Syndicate leaders (Gurupadaswamy with Nijalingappa and his former PSP colleague Asoka Mehta, Parimal Ghosh with Atulya Ghosh, Pahadia with Morarji Desai and Rajasthan Chief Minister Sukhadia) or engaged in political activities unpalatable to the pro-Indira faction (Rao had been campaigning for the ouster of Brahamananda Reddy as Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister), the move was apparently a warning to the pro-Syndicate senior ministers in Mrs. Gandhi's government - Ram Subhag Singh, C. M. Poonacha, Jaisukhlal Hathi, etc. - to either shift loyalty or leave.

Second, the Prime Minister and her supporters initiated a signature campaign to call a special AICC session to rescind the decision taken at the Faridabad AICC session (April 1969) to extend Nijalingappa's tensure as Congress President by virtue of postponing party organizational elections by a year (pending the revision of the party's constitution at the Bangalore AICC session).

The Spreading of Conflict to the states. The non-confidence move against the Congress President soon spread to the states. The pattern of support for the two factions in various states, as reported in the press, is summarized in Table 3.3. It is interesting to compare the respective position of the two factions in different states at this point with the pattern of alignment in state Congress parties at the time of the presidential election in mid-August (Table 3.1). The obvious change since then is the reversal of the overall situation; the Syndicate which had been the stronger faction then, was now the weaker. More specifically, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Assam have moved from the "strongly pro-Syndicate" cell to the "strongly pro-Indira" one, and Kerala and Haryana from "strongly pro-Syndicate" cell to the "divided" one. In addition, though the cell position of the then "divided" states remains unchanged, the press reports indicated that the pro-Syndicate leaders in these states were increasingly losing their rank and file supporters to the pro-Indira leaders. The radical ideological posture taken by the Prime Minister and the clear indication of a mass upsurge in her favour were obviously the main factors behind this swift change in factional alignment in the states; only the top Syndicate leaders could manage to withstand this swift pro-Indira wave and hold on to their entrenched positions within the party in their home states - Kamaraj in Tamil Nadu, Desai in Gujarat,

TABLE 3.3

THE AICC REQUISITION MOVE: PATTERNS OF SUPPORT
OR OPPOSITION IN STATES

Strongly pro-Syndicate ^a	Strongly pro-Indira ^b	Divided ^c
Bombay ^d	Andhra Pradesh	Bihar
Gujarat	Assam	Haryana
Karnataka	Himachal Pradesh	Kerala
Tamil Nadu	Jammu and Kashmir	Uttar Pradesh
	Maharashtra	West Bengal
	Orissa	
	Punjab	
	Rajasthan	

NOTES:

^aBoth Chief Minister/Congress Legislature Party leader and Pradesh Congress President favour the AICC requisition move.

^bBoth Chief Minister/Congress Legislature Party leader and Pradesh Congress President favour AICC requisition move.

^cThe two key functionaries in the Pradesh Congress unit take contradictory position on the issue.

^dThe Congress party in Metropolitan Bombay is given the status of a "Pradesh" Congress.

Information about Pradesh Congress units in all union territories could not be ascertained, except for Delhi and Goa, which fell in the "divided" cell; Pondicherry, which fell in the "strongly pro-Syndicate" cell; and Tripura, which fell in the "strongly pro-Indira" cell.

Nijalingappa in Karnataka, and Patil in metropolitan Bombay.

In order to counteract the move to dislodge Congress President Nijalingappa, a "little summit" of top Southern Syndicate leaders - Nijalingappa, Kamaraj, Sanjiva Reddy and K. C. Abraham - was held in Bangalore on October 20. The leaders reportedly sought to evolve a strategy whereby the southern AICC delegates were to be warned against signing the requisition letter that amounted to an expression of non-confidence in Nijalingappa, a southern Congressman of integrity, and thereby partaking in weakening the southern influence in the ruling party. They also perhaps considered instructing their supporters in the CPP to abstain or vote against the government during some crucial debates in the coming winter session of the Parliament.

The Vanishing Peace-Makers. The peace-makers, a vanishing species especially at the national level, appeared again on the scene in the last week of October. With Chavan, the principal peace-maker of the previous two phases of conflict, now having fully defected from the Syndicate to the Prime Minister's camp, the mediators this time came from the group of leaders having an immediate vested interest in the party unity: Ram Subhag Singh, Mrs. Gandhi's pro-Syndicate Railway Minister, and Gujarat and Karnataka Chief Ministers Hitendra Desai and Virendra Patil (both pro-Syndicate) and Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Brahmananda Reddy (pro-Indira). With the hardening of attitudes on both

sides, the peace-makers were hard put to devising workable formulas, and failed even in getting the Prime Minister and the Congress President to agree to have a direct talk.

The Confrontation. The crucial and long-awaited meeting of the CWC, especially called to deal with the current crisis in the party, assembled on November 1. Four days before this meeting, the Congress President addressed a long, acrimonious letter to the Prime Minister, apparently purporting to be a virtual indictment against her to be considered at the ensuing CWC meeting. In a crucial paragraph of the letter, Nijalingappa listed the charges against the Prime Minister:

I have no doubt that the vast majority of Congressmen and lovers of democracy in our country have been baffled and distressed by your reluctance to accept the decision of the Parliamentary Board [CPB]; your wrath at being outvoted and your references to the grave "consequences that will follow"; your peremptory dismissal of Shri Morarji Desai which could only be understood as one of the grave consequences that you foretold; your repeated refusal to issue a whip to the members of the Congress Parliamentary Party or even appeal to the electors, in spite of the moral duty cast on you as Leader of the Congress Parliamentary Party and repeated requests that I and the Executive Committee of the Parliamentary Party made to you; your support of the allegations made by Shri Jagjivan Ram and Shri Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed; your contention that the "untenable" story had "removed the basis" of the candidature of the Congress nominee, and your support to the demand for a "free vote" or "conscience vote" knowing full well that this was to be a vote for a candidate of the Communist Party and the Muslim League, and that would lead to the defeat of the Congress candidate and the eventual disintegration of the party.²⁶

Just a day before the CWC meeting, the Congress President dropped three pro-Indira members - Subramaniam, Ahmed, and Sharma - from its membership and withdrew invitations earlier issued to them for the November 1 meeting. Subramaniam, elected to the CWC by the AICC, was removed on the ground that being an ex-officio AICC member in his capacity as the Tamil Nadu Pradesh Congress President, he ceased to be a member of the AICC - and therefore of the CWC - as a sequel to his forced resignation from the Pradesh party presidency; Ahmed, a nominated member of the CWC, was dismissed because, as the Congress President put it, "I no longer have the confidence that I had in you when I nominated you to the [Congress] Working Committee";²⁷ Sharma, appointed to the CWC as one of the AICC General Secretaries by the Congress President, was also dismissed for having lost the confidence of the President (it was reportedly Sharma who had earlier leaked out the drafts of Nijalingappa's letters to Subramaniam and others, which were then not sent out).

The Congress party irrevocably split, with two separate CWC meetings on November 1, one at the party headquarters at 7, Jantar Mantar Road, New Delhi, and the other at the Prime Minister's residence. The official CWC meeting, attended by 11 of the 21 members, rejected outright the requisition for a special AICC session claimed to have been signed by 405 of 703 members of that body; the Syndicate cast doubt on the genuineness of at least 100 signatures, alleging

that some signatories were not even members of the AICC and that government influence was used to collect signatures. The pro-Indira rump of the CWC challenged the decision of the "truncated" CWC to reject the requisition as an attempt to stifle internal democracy within the party, and decided to convene a special AICC session on November 22-23, in New Delhi, to elect a new party president and a new CWC.

The following day, the Syndicate CWC strongly warned the rebel requisitionists against holding an "unconstitutional" AICC session and urged them to retrace their steps and join in the efforts to restore discipline and unity in the party. The pro-Indira CWC summarily brushed aside the threat and rejected the unity appeal as not motivated by sincerity.

The pattern of split at the final showdown in the CWC meeting on November 1 is presented in Table 3.4; it is instructive to compare the line-up at this meeting with that at the August 25 meeting, when the unity resolution was passed prior to the reopening of the conflict in this final phase (refer back to Table 3.2). The comparison of the two tables shows that except for the "pull" of polarization making for the movement of the compromisers of both pro-Syndicate and pro-Indira leanings in the "appropriate" directions of the hard core factional categories, there are no wild realignments (except that of Rajasthan Chief Minister Sukhadia) on a scale observed earlier in this section in the case of Pradesh Congress leaders (Tables 3.1 and 3.3). This is indicative

TABLE 3.4

LINE-UP IN THE NOVEMBER 1 CWC MEETING

Pro-Syndicate	Pro-Indira
Nijalingappa	Indira Gandhi
Kamaraj	Chavan
Morarji Desai	Ram
S. K. Patil	Ahmed
Ghosh	Dikshit
Ram Subhag Singh	Subramaniam
Venkatashubbiah	Sharma
Sadiq Ali	Sukhadia
Hitendra Desai	Naik
Gupta	K. B. Reddy
Abraham	

of the fact that the attitudes at the top party elite level had hardened into more stable factional loyalties than at the lower levels.

The Mediation That Failed. A desperate and futile attempt to bring the already split high command of the party together was made by the Congress Chief Ministers, whose governments in their respective states promised to be the immediate casualties of the schism in the national party. Notable about the peace-makings in this final round of conflict is the fact that whereas in the previous rounds some central leaders like Chavan and Ram Subhag Singh were just as active in mediation as the state leaders, the only mediators now left in the field were the state Chief Ministers.

The Assam Chief Minister, B. P. Chaliha, was the first peace-maker to appear on the scene. An erstwhile Syndicate ally, Chaliha had currently turned "neutral", but not without betraying which side of the fence he would jump on in case the party did finally and irrevocably split. With his final loyalties tagged to the pro-Indira faction, he made an impassioned appeal to both sides to shed rigidity and settle the outstanding disputes amicably and save the Congress organization from disintegration and the country from lapsing into political instability both at federal and state levels. He was immediately joined by six other Chief Ministers - UP's C. B. Gupta, Gujarat's Hitendra Desai, Karnataka's

Virendra Patil, Rajasthan's M. L. Sukhadia, Andhra's K. Brahmananda Reddy, and Haryana's Bansilal - in finding a way out to save the unity of the party. In their "shuttlecock" diplomacy, the Chief Ministers found that the Syndicate would not consider any peace formula which did not provide the restoration of the status quo as on August 25, when the CWC passed Chavan's unity resolution; this involved the annulment of the expulsion of the three pro-Indira CWC members by the Congress President and the withdrawal of the requisitioned AICC meeting to elect a new party president by the Prime Minister and her supporters. The Prime Minister's camp, on the other hand, stood firm on its demand for a requisitioned AICC to elect a new party president, or else agreed to let Nijalingappa continue in his present position provided he reconstituted the CWC and the CPB in consultation with the Prime Minister. After two days of labour the Chief Ministers gave up on November 3, as they failed to discover a meeting ground between the Prime Minister and the Congress President.

Another unity move was initiated on November 5 by Karnataka Chief Minister Virendra Patil, a fellow Karnataki of Nijalingappa and an ally of the Syndicate. He was joined in his efforts by K. C. Abraham, a pro-Syndicate leader of the Kerala Pradesh Congress. After day-long efforts, a direct meeting between the Prime Minister and the Congress President was arranged. On November 6, Mrs. Gandhi invited Nijalingappa

for a meeting at lunch, to be followed by talks over dinner at the latter's house. The discussion at the lunch meeting ended in an impasse, and the dinner parleys were called off by Mrs. Gandhi. In addition to Nijalingappa's insistence on the restoration of the status quo as it obtained at the Bangalore AICC session in July (implying Morarji Desai's reinstatement in the government, among other things), the hitch that spiked the meeting related to the basis on which fresh organizational elections were to be held within the party. Mrs. Gandhi, apparently eager not to allow the Syndicate more time to mobilize organizational support in its favour, insisted that elections to the higher party bodies should be held on the basis of the existing delegates. Nijalingappa, on the other hand, maintained that the elections should take place beginning with the Mandal Congress Committee at the base and proceeding upwards, as "limited" elections might be unconstitutional.

The following day, Mrs. Gandhi addressed a hard-hitting, six-page open letter to the AICC members on "the crisis in the Congress and in the nation", in which, among other things, she asserted:

What we witness today [in the party] is not a mere clash of personalities, and certainly not a fight for power. It is not as simple as a conflict between parliamentary and organizational wings . . . It is a conflict between those who are for socialism, for change and for the fullest internal democracy and debate in the organization on the one hand, and those who are for status quo, for conformism and for less than full discussion inside the Congress . . .

In his last years, my father was greatly concerned that the Congress was gradually moving away from the people and that there were people inside the Congress who were offering resistance to change. My own experience even before the fourth general election was that the forces of status quo, with close links with powerful economic interests, were ranged against me . . .

The Congress must open its closed doors to winds of change . . . It must make a fresh effort to forge fresh links with the new generation which has grown since independence. It must reflect the modern elements in our society . . . It must command the loyalty of our intelligentsia. It must seek to induce amongst the ordinary people a feeling of confidence that we are a party which seeks to serve the people.²⁸

As the tension between the two factions kept mounting with clear indications that the official CWC, with its one-vote edge, was determined to expell the Prime Minister from the party, the Chief Ministers initiated yet another unity move on November 10. This time the initiative was taken by Rajasthan Chief Minister Sukhadia, an erstwhile Syndicate ally but now in the Prime Minister's camp. Sukhadia requested his counterparts in other Congress ruled states to rush back to New Delhi for a meeting on November 11, to make another sincere attempt to restore unity in the party.

The Chief Ministers worked out a four-point peace formula, which envisaged (1) the cancellation of the CWC meeting called on November 12 by the Syndicate and of the CPP meeting on November 13 called by the pro-Indira faction; (2) the calling-off of the requisitioned AICC session by the Prime Minister and her supporters on the assurance that the Faridabad AICC resolution postponing organizational elections

for a year would be reviewed at the next regular AICC session in December; (3) the "freezing" of the status quo as it existed then (at the time of the present peace move), implying restraint in taking fresh steps by any side against the other in the parliamentary and the extra-parliamentary party; and (4) the settlement of outstanding disputes by a six-member team consisting of three members from each side.

The mediation move by the Chief Ministers failed, however, on account of the unwillingness of the Prime Minister to allow at least one outstanding dispute to go to the six-member mediation committee. This related to the charge sheet against her and her followers contained in the Congress President's letter of October 28. Her insistence that these charges be immediately withdrawn, reflecting her preference not to go to the next round of negotiations with the sword of disciplinary action hanging over her head, was firmly rejected by the Congress President, apparently apprehensive that the withdrawal of these charges would have left him with no basis for any disciplinary action in case of the failure of the subsequent negotiations to bring about a compromise.

The Split. On November 12, the Syndicate CWC, in an obviously desperate and futile bid to impose "discipline" in the party, expelled Mrs. Gandhi from primary membership in the party for her "anti-party" activities, and instructed the CPP to elect a new leader to replace her; it also declared the

Prime Minister's attempt to set up a "parallel" CWC and AICC as "patent and grave acts of indiscipline."²⁹

Just before this resolution was moved, a fresh compromise bid was initiated by UP Chief Minister C. B. Gupta, who, along with Gujarat Chief Minister Hitendra Desai, briefly left the CWC meeting for talks with Sukhadia, the pro-Indira Chief Minister of Rajasthan. Disappointed at their failure to break any new ground, they returned to the Syndicate CWC meeting and joined the Desai-Kamaraj hardliners in supporting the resolution, removing Mrs. Gandhi from the primary membership of the party.

The following day, the CPP, with the claimed attendance of 330 out of 427 members, reaffirmed its confidence in Mrs. Gandhi's leadership, ignoring the contrary directive from the Syndicate CWC. With the final breach in the CPP, a few prominent pro-Syndicate senior Ministers still continuing in the cabinet - C. M. Poonacha, and Jaisukhlal Hathi (the Railway Minister and CWC member, Ram Subhag Singh, had already been forced to resign by the Prime Minister on November 4 for his association with the CWC resolutions highly critical of government policies) - resigned from the government.

The opening of the winter session of the parliament on November 16 brought into sharp focus the interplay of the Congress splinters with opposition elements in the party system. On November 17, the right-wing Swatantra and Jana Sangh moved an adjournment motion in the Lok Sabha on the Rabat issue,³⁰

and the Syndicate joined them in the voting. With the 60-member Syndicate now in the opposition, the Congress government fell about 52 votes short of an absolute majority, but the government survived by 306 to 140 votes with the support of the Socialists, Communists, DMK, Akali Dal, and independents.³¹

The Syndicate, though it voted with the rightist opposition parties, clearly did not aim at toppling Mrs. Gandhi's government; it was, in fact, due to the Syndicate's reservations that only an adjournment motion rather than a formal vote of non-confidence against the government was moved. The Syndicate's "limited" opposition to the Congress government was partly dictated by the difficulties of visualizing an alternative government acceptable to all its present and prospective allies, and partly by a desire to make Mrs. Gandhi seek its support for survival and thereby compel her to accept a reunification on terms honourable to it.

The leftist opposition parties' assessment of the Congress split was far from uniform; while the CPI, the S. M. Joshi faction in the SSP, the S. N. Dwivedy group in the PSP, and the DMK tended to accept more readily the socialist credentials of Mrs. Gandhi, the CPI-M, the Madhu Limary-Raj Narain faction in the SSP, and the H. V. Kamath group in the PSP tended to regard the Congress split as a mere reflection of power struggle in the ruling party and wanted specific proof for her socialist professions. However, too weak and fragmented to make a bid for political power on their own,

the leftist parties acted in uneasy unison in extending support to Mrs. Gandhi's government to pressure it to move further leftward.³²

However, the hopes for socialist gains thus raised among the leftist opposition parties by the Congress split were not without concomitant fears and anxieties. As Dilip Mukerjee of The Times of India remarked:

They [leftist parties] are happy over the split in the Congress because they feel it takes forward the process of polarization from which they stand to benefit. But some of them see in Mrs. Gandhi's success in capturing popular imagination a threat to their own position. They are afraid that like her father [Jawaharlal Nehru], she too may cut the ground from under the feet of the left parties, reversing the gains made by their parties in the 1967 and 1969 elections.³³

The showdown between the pro-Indira Congress and the Syndicate in the CWC, CPP, and the Lok Sabha made it clear that whereas the Syndicate had a bare majority of one in the CWC, Mrs. Gandhi was eventually able to muster not only an overwhelming majority in the CPP itself but also substantial left-wing support from other parties in the Parliament. Toward the end of 1969, attention shifted to the final showdown between the two groupings in the national party's general body - the pro-Indira AICC session in the last week of November in New Delhi, followed by the Syndicate AICC meeting the next month in Ahmedabad. The overall pattern of alignment in the AICC too was overwhelmingly favourable to Mrs. Gandhi, though the Syndicate still commanded a majority in many states -

Desai's Gujarat, Kamaraj's Tamil Nadu, Nijalingappa's Karnataka, Atulya Ghosh's West Bengal, and Brahm Prakash's Delhi - plus sizeable support in two others (UP and Bihar) (see Table 3.5).

Within the parliament, Mrs. Gandhi's government continued in power with support from leftist and some regional parties. The power structure in the government and the party tended to take the form of a triumvirate of Prime Minister Gandhi, Home (later Finance) Minister Chavan, and Defence Minister and Congress President Jagjivan Ram, which continued until the 1971 electoral landslide, seen as a personal victory for Mrs. Gandhi, dwarfed her senior colleagues and established her hegemony over the party and the government.

In mid-November, 1970, the Syndicate was rocked by a major internal controversy centred around the question of the Congress-Syndicate merger. The strongest expression of the desire for merger was discernible in two distinct groups within the party: (1) the relatively younger elements in the Syndicate Parliamentary Party led by Dr. Ram Subhag Singh and Sheo Narayan, the leader and Chief Whip, respectively, of the party in the Lok Sabha; and (2) the Syndicate's Pradesh units in Gujarat and Karnataka. Both these elements strongly opposed any formalized arrangement, either in the Parliament or in the electoral arena, with the Jana Sangh and Swatantra, advocated by the top Syndicate leaders; they appeared keen on projecting a socialist image for the party and on keeping

TABLE 3.5
ATTENDANCE AT PRO-INDIRA REQUISITIONED AICC
SESSION, NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER, 1969

States/ Union Territories	Total No. of Elected AICC Delegates	Delegates Attending Delhi AICC	
		N	%
Andhra Pradesh	52	47	90.4
Assam	22	16	72.7
Bihar	73	38	52.1
Gujarat	31	3	9.7
Haryana	12	10	83.3
Himachal Pradesh	7	7	100.0
Jammu and Kashmir	8	8	100.0
Karnataka	34	9	26.5
Kerala	24	14	58.3
Madhya Pradesh	43	43	100.0
Maharashtra	54	50	92.6
Nagaland	3	3	100.0
Orissa (Utkal)	25	19	76.0
Punjab	17	17	100.0
Rajasthan	34	32	94.1
Tamil Nadu & Pondicherry	47	17	36.2

TABLE 3.5 (Continued)

States/ Union Territories	Total No. of Elected AICC Delegates	Delegates Attending Delhi AICC	
		N	%
Uttar Pradesh	114	62	54.4
West Bengal	57	18	31.6
Bombay	10	5	50.0
Chandigarh	2	2	100.0
Congress Parliamentary Party	15	8	53.3
Delhi	7	2	28.6
Goa	6	6	100.0
Manipur	6	4	66.7
Tripura	7	7	100.0
NEFA	1	1	100.0
TOTAL	711	448	63.0

SOURCE: The Times of India (New Delhi), November 24, 1969, p. 7. The figures, along with the names of the delegates attending the requisitioned AICC session were released by a spokesman of the pro-Indira Congress. The Syndicate sources challenged that at least 75 to 100 names in the list were "bogus", but neither then nor subsequently at the Syndicate AICC session in Ahmedabad did they come up with a list of their own. The pro-Indira AICC organizers also showed the press reporters signatures and photographs of delegates, grouped by states, with Mrs. Gandhi.

their options open in case opportunities for the reunification of the two Congress groups became brighter.

These pro-merger sentiments in the Syndicate also received responsive echoes in the Congress. Four backbench Congress MPs, generally credited with right-wing leanings - Bibhuti Mishra, K. N. Tiwari, Rajendra Barua, and Randhir Singh - welcomed, in a joint statement, the "bold" initiative of some Syndicate MPs for the unity of the Congress forces, and urged both sides to rally round Mrs. Gandhi's leadership; the division, they said, was indirectly being exploited by the political forces which the Congress had fought throughout its history. This, as The Times of India News Service remarks, was reflective of

the views of that section of the ruling party which is anti-communist and anti-Young Turks. This section has been privately canvassing the idea of unity to wean the party away from the communists.³⁴

The unity move was finally scuttled by the attitudes of the top leaders on either side. In the ruling Congress, while the party president, Jagjivan Ram, declared that the doors of the party were open for anyone who wished to join it, Mrs. Gandhi let it be known that reconciliation with the opposition Congress splinter was unacceptable unless the veteran Syndicate leaders retired from public life. The top Syndicate leaders, on their part, though all of them sharply reacted to Mrs. Gandhi's suggestion for their political retirement, were greatly divided in their approach to unity:

Patil, Gupta, Nijalingappa, and Ghosh did not appear averse to an "honourable" reconciliation; Morarji Desai did not visualize unity so long as Mrs. Gandhi remained the leader of the party; and Kamaraj firmly maintained that the word "unity" should not be uttered until after the next Lok Sabha elections, undoubtedly hoping that, with the strength of the ruling Congress further sliced, post-election circumstances would compel the two Congress parties to come to a reconciliation.

During its minority government status, the main challenges to Mrs. Gandhi's government, in addition to the political opposition within the Parliament, came from the Supreme Court, which struck down as unconstitutional its decision earlier to nationalize private banks and later (in September, 1970) to abolish privy purses and other privileges of the former Maharaja's (totalling Rs. 48 Million a year) granted under treaties signed at the time of the merger of the princely states with the Republic of India soon after independence. Capitalizing on the public enthusiasm accompanying the controversies thus generated around the issue of a "progressive" government and a "conservative" judiciary, Mrs. Gandhi decided to seek a fresh mandate for amending the constitution to get around the judicial hurdles to her much publicized policies of bank nationalization and privy purse abolition.

The Final Round

The 1971 Mid-Term Elections. The finale to the Congress civil war and the resultant uneasy inter-party equations supporting or opposing Mrs. Gandhi's minority government came over a year later when President Giri, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, dissolved the Lok Sabha on December 27, 1970, and ordered a mid-term election in March 1971, a year earlier than the regular general election scheduled for 1972. In this ultimate appeal to the electorate, Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party, which sought a mandate for its socialist policies and stable consensus government at the centre, was restored to its predominant position even stronger than that during the Nehru era, virtually wiping out the Syndicate and dwarfing all other opposition parties in the process.

The two Congress parties adopted widely divergent strategies in the election. The Syndicate's original proposal for an electoral alliance consisting of all "democratic" (non-communist) parties against the ruling Congress did not quite succeed, and in the end it had to be content with a four-party alliance, consisting in addition to the Syndicate, of the right-wing Jana Sangh and Swatantra party and the left-wing SSP, which argued that the Congress split had not radically changed the political situation so as to require a revision of its strategy of catch-all opposition to the Congress first evolved in 1967. After tough bargaining and

negotiations at the national and state levels, the four parties sought to avoid electoral contests among themselves as far as possible, running 547 candidates for 518 seats.³⁵

Mrs. Gandhi's Congress party from the start sought more selective electoral arrangements, made more limited by the failure of negotiations with the PSP, Akali Dal in Punjab, and the Bangla Congress in West Bengal. It forged limited local arrangements with the CPI in UP, Bihar, and Andhra Pradesh: a complete agreement with the CPI-led United Front in Kerala; and a special kind of deal with the DMK in Tamil Nadu, according to which the Congress agreed not to oppose the DMK in the state Assembly elections in return for a free passage for itself in nine reasonably safe DMK Lok Sabha constituencies out of Tamil Nadu's³⁶.

The election results pertaining to the two Congress parties are presented in Table 3.6. Having won 350 out of 518 Lok Sabha seats (67.6%) with 43.5% of the votes, the Congress was back again in power with an overwhelming majority. It is clear that in the war of succession to the hallowed "Indian National Congress" label, the Syndicate, crushed from 65 seats in the dissolved Lok Sabha to 16 in the new, lost badly to the pro-Indira Congress. Despite its ambitious 239 candidatures, it was reduced to a mere regional rump, with 14 out of 16 seats won by it coming from two states (Gujarat and Bihar). In terms of vote-share too it hardly counted outside the main bases of Kamaraj, Desai, and Nijalingappa in

TABLE 3.6
THE TWO CONGRESS PARTIES AND LOK SABHA
ELECTIONS, 1971

<u>States & No. of Seats in Lok Sabha (in brackets)</u>	<u>Pro-Indira Congress</u>				<u>Syndicate</u>			
	Seats Held	Candidates	Seats Won	% Vote	Seats Held	Candidates	Seats Won	% Vote
Andhra Pradesh (41)	23	37	28	55	10	12	0	5
Assam (14)	8	13	13	57	1	10	0	3
Bihar (53)	24	47	39	39	8	24	3	11
Bujarat (24)	3	22	11	44	11	19	11	39
Haryana (9)	6	9	7	52	2	4	0	11
Himachal Pradesh (4)	6	4	3	77	0	3	0	2
Jammu & Kashmir (6)	5	6	4	54	0	0	0	0
Karnataka (27)	10	27	27	72	8	17	0	16
Kerala (19)	1	8	6	19	0	5	0	1
Madhya Pradesh (37)	23	36	21	45	1	5	0	2
Maharashtra (45)	32	44	42	65	5	9	0	2
Nagaland (1)	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Orissa (20)	4	19	15	40	2	6	0	2
Punjab (13)	6	11	10	46	1	4	0	4
Rajasthan (23)	12	23	14	50	0	4	0	1
Tamil Nadu (39)	0	9	9	12	3	29	1	30

TABLE 3.6 (Continued)

<u>States & No. of Seats in Lok Sabha (in brackets)</u>	<u>Pro-Indira Congress</u>				<u>Syndicate</u>			
	Seats Held	Candidates	Seats Won	% Vote	Seats Held	Candidates	Seats Won	% Vote
Uttar Pradesh (85)	44	78	73	48	7	44	1	8
West Bengal (40)	13	31	13	29	4	34	0	1
Delhi U.T. (7)	1	7	7	64	0	5	0	1
Other U.T.s (11)	4	9	8	39	2	5	0	6
All India (518)	226	440	350	43.05	65	239	16	10.48

Source: Morris-Jones (1971: 730-31).

NOTES: The columns "seats held" refer to seats in the Lok Sabha at the time of dissolution. The figures are based on unofficial sources.

Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, and Karnataka, respectively.

The impact of the impressive electoral victory of the Congress over the opposition forces was tremendous; it produced a strong whirlwind among the opposition parties, sending many of them swiftly into the Congress orbit. In fact, even before the election, the popular upsurge in favour of Mrs. Gandhi's Congress was much in evidence, and with it, the centripetal pull exercised by the Congress on the non-Congress groups. For example, in addition to the opening of negotiations for the merger with the Congress of the BKD and some other breakaway "Congress" parties, there were indications, as already noted, that even the Syndicate leadership and rank and file were eager, in varying degrees, to reunite with the Congress.

The impact of Mrs. Gandhi's landslide success in the Lok Sabha elections on state politics, particularly in Gujarat, Karnataka, and Uttar Pradesh (the three states under Syndicate governments since the Congress split in 1969), was disastrous for the Syndicate. In Karnataka and Gujarat, the Syndicate governments fell like houses of cards after defections to the Congress "too fast for news flashes to keep pace with them";³⁷ and after a spell of President's Rule both these states elected Congress governments with overwhelming majorities in Vidhan Sabha elections held in March, 1972. In Uttar Pradesh, the trickle of defections from the Syndicate to the Congress since the split now became a stream, and the Syndicate-led SVD

(Samyukta Vidhayak Dal) coalition government gave way to a Congress government headed by Kamalapati Tripathi, the old factional rival of the Syndicate's C. B. Gupta. In Bihar too defections slowly but surely led to the fall of the SSP-led SVD government (consisting of, among other parties, the Syndicate) and its replacement by a Congress-led coalition government under the Chief Ministership of D. P. Rai, Young Turk leader in the Bihar Pradesh Congress.

The impact of the Congress electoral landslide was also profound on the regional breakaway "Congress" parties led by Congress defectors who had left the party, protesting against the "coterie rule" in their respective state Congress parties, around the 1967 general elections. The return of the defectors to the parent Congress organization accelerated. Some, like the Jana (People's) Congress of Orissa, the Loktantrik (Democratic) Congress Dal of Bihar, and the Janata Paksha (People's Party) of Karnataka, had already rejoined the pro-Indira Congress before the 1971 elections; others, like the Bangla Congress of West Bengal and Utkal Congress of Orissa, were to merge sometime after the elections; still others, like the BKD in UP and the Vishal Haryana Party, ultimately did not return, primarily because the Congress factions that had driven them out were still in firm control of the Congress parties in the states concerned and had aligned themselves with the pro-Indira Congress at the national level (e.g., the Tripathi faction in the UP Congress and the Bansilal

group in Haryana). The return of the rebels was easier in the states where the Congress factions dominant at the time of their defection from the party were now affiliated with Syndicate (e.g., the Atulya Ghosh faction in West Bengal Congress, and the groups of S. N. Sinha, M. P. Sinha, and K. B. Sahay in the Bihar Congress).

Independents everywhere and a few non-Congress opposition groups in some states also joined in this scramble to climb aboard the Indira bandwagon; in Karnataka, for example, the entire state unit of the PSP merged with the Congress.

The process of the re-establishment and renovation of Congress dominance initiated by the 1971 Lok Sabha elections was reinforced by the 1972 Vidhan Sabha elections, when three more non-Congress states - Punjab, West Bengal, and Kerala - fell into Congress hands, wholly or partly, with the formation of single-party Congress governments in the first two and a CPI-Congress-Muslim League coalition government in the third. By this time the only non-Congress states left were Tamil Nadu under the DMK, Nagaland under the Naga Nationalist Organization, Meghalaya under the All-Party Hill Leaders' Conference, and the union territory of Goa-Daman-Diu under the Maharashtratravadi Gomantak Party.

The Impact

In this section, I wish to note briefly the impact of the Congress split on the party itself, on the party system,

and on the larger political system. For the party and the party system, the obvious effect of the split was the restoration of the Congress predominance, representing as before, a massive centrist ideological posture, but not without moving the centre itself slightly to the left. It is notable that this reassertion of Congress predominance was mainly accomplished through personalistic and charismatic appeals and without a strong party organization, leading Morris-Jones (1971: 741) to voice

a suspicion that a leadership which found party at worst a source of trouble and at best inessential to success may prefer the freedom of courtly rule to the necessity of institutional organization.

Mrs. Gandhi's reported recent attempts at weakening the hold of her senior allies such as Chavan over the Maharashtra Congress, that of Swaran Singh over the Punjab Congress, and that of Jagjivan Ram over the Congress Harijans, by encouraging revolts against their leadership, these seem to support the above suspicion. But there are also indications, to the contrary, that there is a greater awareness on the part of the leadership of the need for an effective party organization, e.g., the newly instituted practice of holding regular training camps by the national and local party organizations and the changes in the criteria of the party's "active" membership, which, among other things, make attendance at a specific number of training camps compulsory.

The re-emergence of Congress predominance has, paradoxically, not only reduced the direct electoral and parliamentary strength of the rightist minority parties but also of those on the left; though the leftist parties' indirect political leverage was enhanced, because the split placed the faction of their preference - the Congress left wing - in firm control of the ruling party. Though the leftward swing of the Congress has already been turning back, as is evident, for example, from the Congress Chief Ministers' effective opposition to the central leadership's suggestion for further lowering of the ceilings on landholdings (Kuldip Nayar 1971: 103-104), the party ideology will never be the same again; this big party's penchant for everything "small" - farmers, industrialists, businessmen, employees, etc. - continues to be vigorously reiterated. The Congress right wing has been virtually shorn of its top leadership, although far from exterminated, and the rightist minority parties have probably never seemed so emasculated before. While the Jana Sangh's organizing ability and will power, if not its electoral strength, appear more or less intact, the Swatantra, the BKD, and others have, after an agonizing reappraisal of their separate existence, recently merged to form a new political party, the Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD). It may well be that it is because of this simultaneous weakening of both the rightist and leftist opposition groups, that recently the most significant oppositional political activities

have occurred outside the confines of the party system; the anti-corruption and anti-inflation agitations in Gujarat, leading to the dissolution of the state Vidhan Sabha, were led primarily by students, and a similar agitation in Bihar going on since the spring of 1973, has been carried on under the overall leadership of the saintly Sarvodaya leader Jayaprakash Narayan, with a preponderantly student and non-party intelligentsia participation. The opposition parties have tended to follow, rather than lead, these movements.

The split also affected the internal decision-making process in the Congress. In the final phase of the split crisis, the party was, as it were, "handed over" to the rank and file in the CPP and AICC which had a final say in the intra-party conflicts; furthermore, Mrs. Gandhi based her case against the Syndicate oligarchs mainly on the principle of internal party democracy. A systematic comparison of the nature and content of internal party democracy before and after the split is beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to note here that though the pre-split elitist process of decision-making is, perhaps inevitably, on its way back, particularly in the case of the AICC, the general bodies of both the parliamentary party and extra-parliamentary party organization seem to have retained in some measure the new levels of confidence and legitimacy acquired during the crisis.

The party schism also produced a shift in the pattern of relationship between the Congress government and the party's mass membership organization. It reversed the process of the emergence of the party presidency and its Working Committee as an autonomous centre of authority, divorced from the government, which took place during the post-Nehru period, first under Kamaraj and then under Nijalingappa, and established Prime Minister Gandhi's special position as a super-leader reminiscent of the unchallenged position of Nehru both in the government and the party. All party presidents subsequent to the split - C. Subramaniam, Jagjivan Ram, S. D. Sharma, and D. K. Barua - have been the personal nominees of the Prime Minister, and except for Ram who finally preferred cabinet Ministership, they have been less than top-ranking Congress leaders.

Moreover, the party split proved to be a great catalyst for elite circulation. Not only did it displace a segment of the established elites within the party and thereby expand the opportunity structure for others and accelerate their career mobility, but it also opened up the doors of the party to accommodate some newly mobilized social forces as well as some regional breakaway "Congress" leaders, who had fallen by the wayside as casualties of factional conflicts in the past. These themes are more systematically explored in the chapters that follow.

Finally, the Congress split in its aftermath, especially since the Congress landslide in the 1971 Lok Sabha elections, has brought about a new balance of forces in federal-state relations in India. Following the Congress electoral reverses in 1967, five configurations of power at the state level had emerged: (1) the Congress-governed states, (2) the non-Congress, rightist-dominated, governing coalitions, (3) the non-Congress, leftist-dominated, governing coalitions, (4) the non-Congress, catchall, governing coalitions, and (5) the single party, non-Congress states. The Congress has by now regained most of the states lost in 1967, and the Prime Minister has since effectively reasserted the centre's dominance over the periphery; in a large majority of cases of Congress Chief Ministerial successions in different states since 1971, the candidates whom Mrs. Gandhi explicitly or implicitly preferred successfully acceded to this key position.

Notes to Chapter III

¹The text of Mrs. Gandhi's note on economic policy is reprinted in Ibid., July 11, 1969, p. 9.

²The text of the CWC resolution is reprinted in Ibid., July 12, 1969, p. 7.

³The texts of Mrs. Gandhi-Desai correspondence between July 16-19 on this issue are reprinted in Ibid., July 22, 1969, p. 11.

⁴Morarji Desai (1974b: 288).

⁵For the text of the ordinance, see Ibid., July 20, 1969, p. 12, 13.

⁶The text of the Prime Minister's AIR broadcast is reprinted in Ibid., July 20, 1969, p. 5.

⁷The Indian Institute of Public Opinion, "Other Leaders: Shrinking Statures," Monthly Public Opinion Survey, XV 3-5 (1970-71), pp. 52-97, at 52.

⁸Desai later told a National Press Club dinner on August 2, in response to a query regarding his reported understanding with the Syndicate: "I had no tie up as it was [not] in 1966. If at all, I was a victim of the Syndicate." The Times of India, August 3, 1969, p. 7.

⁹Morarji Desai (1974b: 293).

¹⁰Article 75 of the Indian constitution contains potentially contradictory provisions; it provides that the Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President and will hold office during the latter's "pleasure"; then it goes on to say that the council of Ministers shall be "collectively responsible" to the Lok Sabha. Constitutional jurists generally interpret that the "pleasure" of the President is coextensive with the parliamentary "confidence" in the Prime Minister and his government, and the Presidential incumbents have so far seemingly concurred with this interpretation, though one incumbent, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, in a

lecture to the Indian Law Institute, did raise the question - promptly characterized by Prime Minister Nehru as an "academic" one - whether the Indian Presidency was, in terms of its powers and functions, entirely an institutional replication of the British Monarchy. In any case, one is struck by the amount of "appeals" addressed to the President by various groups and political parties in the country to intervene in a non-partisan manner.

¹¹Nijalingappa's diary quoted in Kuldip Nayar (1971: 26).

¹²Text of the letter, along with the Congress President's reply to it, is published in The Times of India, August 13, 1969, p. 7.

¹³Text of the letter is published in Ibid., August 16, 1969, p. 7.

¹⁴Ibid., August, 16, 1969, p. 1.

¹⁵Ibid., August 15, 1969, p. 1.

¹⁶Romesh Thapar, "Capital View: Confusion and More Confusion", Economic and Political Weekly, IV-32 (August 9, 1969), p. 1294.

¹⁷For electoral statistics on the Presidential electoin, see Chandidas and Morehouse (1971: 88-99).
On the Presidential electoral system, see Pylee (1965: 347-53).

¹⁸The Times of India, August 19, 1969, p. 1.

¹⁹Ibid., August 24, 1969, p. 1.

20 and 21

The texts of the CWC resolutions are available in Ibid., August 26, 1969, p. 5.

²²Ibid.

²³Ibid., October 10, 1969, p. 1.

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵The Prime Minister's letter to Gurupadswamy is published in Ibid., October 16, 1969, p. 7.

²⁶The text of the letter is available in Ibid., October 31, 1969, p. 7.

²⁷Ibid., November 2, 1969, p. 5.

²⁸The text of the letter is available in Ibid., November 12, 1969, p. 7.

²⁹Ibid., November 13, 1969, p. 6.

³⁰The Rabat issue, widely seen as an avoidable foreign policy fiasco of the government, refers to the first international summit of Islamic states at Rabat in September 1969. India, originally not invited, staked its claim as a country with a large Muslim population and managed to get itself invited; it sent a delegation led by union Minister Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, but on Pakistan's protest the Indian delegation was prevented from attending the rest of the meeting.

³¹The list of 57 Syndicate MPs voting with the opposition is published in The Times of India, November 19, 1969, p. 7. Three more MPs, not present at the time of the voting on account of absence from the capital or for other reasons, were also reported to be affiliated with the Syndicate.

³²See Dilip Mukerjee, "The Left and Mrs. Gandhi: Hopes, Fears, and Anxieties", The Times of India, November 22, 1969, p. 8.

³³Ibid.

³⁴The Times of India, November 20, 1970, p. 9.

³⁵Morris-Jones (1971: 724-26).

³⁶Ibid.

In the three states of Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, and Orissa, where state Vidhan Sabha elections happened to coincide with Lok Sabha elections - in the rest of the states the elections at two levels got "delinked" on account of the mid-term

federal elections - the Congress fully withdrew in favour of the DMK in the Vidhan Sabha elections in return for some concessions in the Lok Sabha elections, it helped form, without joining it, a non-CPI-M coalition led by Bangla Congress' Ajoy Mukherjee, and it lost Orissa again to a non-Congress governing coalition by alienating the breakaway Utkal Congress into coalescing with other parties by insisting on the defectors' full merger with the Congress as a price for coalition.

³⁷Ibid., p. 738.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONGRESS SPLIT: AN ANALYTICAL SYNTHESIS

A multiplicity of analytical themes can be derived from the empirical description of the Congress split of 1969 in the preceding chapter. In this chapter an attempt is made to gather these themes into three broad clusters of independent variables - primary or intervening - and indicate interactions among them in producing a schism in a party such as the Congress. The analytical framework of party schism derivable from the case of the Congress split conceives of the intra-party elite conflicts and the social mobilization in the larger society as the two primary causal influences mediated by the effects of the nature of the party system and the party concerned.

Elite Conflicts

Although a politics centered around a few leading figures is a feature of less competitive political systems, the leadership variable as such is worthy of analytical focus in any political system, irrespective of the degree of political competitiveness. In the literature on the contemporary Indian Congress party elite, one can discern a number of approaches purporting to describe and analyze various facets of relationships among the important party leaders. The first of these is, of course, the biographical

approach which seeks to unravel and explain the nature and direction of Indian politics by carefully and intimately pursuing the career and personality of one or a few selected leaders. Depending on the research methodology followed, this approach can be broadly divided into two categories: (1) the sociologically oriented political biography, based on the biodata of the leading Congress leaders; and (2) the psychoanalytical biography, with its focus on the personality-formation of the leader and the recurrent interplay between private personality and public performance. The best examples of the first are Brecher's (1959) biography of Nehru and Hangen's (1963) biographical profiles of 10 Congress leaders constituting the "pool" from which Nehru's successor would come; the second category is best illustrated by Erikson's (1968) and Wolfenstein's (1967) psychobiographical studies of Mahatma Gandhi.

The "government-versus-party" model attempts to picture the struggle at the summit of the party between the sets of Congress leaders who stress - successfully or otherwise - the primacy of the parliamentary party over the mass membership party organization outside the parliament or vice versa, depending on where their major strength is concentrated. The most representative works using this analytical focus are Kochanek (1968) and Franda (1962).

A third approach focuses on factional conflicts among Congress elites with a wider perspective than the restrictive

framework imposed by an exclusive interest in factionalization between the ministerial and organizational leaders of the party; it seeks to analyse such aspects of Congress factions as structural properties of their leadership and bases of support, their functional and dysfunctional roles for the members, for the party, for the political system as a whole, and so on. Perhaps the best illustrations of this approach are Brass (1965), Sisson (1972), and contributions to Weiner (1968) at the state level and those of Nicholson (1972) and Brecher (1966) at the national level.

A fourth approach may be called the "centre-versus-periphery" one. Here the conflict among elite groups is viewed as continuous interaction and adjustment between party strataarchs with their support base concentrated in the national and/or state (regional) party and those with their support base restricted to one or the other level. The works most nearly approximating this model are Franda's (1968) study of the federalizing process in West Bengal and Harrison's (1960) now classic study of regionalism in India as reflected in conflicts at the elite and mass levels.

A fifth approach is more comprehensive than others and it views the conflict and coalescence in the party from the widest possible perspective to examine how the various elite groups, with varying socialization contexts in different institutional and associational groups and at different levels, interact with each other in shaping specific events of major

significance. Brecher's (1966 and 1967) studies of the Shastri and the Gandhi successions are cases in point. This is the approach which I myself have broadly sought to follow in the empirical inquiry into the 1969 Congress split in the preceding chapter.

An important aspect of intraparty elite conflict at the national level revealed in my description of the Congress split is a very complex pattern of relationships between the top- and second-echelon party leaders at the national level and their linkages with the Pradesh Congress stratarchies. These complicated interactions, as revealed by the Desai affair, the Presidential election campaign, and the AICC requisition move, showed that, very broadly, the top Syndicate leaders, backed by the second-echelon "Ginger Group" leaders in the Parliament and by most of the dominant state Congress machines, started out as a temperamentally conservative majority coalition in the party ranged against Prime Minister Gandhi and her "Kitchen Cabinet" with a radical leftist posture, supported by the "Young Turks" in the Parliament and a few dominant Pradesh Congress machines and most of the minority state Congress factions. This broad division remained very fluid, with a progressive strengthening of the pro-Indira forces by increasing desertions from the Syndicate, with the bank nationalization, Giri's victory in the Presidential election, and the pro-Indira Congress landslide in the 1971 elections marking the important milestones in that process. The top

Syndicate leaders with direct links with and control over Congress parties in their respective home states could withstand the "Indira wave" longer than others, but eventually even they were swept off their feet, even in their respective preserves of influence.

Another important fact apparent from the description is that the activation of the ideological component in the intra-party conflict followed rather than preceded the first open confrontation between the top party elites over the nomination of the party's candidate for the Indian presidency. To be sure, the relation among these leaders had been far from harmonious. But, despite tensions, they had got along reasonably well in the past. Writing in 1966, Brecher (1966: 90) observed:

[M]ost important is the pragmatic outlook of almost all members of the Congress elite. It is true that Morarji is identified with the Right, Shastri with the Centre, and Mrs. Gandhi and Nanda with the Left. But these labels are ill-suited to Congress politicians. All are formally committed to socialism, yet they mean different things . . . Morarji as Prime Minister might be more favourable to the private sector and Mrs. Gandhi to the public sector, but neither would deviate radically from present policy. And the ideological component in their behaviour is minimal. They are adaptable to the powerful currents carried by India's interest groups; none is highly motivated ideologically.

However, once conflicts over power among these leaders surfaced, they as well as their followers were motivated to do everything they could to use the existing divisions within the party - whether ideological, organizational, stratarchical, or whatever - to their advantage. As the journalist Pran

Chopra remarked:

Ideological divergences offered aid and abetment the more they were brought in to conceal ambition; towards the end they began to matter more than anything else.¹

In the light of this fact, it is hardly surprising that the two sets of party leaders competing for control over the party and government should perceive this internal conflict in diametrically opposed images: the Syndicate leaders in purely "struggle-for-power" terms and the pro-Indira leaders in strictly ideological terms. The following excerpts illustrate this point.

Syndicate Images

Nijalingappa:

[T]he cleavage in the Congress has nothing to do with any divergence of policies; it has been caused wholly by Mrs. Gandhi's mounting desire to be the source of all power in this country.²

Atulya Ghosh:

Ideology, programme, and policy have nothing to do with the split. The fact of the matter was that the Prime Minister had wanted to get rid of certain individuals and PCCs [Pradesh Congress Committees] in order to strengthen her personal position in the country even if it weakened the organization. Since her installation as Prime Minister she has been trying to be in closer contact with the Communist Party of India on the all-India political level . . . She was convinced of the idea that if she were to retain her Prime Ministership she would have to organize what could be called a sort of united front at the centre with the help of the CPI and other regional parties.³

Mrs. Tarkeshwari Sinha:

She [Mrs. Gandhi] does not consult her colleagues. She wanted to split the Congress. The Young Turks helped her by creating a situation where she could do it easily. The advisers she listens to are all communists. Temperamentally she is an intriguer.⁴

Pro-Indira Images

Mrs. Indira Gandhi:

We have to move faster; we can't afford not to, and certain people oppose this. But if we don't move faster, people aren't prepared to wait for us. They will try to take the situation into their own hands, resolve matters in their own way. The people of this country today are more and more conscious of what they need and want. You'd be surprised at the number of people - women included - who vote now, and who never did before.⁵

Jagjivan Ram:

The difference is basically ideological; it is in emphasis and approach to problems. . . If you read carefully through the proceedings of the Faridabad [AICC] session of early last year, you will not fail to see that there is a distinct divergence of view as between the Prime Minister - which meant her government - and the then Congress President and some of his associates.

The Government wanted to expand the Public sector as part of its declared objective of fighting poverty, while the other side wanted to give a free hand to the private sector even in heavy industry.⁶

Y. B. Chavan:

The main cause was that most of us were anxious to implement the economic programme and others were not. But bank nationalization has been a step forward. A new opening has been made for credit facilities to small farmers and small industrialists (When the interviewer drew his attention to the fact that it was not only the economic policy but also the nomination of the Presidential candidate that had raised the controversies leading to the party split, Chavan quipped: "As to that I myself campaigned for Mr. Reddy. But I would rather not discuss the matter."⁷

The only way to reconcile these apparently contradictory elite images about the party split is to conceptualize competition between two elements of this leadership following contrasting strategies - the Syndicate relying heavily on the national party's organizational wing and state party

machines, Mrs. Gandhi seeking support in the cabinet, the Congress Parliamentary Party, and the party rank and file generally, as well as mobilizing the masses through ideological appeals directed to certain newly politicized sections of the mass public. The secret of Mrs. Gandhi's tremendous success was her ability to skillfully link her own political ambitions and those of her associates with the career aspirations of a new generation of political activists in many institutional organs of the party at different levels of the political system, and then present a credible ideological posture and policy alternatives to the politically relevant public. The credibility of Mrs. Gandhi's ideological stance was greatly facilitated by her wide popularity, her socialist public image, and her accessibility to the left, all partly inherited from her father and partly of her own making. A mass opinion poll concerning six top Congress leaders, three from each faction, carried out by the IIP0 soon after the party split, revealed that despite an evident element of cynicism in the public mind about the "opportunism" of its leaders, Mrs. Gandhi's image was better than others, only the puritanical Desai coming anywhere close to her in this regard. Moreover, there was a high percentage of "Don't Know" responses for all, including Mrs. Gandhi, but she came out better than anyone else. Further, a very large proportion of the respondents, especially if we consider the respondents with opinion, perceived her and those aligned with her as either

centrists representing the interests of all classes or as leftists representing the interests of the poor, while the most typical public image of the Syndicate leaders, including the otherwise socialistically inclined Kamaraj, was that they were rightists representing the interests of the rich (see Table 5.1).

Each new indication of the success of Mrs. Gandhi's strategy increased her ability to affect political careers in the federal as well as state arenas. It not only arrested but also reversed the process of sizeable defections from the Congress which had assumed an alarming rate, especially after the party's reverses in some of the states in 1967.

Social Mobilization

In attempt to explain the paradox of the "modernity of tradition" in India highlighted by the Rudolphs (1960 and 1967), Elkins (1974: 328-32) juxtaposes the concept of "hierarchic" or "vertical" society alongside Deutsch's (1961) concept of "social mobilization", underlying which, he asserts, "is an implicit image of the type of society commonly called 'mass society'" (Elkins 1974: 328). The two types of society are conceptualized in terms of two different dominant patterns of relationship among persons defined in equal or subordinate-superordinate terms. In both societies, writes Elkins (1974: 340),

	Pro-Indira Congress				Syndicate			
	Mrs. Gandhi	Chavan	Ram	Desai	Kanara]	Nijalingappa		
	% of total responses with opinion	% of total responses with opinion	% of total responses with opinion	% of total responses with opinion	% of total responses with opinion	% of total responses with opinion	% of total responses with opinion	% of total responses with opinion
Leftist, Represents Interests of Poor. ^c	24	7	8	22	*	*	*	*
Centrist, Represents Interests of all Classes ^c	48	37	38	108	7	21	9	24
Rightist, Represents Interests of Rich ^c	4	3	4	12	42	63	36	118
Person of Strong Conviction	39	7	5	14	19	57	6	21
Opportunist	12	26	27	77	13	39	25	73
	60	34	35	100	34	100	31	100
Don't Know	40	66	65	66	66	69	67	67

SOURCE: Indian Institute of Public Opinion, "Popular Images of Congress Leaders: Cynicism Abounding", Monthly Public Opinion Survey, XV-8 (May, 1970), p. 18.

NOTES: a The source table also included three state Congress leaders from UP - C. B. Gupta, Kamalapati Tripathi and Charan Singh - who have been excluded from the table reported here.

b Multiple responses provided for Ns not given. c. collapsed categories.

horizontal and vertical relations exist; but the relative frequency of the two forms of interaction and the degree of legitimacy accorded each is different.

Elkins puts India in the category of a hierarchic society and illustrates its hierarchic character with such social and economic structures as dominant castes and work-teams shaped in the image of the traditional jajmani system

with the basic pattern invol[ving] a leader who commands material resources (for example, owns land or a business) and the people who are dependent on him for employment and other prerequisites (Elkins 1974: 330).

Elkins (1974: 328, 341-42) then goes on to theorize that the political consequences of social mobilization will not be identical in the mass and in the hierarchic societies. Whereas social mobilization and politicization ought to be expected to have a more direct, uncontaminated relationship in the mass society, this relationship is likely to be subject to the interaction effect of the traditional hierarchical social structures in the other type of society. Thus, in the case of hierarchical societies, we can have, on the one hand, the paradox of "modernity of tradition" whereby traditional social organizations such as caste may appear in their "democratic incarnation" as effective agents of political mobilization even in a context lacking in social mobilization; on the other hand, the traditional hierarchic social relations may operate to restrain and counteract, in some measure, the explosive political consequences of social mobilization.

However, despite these restraining influences of the non-mass features of the Indian society, competent observers agree that the latter part of the second and the third post-independence decades in India witnessed new levels of social as well as political mobilization as distinct from the first decade and a half, which was mainly the period of the political system's penetration in the countryside and of the politicization of the rural notables (see Weiner 1967; and Huntington 1968: 446-48). Writing in 1962, Weiner remarked:

Within a few decades, there may very well be substantial increases in unionization [of workers]. Existing caste, tribal, and other community and regional groups may be better organized. With a rise in educated unemployment, student militancy may increase, and urban areas may become even greater centers of discontent than they are today. Peasant agitations, especially of the landless, may be expected; and peasant proprietors may demand greater government expenditures. As the economic supply grows, "consumer" political demands may increase even faster (Weiner 1962: 238).

Not only were these projections largely confirmed by later developments, but there was also a trend for a certain measure of qualitative change in the overall nature of public protests and pressures. The most important political controversies of the 1950s and early 1960s were "cultural" (e.g., linguistic-regional, caste, and communal); by the late 1960s and early 1970s, though the cultural issues did not wholly disappear, the "economic" issues such as industrial unrest as reflected in strikes, dharnas, bundhs, and gheraos; intra-linguistic regional agitations based on regional economic

disparities such as the Telengana agitation in Andhra Pradesh; increased student militancy and their anti-government furies; and , finally, the "Naxalite"-type extremist political violence by the urban unemployed and the rural landless achieved new levels of salience. The picture is one amenable neither to a purely "class" interpretation nor to a strictly "mass" explanation, but perhaps to a combination of both. For whereas the growing politicization of the hitherto submerged social classes (i.e., the traditionally "servicing" lower castes predominating among both urban-industrial and agricultural workers) would seem to suggest the suitability of class analysis of these developments, the growing social and psychological disorientation and alienation among the vast lower and middle classes generally arising from economic stagnation, unemployment, inflation and food shortages would caution against ruling out a mass political explanation.

The Congress split of 1969 can be plausibly interpreted, at least partly, as a consequence of the broad social changes in the Indian society summarized above. The elite conflicts within the party from which the trouble first arose was soon rationalized in terms of public demands and of the need for the party to adapt to a new level of social mobilization. That a section of the party leadership had a clear incentive, in pursuit of its career ambitions, to seize upon an opportunity of linking its career aspirations with the

support of newly politicized groups among the masses has already been discussed in the preceding section. This interpretation also helps to reconcile two apparently contradictory observations about the Indian party system. The first observation is that the Congress party in the early post-independence period was increasingly deradicalized (Weiner 1967; Huntington 1968; 446-48); the second observation points up the fact that, even though the major minority parties of the left and the right also showed some signs of moderation during this period, such trends were countered by the increasing radicalization of the sizeable extremist sections of these parties, often resulting in major splits, and that electoral support was gradually shifting from the centrist Congress to the militant parties of both the right and the left (Kothari 1970; Sen Gupta 1972; Brass and Franda 1972). For this reason the deradicalization of the Congress in the early post-independence period can hardly be equated with the "decline of ideology" phenomenon noted in the case of some post-war Western European party systems, where in the context of the recent prosperity the entire party system succumbed to a "contagion from the right". In the Indian party system, operating in the context of the "politics of scarcity", the contagion from the left has, in retrospect, been stronger, even though this contagion catches the minority parties earlier than the predominant party.

The empirical description of the Congress split has already indicated that targets of Mrs. Gandhi's ideological appeals and mobilization strategies: by using the most prominent Harijan, Muslim, and Sikh Congress politicians - Jagijan Ram, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, and Swaran Singh, respectively - as her principal lieutenants in her fight against the Syndicate, she successfully sought to ensure the support of India's major minority communities; and by bank nationalization, abolition of privy purses and privileges and promises to step up the creation of more employment opportunities, she made a powerful appeal to India's numerous middle and lower classes.

This is clear from an examination of the types of groups which came to organize popular rallies in support of Mrs. Gandhi in front of her official residence in New Delhi in the wake of bank nationalization and Giri's victory in the Presidential election (Table 4.2). The composition of these rallies clearly indicates a sort of implicit "core combination"⁸ behind Mrs. Gandhi's Congress, between the urban intellectuals (lawyers, teachers, doctors, students) and other urban lower-middle and lower classes (school teachers, press and public sector employees, and shopkeepers), on the one hand, and the rural underprivileged groups (peasants, Harijans, and workers), on the other. To put this development in the perspective of secular trends of elite circulation in India,

TABLE 4.2

PRO-INDIRA RALLIES AT PRIME MINISTER'S RESIDENCE

Date	Group
July 23, 1969	Representatives of Delhi Bar Association
August 4	Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee rally
August 7	Government School teachers
August 9	Delhi Pradesh taxi operators
August 15	Harijan (Scheduled Castes) villagers from neighbouring Haryana
August 20	Workers, Khudai Khidmatgars (a Muslim organization), Kisans (peasants), and shopkeepers from Faridabad (Haryana)
August 23	Bank and Press workers of Meerut (UP)
August 23	Doctors and medical students of G. B. Pant Hospital and Maulana Azad Medical College
August 25	Public (Nationalized) sector employees

what it means is that the phenomenon of displacement of the urban-based Westernized Congress elite of the nationalist movement by the rural notables following independence may have been set back in some measure by the former elite groups seeking to maintain or re-establish their position by a coalition between a modernizing urban elite and a newly mobilized segment of the rural sector against the traditional rural elites (see also Rosenthal 1970 on this point).

This does not mean, however, that in forging this core combination of support, Mrs. Gandhi has completely driven the rural privileged groups to desperation. The big farmers and middle peasants had, in fact, nothing to lose and something to gain from the most important and controversial policy shift of Mrs. Gandhi, namely, the bank nationalization and the new credit priorities envisaged by her for the nationalized banks. Indeed, Mrs. Gandhi could not have picked a better rallying point. As Sam Lal of The Times of India commented:

The left intelligentsia, which never bothers to look closely at the danger of over-bureaucratization of the economy, accepts by its very definition any extension of public ownership as evidence of progress, without caring to find out how a particular measure is likely to work in practice. The rich and middle peasant on whom the Congress party bosses at the state and district levels, like the leaders of many other parties, depend for their main support in the countryside see in the bank takeover the promise of more and more credit. So for the moment the city radicals and the village conservatives find themselves standing in the same line, singing the same chorus! Mrs. Gandhi's great acumen lay in selecting bank nationalization, of all issues, for forcing the pace.⁹

Moreover, the industrial and commercial interests adversely affected by this decision happen to be largely inconsequential politically, because, though business and industry in India, unlike many other Asian and African countries, are owned and operated by indigenous, rather than foreign, entrepreneurs, these entrepreneurs come in disproportionately larger numbers from numerically smaller caste, religious, and linguistic minorities such as Jains, Marwaris, Parsis, Gujaratis, and Vaishya castes generally. Partly for this reason, partly for the traditional Brahmanic ideological distaste or even contempt for economic activities, and partly because of the widespread public suspicion against business malpractices, the business community in India finds itself in a politically inhospitable climate.¹⁰ As Girilal Jain of The Times of India observed:

Maharashtra Congress leaders would not have been so enthusiastic about bank nationalization if some of the affected institutions belonged to the [rurally dominant] Maratha caste and if its economic status in [Metropolitan] Bombay was better than it happens to be.¹¹

A similar explanation is applicable to most other Pradesh Congress units that generally tended to react favourably to the bank nationalization decision.

The Party and the Party System

As already discussed in Chapter I, a predominant Party such as the Congress, as a sociological phenomenon, is highly

prone to splits and mergers. My purpose in this section is to indicate how the broad changes in Indian Society, summarized in the preceding section, produced significant changes in its politics, including the split in the Congress, and how this impact was mediated by the nature of the ruling party and the party system in general.

The analysis of Indian politics during the 1950s and major part of the 1960s was based on two implicit paradigms. The first, applied to the elite interactions at the top, which may be called the "consociational democracy" elitist model,¹² views the overarching elite cartel at the summit of an otherwise regionally and plurally fragmented political community as an affair of "a small elite, homogeneous in social [though not regional] background, mainly upper caste, English-educated, and constituting almost a 'one class' ensemble". This characteristization applied not to the Congress leadership alone, but also to "most of the dissenting elites [who] . . . had at one time belonged to the Congress and shared much of the social and intellectual background of Congressmen" (Kothari 1970: 160).

The second paradigm, applied to the levels below the centre, may be called the model of "clientelist politics", as distinguished from the model of the unmanipulated or autonomous voter of the "pluralist democracy-civic culture" tradition and from that of "caudillo politics". Fundamentally, these three models of local-level politics differ in that the clientelist

and caudillo politics paradigms, unlike the unmanipulated-electorate model, are characterized by the emergence of patron-client sets, bound together by personal ties of dominance and deference and motivated by a common desire for divisible personal gratifications rather than for broad policy outputs. What distinguishes the clientelist from the caudillo model is the prevalence of violence in political competition and a greater instability of the patron-client sets in the latter and the relative absence of these features in the former.¹³

Studies of local politics in India have repeatedly pictured a predominantly modernizing elite at the centre interacting, through intermediaries of "vote banks" and "patron-brokers", with a largely traditional periphery, both the targets of mobilizational appeals from the centre and the source of inchoate demands and support (Bailey 1963; Nicholas 1968). By the late 1960s and early 1970s, competent observers were already noting latent or manifest processes at work potentially disruptive of the clientelist pattern of politics. They were led to conceptualize a trend toward the emergence of a "new-type politics", gradually eroding the old-style politics. Thus a mass survey carried out in 1967 after the elections by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi, showed in the words of Kothari, that there was an evident

shift from the politics of manipulation of the voters by party machines to a type of politics in which the direct appeal of parties and political personalities, the election campaign, and the issues at stake will play a major role (quoted in Morris-Jones (1971: 721)).

In a similar vein, Myron Weiner asserts,¹⁴ and Morris-Jones (1971: 721) concurs, that political parties in India had operated, until before the 1971 elections, on the assumption that electoral success depended on distribution of patronage through local "vote banks", because the voters' loyalties to the local leaders were stable, and both were less concerned with broad policies than with concrete distribution of benefits. In 1971, Mrs. Gandhi challenged

these assumptions in that she essayed to create a separate national arena so as to bypass the hostile intermediary power structures and reach the voter directly, or at least specific groups among them (Morris-Jones 1971: 721).

While it may be too soon to discard the earlier model in the face of what may well be insufficient and inconclusive evidence,¹⁵ there is no doubt that the Congress schism was significantly affected by the trends described above - structural changes in the mass electorate, in the party system, and in the Congress itself. First, but for these changes, first reflected in the 1967 election results, the whole struggle between the Syndicate and the pro-Indira faction would have lacked both context and authenticity, and Mrs. Gandhi, if she had decided at all to challenge the authority of the party oligarchs, might well have gone the way of J. B.

Kripalani, C. Rajagopalachari, Jayaprakash Narayan and other prominent Congress dissenters of the past, who were reduced to being either political loners or leaders of minority parties after leaving the Congress.

Second, notwithstanding its highly factionalized character, the Congress has been an eminently successful party in internal conflict management, such that it could both prevent widespread fragmentation and still ensure electoral success (Weiner 1967: 460). In the light of this fact it appears surprising that the well-tried reconciliatory mechanisms of the party failed so miserably in forestalling the split of 1969. As indicated in Chapter 2, the 1969 split was the climax of a general process of decline in the conflict-managing capability of the party, which first became evidenced to a rather alarming degree around the time of the nearly disastrous 1967 general elections (the first since Nehru's death in 1964). The factional character of the Congress, particularly at the state and district levels, is well known and is by no means a recent development. But the top leadership echelon of the party during Nehru's premiership usually maintained an olympian aloofness from the factional conflicts at lower levels of the party strataarchy (Nicholson 1972). This provided a useful reserve of widely respected "non-aligned" top party leaders to mediate and quite often arbitrate between lower level factions as well as to keep the dominant factions from railroading the dissident factions

into absolute desperation. At any rate, this has been the typical mode of intra-party dispute settlement in the Congress - a pattern quite in consonance with the traditional Indian process of dispute settlement by "arbitration and mediation by a third party, rather than bargaining by contesting parties" themselves (Weiner 1967: 466).

The effectiveness of central intervention in lower level factional feuds declined considerably in the late 1960s because of the increasing autonomy of the Pradesh Congress parties and a divided central leadership in the post-Nehru period (see Kochanek 1968: 298; Roy 1966 and 1967; and Hardgrave 1970: 168). In 1969, when the party's badly divided national leadership itself required peace-makers, there was hardly a "non-aligned" mediator left, either at the national or the state level.

Third, the increasing militancy of both the rightist and leftist minority parties and the presence of the "slack resources" of the regional breakaway "Congress" parties and independents provided cushions of external support to the warring factions in the ruling party, as was illustrated by the Presidential election as well by as the 1971 mid-term Lok Sabha election. A considerable measure of realignment in this sector of the party system, particularly in its "slack" component, which tended to merge with Mrs. Gandhi's Congress, was also contributory to the restoration of the Congress predominance in the party system.

Fourth, the remarkable recuperation of the Congress through innovative strategies of political mobilization, as revealed by the party schism and its aftermath, was also facilitated by what Kothari (1970: 153) calls the "dual inheritance" of the Congress from its national movement past - "of being an authoritative spokesman of the nation as well as its affirmed agent of criticism and change". Though Kothari does not bother elaborating this point, it is possible to argue that the Congress is the inheritor of at least three ideological traditions, all representing variegated combinations of reformative and conservative, modern and traditional, renunciatory and power-seeking strands of motivation and thought: (1) the conservative tradition of Lokmanya Tilak, Sardar Patel, Rajagopalachari, and Morarji Desai; (2) the liberal-reformative-socialist tradition of Surendra Nath Banerjea, Gokhale, Nehru, and Mrs. Gandhi; and (3) the saintly, anarchist tradition now best represented by the Sarvodaya movement led by Acharya Vinoba Bhave and Jayaprakash Narayan. Mahatma Gandhi seems to be a peculiar case in that he seems to stand in the mainstream of all the three traditions, though he himself is clearly the source of the third.¹⁶

The Congress, thus, like Hinduism, represents a very complex multi-layered political tradition, which makes the task of innovation simultaneously both easy and difficult - easy because the presence of multiple layers provides a variety

of sites and incentives from which competitive innovation may emerge, and difficult because innovation is liable to be easily absorbed by the complexity of tradition, though not leaving the tradition the same.¹⁷

Notes to Chapter IV

¹Pran Chopra, Citizen and Weekend Review (New Delhi), August 23, 1969, p. 10.

²In interview with journalist Basant Chatterjee (no date: 7).

³Atulya Ghosh in his pamphlet, The Split in the Indian National Congress, quoted in Drieberg's (1973: 125-26) biography of Mrs. Gandhi.

⁴In interview with journalist Dom Moraes; see his "The Indian Prime Minister Prepares for an Election: Indira Gandhi is Either Hated or Adored", The New York Times Magazine, February 14, 1971, pp. 10-11, 42-59, at 46.

⁵Ibid., p. 58.

⁶In interview with Basant Chatterjee (no date: 11).

⁷In interview with Dom Moraes (p. 48), cited in note 4.

⁸The term is suggested and used by Ilchman and Uphoff (1969: 42-44).

⁹Sam Lal, "The National Scene: Is it the End of the Story?" The Times of India, July 22, 1969, p. 8.

¹⁰For excellent analyses of the sub-culture and role of business in Indian Politics, see Weiner (1962), Kochanek (1974), Symposium on politics and Indian business in Asian Survey, XI-9 (September 1971).

¹¹Girilal Jain, "The Folklore of Radicalism: A Middle Class Ideology", The Times of India, July 23, 1969, p. 6.

¹²The model is suggested by Lijphart (1969).

¹³For elaboration of the model of "clientelist politics" primarily from the perspective of the relatively under-developed non-Western societies, see Scott (1969), La Marchand and Legg

(1972), and Powell (1970). When formulated with primary reference to the similar, though not identical, patterns of social and political relationships in some American urban settings of the pre-New Deal era, the model is typically called the "machine politics"; see particularly Merton (1957), Epstein (1967: 104-111), and Rogler (1974).

The comparative political corruption perspective to the study of political development, which subsumes the clientelist and machine politics models mentioned above, is now differentiated into the more normatively oriented "classical" school given to "the wholesale condemnation of corruption as a totally undesirable and harmful phenomenon" and the "revisionist" school which has also attempted to specify the potential contributions of corruption to development, both political and economic, mostly on a very high level of generalization" (Ben-Dor 1974: 64). See also Scott (1973), and Heidenheimer (1970).

The model of caudillo politics is perhaps best outlined in Wolf and Hansen (1967).

The model of the autonomous electorate may be culled from Almond and Verba (1963) and the various American voting behaviour studies cited in note 18 of Chapter I.

¹⁴Weiner's Hindustan Times article (January 14, 1971) is cited in Morris-Jones (1971: 721).

¹⁵Morris-Jones (1971: 739-40) aptly remarks: "[I]t is still too soon to announce an issue-oriented electorate and far from appropriate to declare in large terms that caste and similar loyalties have been replaced by class sentiment, though patchily this has happened in limited measure. Nor is it to imply that local matters, the interplay of personalities and the manipulations of intermediaries played no part; it is rather that they were present but overlaid by this remarkably widespread general response. If on this occasion many of the old manipulators were pushed somewhat to one side, it was in part because they were old; in such a great and varied electorate there must still be scope for the intermediary even if he does have to amend his style."

¹⁶Perhaps the most comprehensive introductions to the ideology of the Congress and Congress leaders are Kaushik (1964) and Varma (1967 3d ed); the former focuses on the ideological component of the Congress as an organization and the latter analyzes the same problem from the perspective of individual Congress leaders. On the saintly, anarchist strand, the best analyses are Bondurant (1959), Erikson (1968), and Ostergaard and Currell (1971).

On the related, but more general, theme of the Indian political culture, see Morris-Jones (1967, 2d. ed.: ch. II); Kothari (1970: ch. VII); Weiner 1956 and 1965); and Nandy (1973).

¹⁷On the theme of the complexity and pliability of the Hindu cultural tradition, see Singer and Cohn, eds. (1968).

CHAPTER V

A PARADIGM OF FACTIONAL AFFILIATION

In the preceding chapters an attempt was made to describe and explain the 1969 schism in the Indian National Congress in terms of the effects of intra-party elite conflicts, mass social and political mobilization, and the nature of the party, the party system, and the larger political system. In this and the following chapters, the analytical focus shifts to a different angle, namely, to the personal background and environmental pressures on the Parliamentary party elites to affiliate with either of the two major factions into which the party split.

The Paradigm

Utilizing the central dependent variable of factional or splinter party affiliation, a paradigm is sketched here, which postulates three sets of explanatory factors at two different levels of analysis. First, at the micro level, there are socio-cultural and political personal "background" variables of party leaders that are widely assumed to exert influence on their attitudes/behaviour. The second and third sets of factors operate at the macro level and are here termed "setting" and "contextual" factors, respectively. The

distinction between the two is drawn, following Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune (1970: 53-57, quote from 54), on the basis that whereas the settings "constitute characteristics to which all individuals within a system are at least potentially exposed" (e.g., various typologies of politics or even of political parties) contexts refer to aggregates of individual characteristics of ecological nature observable at the within-system level (e.g., states, regions, constituencies, etc.).

The Elite Backgrounds

The single-case or paired comparative biographical methods as well as large-sample statistical analysis of elite backgrounds, with either a theoretical or atheoretical focus, are well established methods of research in the social sciences. While intrinsic interest in the elites has often led to atheoretical collection of information about their socio-economic and political backgrounds, a social scientist is primarily interested in these data for their theoretical worth, viz., predictability of elite recruitment patterns and elite attitudes/behaviour.

In current theories of political recruitment, elite background constitutes one of the principal sets of explanatory factors.¹ Similarly, the current explanatory paradigms of elite attitudes/behaviour typically take the form of assumed causality flowing from background variables through attitudes to behaviour, though it is now being increasingly recognized,

thanks to the "cognitive consistency/dissonance" theories of social psychology,² that some times, instead of attitudes causing behaviour, behaviour might motivate change in attitudes in order to remove inconsistencies between an attitude and a behaviour already engaged in, for whatever reasons. The political-sociological theories of "cross-pressures" too direct attention to the factors that might intervene to produce perturbations in a simple "attitude-causes-behaviour" hypothesis.³

The logical assumptions for predicted relationships between elite background variables and elite political attitudes/behaviour are provided by the theoretical perspectives of political socialization. Political socialization theories assert that the attitudes and orientations of political elites are significantly affected by their social and political backgrounds which serve as contexts of socialization.⁴

Despite recent criticisms of the elite background approach in terms of its generally weak predictiveness (see Searing 1969: 488-89), it remains central to elite studies, and will probably always retain its significance as at least a partial explanation of elite behaviour; it will also remain as the only basis for analysis of trends over time in leadership recruitment and composition, reflecting or else presaging broad social and political changes in society at large. As Quandt (1970: 184) remarks:

[I]n the search for theoretically interesting statistical relationships, information concerning political elites may be seen as a dependent variable affected by social and economic changes, or as an independent variable producing results of political and social significance.

Within this general framework of elite background approach, my primary concern here is with the relationship between the elite background variables and party factionalism. Most empirical studies to date have focused on associations between background variables and party identification, but, with due caution, the literature on parties can usually be extrapolated to factions.

Social stratification and factional affiliation. It would be pretentious to review the vast literature on the relationship between social stratification and party or factional identification of the mass electorate or activists. I will therefore restrict myself to suggesting in a very broad way a working hypothesis dealing with these relationships on an abstract plane and to briefly noting some relevant empirical findings from India. At the most abstract level, the principal generalization that can be made is, in the words of Lipset (1963: 234), the following:

More than anything else the party struggle is a conflict among classes, and the most impressive single fact about political party support is that in virtually every economically developed country the lower-income groups vote mainly for parties of the left, while the higher-income groups vote mainly for parties of the right.

The fact that many non-class groups intervene in this simple class-political preference relationship to make it more complex does not fully vitiate this hypothesis; this only specifies it. For example, in an attempt to identify non-class cleavages that can override class cleavages in determination of partisan support, Rose (1968) suggests the following hypotheses, using Britain as the test case: "Working-class voters will deviate from overall patterns of class voting" under the following conditions: (1) where religious loyalties are strong, (2) where nationality differences exist, (3) where peasant population is high, (4) where regional differences exist, (5) where colour differences exist, (6) among workers subjectively identifying with the middle class, (7) among workers not interested in class-salient issues, (8) among workers not showing higher levels of political involvement, (9) among workers not heavily unionized, (10) among unemployed workers, (11) among workers not enjoying greater security of employment, (12) among more prosperous workers, (13) among workers with personal capital, (14) among working class women, (15) among workers who do not read pro-Labour newspapers, (16) among workers living in predominantly non-working class areas; (17) among workers who are more mobile residentially, and (18) among workers with lower education.

The non-class variables referred to above that tend to modify the straightforward class-partisan support hypothesis can be broadly grouped into four major categories: (1)

primordial or "vertical" cleavages such as religion, national-origin, ethnicity, and race, which tend to moderate class polarization where they cross-cut class divisions; (2) social mobilization variables such as education and urbanization, which are generally disruptive of deferential attitudes and behaviour of subordinate classes and patron-client patterns of relationship; (3) openness of the stratification system and general prosperity, precluding a deeply felt relative deprivation among the subordinate groups and permitting them reasonable hopes for upward mobility and subjective identification with higher class status that dampen radicalism; and (4) involvement in class-appropriate organizations and activities and encapsulation from external socializing cues and influences, which tend to accentuate class consciousness.

In addition, it has been suggested that while the established community leaders are more predisposed toward the maintenance of the status quo, leaders coming from marginal groups are more likely to accept new radical programmes for social change. Lenski (1954), for example, points out that the overall social status of an individual is made up of several factors and that he may or may not have a consistent ranking on each of them. He calls consistency of status on several factors "status crystallization" and hypothesizes that individuals with consistent ranking are more likely to be conservative in their political attitude and behaviour and those with inconsistent status more liberal.

Moreover, female sex is another demographic variable usually found to be positively associated with more conservative political attitudes and behaviour. It must, however, be pointed out that when one controls for other variables, sex becomes of limited theoretical importance as it appears to be reflecting the indirect influence of a third variable commonly related to both sex and conservative political attitude. As Lipset (1963: 275-278) points out, "Traditionalism may help to account for the greater conservatism of women . . . [who] are usually more influenced by traditional religious beliefs which uphold the existing social order."

Finally, it is often maintained that aging is related to a shift to more conservative political attitudes (Hyman 1959: ch. 6). The theoretical underpinning behind this hypothesis rests on age-related changes in the direction of cautiousness and resistance to change, which, among other things, may manifest the increasing integration of the person into the existing social system and therefore greater satisfaction with and stake in the maintenance of the status quo. However, some more recent studies reviewed by Foner (1972) suggest that a more complex relationship than that implied in the "aging-leads-to-political-conservatism" hypothesis exists between the two variables; on the whole, attitudinal change on specific political issues will be consistent with the change in the attitude of the population at large, whereas shift in general political ideologies will be in the conservative direction.

Although generalizations about the relationship of indicators of social stratification to parties in Western democracies are typically based on the socio-economic backgrounds of their respective electorates (e.g., Alford 1963, Lipset 1963: part II), there is some evidence that the same differences, albeit less pronounced, exist on the leadership level (e.g., Blondel 1963). Reliable voting behaviour data on the Indian electorate are scarce (for a recent review see Blair 1969: ch. 2), but we do have relatively more information on party identification among leaders. A recent examination of the socio-economic backgrounds of the members of Parliament is summarized by Kothari (1970: 205-207) as follows:

[T]he Congress party encompasses a wide variety of occupational groups, while some of the other parties have a more cohesive, and therefore narrow, base. This is especially true of the Swatantra Party and the two communist parties, though in quite opposite ways. The Swatantra seems to be a coalition of landed interests and former princes on the one hand and businessmen and retired civil servants on the other. Here it should be noted that although land-based occupations figure in a number of parties, the Swatantra attracts the erstwhile landed aristocracy more than the middle peasantry which figures more in the ranks of the Congress, the Jana Sangh, the DMK, and the two socialist parties. Similarly, although "trade and industry" figures in the Jana Sangh and DMK as well as in the Swatantra, the latter represents large-scale industrial interests while the former consists of smaller traders and shopkeepers. On the other hand, the two Communist parties draw overwhelmingly upon trade-unionists and other "professional" politicians and journalists.

From these assumptions and evidence dealing with relationships between social stratification and party identification, we may extrapolate to analogous types of

attitudes and behaviour in the realm of party factionalism by substituting factions for parties as our frame of reference.

Political Career Patterns and Factional Affiliation.

While there are numerous studies of career patterns of elites in many countries, there is little evidence that bears immediately on party or factional affiliation at a more abstract level. There is some evidence to the effect that just as upper-or middle-class status constitutes an important spring-board in the career modality of leaders of classic right-wing parties, a similar function is performed by involvement in some class organization (e.g., trade union) or in the party itself in the case of the left-wing parties. While the former can develop their autonomous system of recruitment internal to the party gradually and rely partly on social notables as well as its organizational apprentices, the latter can recruit their leaders primarily from the party. Thus, whereas the leadership of right-wing parties is typically conditioned by both internal and external factors, that of the left-wing parties is far more a product of intra-party recruitment and movement to the top is almost exclusively internal to the party. In the case of the latter experience and status in an auxiliary wing of the party or the party itself thus serves as a substitute for social status external to the party (Blondel 1963: 128-30).

Moreover, another source of variation in career patterns of party leaders likely to serve as a basis for factions is the organizational differentiation between the parliamentary party and the extra-parliamentary party organization. The patterns of linkages between the two and variables affecting them have been discussed elsewhere (Jowell 1973) and do not specifically concern us here. Suffice it to note here that the leaders with the major party of their careers moulded predominantly into one or the other of the two wings of the party often come to develop differences in perspectives as also a vested interest in the autonomy of their own unit or its domination over the other. The argument about the conflict of perspectives, in the case of working-class parties, between the mass membership party organization imbued with a special mission deriving from the traditions of the working-class movement and their more "domesticated" parliamentary wing seeking to broaden their appeals beyond workers and diluting the socialist doctrine in the process is well known. In addition to the need for broader electoral base, other factors contributing to deradicalization of the parliamentary wings of the working-class parties are, from the working-class militant's point of view, income and standard of living of parliamentarians and general atmosphere of Parliament that are characteristically middle-class (Duverger 1963: 190-92).

However, the pattern of greater radicalism of the external party organization than its parliamentary counterpart characteristic of working-class parties usually ought to be reversed in the case of predominantly middle-class parties of conservative or liberal orientations. For in the case of these parties, the parliamentary representatives, with greater concern with ensuring their electoral success by appealing to a broader stratum of population, ought to be more sensitive to the demands of the underprivileged groups than the party bureaucrats. In the Congress party of India, for example, the major conflicts in the national-level party since independence have typically tended to shape into one between a more conservative external party leadership and a mildly radical or liberal parliamentary party leadership.

Factional leaders may also differ in terms of their experiences and status at different levels of politics - local, state, and national - both within the party and other socio-political institutions. For instance, forces of tradition are usually stronger at local levels of politics than at the higher, where elements associated with modernization are more pronounced. Similarly, control or lack of control over local institutions may be differently associated with orientations and behaviour of party elites. For example, in a study of factionalism in the Congress party in Zila Parishads in Maharashtra, Mary Carras (1972: 186) found that one factor that consistently discriminated between the

"dissident" and "loyalist" Z. P. Congressmen was the association of the former with powerful local cooperative organizations and that of the latter with unorganized private economic interests.

Generational differences are another important aspect of political career background that may be differently related with party or factional affiliation. Shared common experiences and socialization during a specific historical period or attendance at a particular school or university create common memories and orientations, which, in turn, may lead to similar party or factional affiliation. For instance, in his study of French deputies, Dogan (1961: 87) found that the number of resisters to the Vichy regime and German occupation was differently represented in different parties - consistently higher among the Communists, Socialists, Gaullists, and Popular Republicans than among the moderate bloc and the Poujadists.

In India, participation in the pre-independence nationalist movement constitutes a significant political generational experience. With the complex and variegated motivational strands that the joiners brought to this movement, the socializing experiences and orientations acquired through them would probably also be very complex. As Barrington Moore (1966: 387-388) remarks:

The British occupation . . . called into existence an opposition movement, the Congress party, composed of intellectuals, such as Nehru, with a leaning toward socialism; solid businessmen to whom such

notions were poison; journalists, politicians, and lawyers who gave articulate expression to a wide variety of ideas - the whole resting on a peasant base newly awakened by Gandhi, who had in his makeup rather more of the traditional Indian holy man than of the modern politician.

However, it seems safe to assume that the highly Westernized intellectual participants of the movement typified by "the leftist, Cambridge-educated, fastidious, ambivalent Brahman intellectual, Jawaharlal Nehru" (Shils 1961: 41) were much more likely to be reinforced in their leftist political orientations than those with business or peasant background. Even the latter, through their constant exposure to Gandhi's "constructive" politics, must have come out with a definite commitment to some notion of social justice and fair play, however romantic and moderate. Party members with such an orientation, one would expect, should be more likely to support the moderately leftward course charted by Mrs. Gandhi in opposition to the conservative leadership of the external party.

The Contextual Variables

The importance of contextual variables as contingent or conjoint influences on political behaviour has increasingly been recognized by social scientists (the Volkonen and Scheuch papers in Dogan and Rokkan, eds., 1969: 53-68 and 133-135, respectively). The basic elementary logical structure of such explanations, in the words of Stinchcombe

(1968: 201),

take[s] the form of "environmental effects". The behaviour attached to some element (an individual, a point in space, a group) is explained by the characteristics of its environment (the group culture, the opportunities confronting the element, the characteristics of nearby points in space). Such environmental or contextual explanations involve forming concepts of the relations between elements and the environments The specification involves the specification of two components of environmental concepts: a variable characterizing the environment, and a variable characterizing the relation of the element to that environment.

This theoretical perspective has been fruitfully employed in research on party identification and voting and legislative behaviour. Studies have, for example, shown that not only is electoral support for different parties highly associated with socio-economic characteristics of constituencies, but that constituency variables often also hold one of the important keys to the explanation of party identification and other aspects of a legislator's behaviour.

Two types of environmental influences on factional alignment of party legislators can be mentioned. First, there is the impact of what may be called the "regional" environment. Party members coming from the same region of the country may be more likely to affiliate with a certain faction than those coming from other regions. The similarity of their regional background will lead to some degree of identity of socio-economic interests and similarly felt perceptions of local pressures. The similarity of their cultural backgrounds will promote greater social interaction among themselves in the

national capital, often at great distance from home. Similarity of political orientations might result from such experiences as interaction proceeds.⁵

A second form of influence of the environment is that of residential surrounding. It seems reasonable to assume that the predominant economic or occupational interest of the area will lead to the establishment of some standard or norm in terms of party or factional identification, which may vary in strength depending upon the homogeneity of the context. Blondel (1963: 65), for example, observes that in Britain "in middle-class districts, manual workers were less likely to vote Labour than in working-class districts". In addition, analyses of voting behaviour of legislators in the United States have yielded consistent support for appreciable constituency pressures on their behaviour.⁶

The environmental or contextual variables relevant for party or factional identification and support may be broadly divided into two major dimensions: (1) socio-economic and (2) political. The socio-economic environment subsumes, in addition to the ethnic and purely cultural aspects, the standard indices of general societal characteristics such as the nature and level of agricultural enterprise, proportion of non-agricultural employment, urbanization, literacy, mass-media, etc. In the context of a "transitional" society it can perhaps most comprehensively be summarized by the general concept of social mobilization, defined by Deutsch (1961:

494) as

the process by which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded and broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour.

The changes in individual socialization and behavioural patterns indicated above are assumed to result from the multi-faceted social changes which tend to transform traditional patterns of subsistence agriculture into a market-oriented one; alter older configurations of physical location, occupation, and reference groups (urbanization); open up new sources of information (literacy and mass media); and give rise to new orientations toward authority (political participation). In a similar vein, Lerner (1958) has sought to demonstrate strong correlation among three major indicators of social change - urbanization, literacy, and media - and between these and a psychological dimension of modernization, namely, "empathy". The temporal sequence of this development hypothesized by Lerner is that urbanization comes first, then literacy, followed, in turn, by mass media - all contributing to individual's modernity. Lerner's insights have been further pursued by McCrone and Cnudde (1967) in identifying a chain of causation through several stages.

These theoretical insights have come in for criticism in the subsequent comparative politics literature, which have attempted to clarify and modify the relationships among the social mobilization variables and between these and their assumed political consequences. On the theoretical plane,

the criticisms have centered around at least four themes. First, the assertion about social mobilization assuming "a single underlying process of which particular indicators represent only particular aspects" (Deutsch 1961: 495) has been challenged as an oversimplification of the changing social structure, which obscures the complex ways into which the supposedly traditional and modern elements interact. Such dichotomization acts as a conceptual blinker to the continued existence of traditional structures and processes alongside the modern ones as well as the potentiality of some traditional social structures (e.g., caste in India) to perform certain modern functions (e.g., electoral mobilization) without undergoing a radical transformation (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967).

Second, it has been argued that individuals affected by social mobilization do not immediately develop a fully articulated modern value system. Frequently, it leads to compartmentalization of cultural norms or to a plurality of value systems, different elements of which are appropriate for different settings (e.g., a more traditional norm for home and a more modern one for office, an implicit division of labour between the husband and wife on a vague modern/traditional line, a behaviour pattern adjustable to class norms in the city factory where one works and to those of caste in the village when he visits his folks during holidays (see Singer 1972 and Ames 1969)).

In addition, there have been attempts to specify the differential effects of the several social mobilization variables on modern mass politics, assuming that they may not be similarly operative as independent variables. For example, Cameron, Hendricks, and Hofferbert (1972: 262) criticise the tendency in the literature to treat urbanization and industrialization as simply two different indicators of the same underlying phenomenon, which

ignores the vast history of urban and commercial areas which existed well before the initial stages of the Industrial Revolution in the seventeenth century.

In an empirical analysis of political participation and partisanship in five widely divergent nations (France, Switzerland, the United States, Mexico, and India) they found that

contrary to much theory, urbanization as such does not have a positive impact on participation and leftist voting. Urbanization seems to be relatively unimportant for much of political life, with the exception of partisanship in the unique case of the United States and in countries dominated by one party reliant upon rural peripheries [India and Mexico]. Much of the reputed impact of urbanization on mass politics represents a misunderstanding of the contextual effects of industrialization (Cameron et al. 1972: 282).

Moreover, the earlier works in social mobilization theory have also been criticised for their tendency to conceptualize a unilinear process of political development, one that does not explicitly recognize the possibility of breakdown or decay on the road to modernity. As Huntington (1968: 35), the most prominent exponent of this line of attack, remarks:

A basic and frequently overlooked distinction exists between political modernization defined as movement from a traditional to a modern polity and political modernization defined as the political aspects and political effects of social, economic and cultural modernization. The former posits the direction in which political change theoretically should move. The latter describes the political changes which actually occur in modernizing countries. The gap between the two is often vast. Modernization in practice always involves change in and usually the disintegration of a traditional political system, but it does not necessarily involve significant movement toward a modern political system. Yet the tendency has been to assume that what is true for the broader social processes of modernization is also true for political changes.

Deutsch (1961: 501) did show some awareness of this problem inasmuch as he pointed to the contingent role played in this process by the social composition of a nation, such that mobilization will lead to political development in homogeneous societies, while it would have a more turbulent course in heterogeneous nations. However, the main contribution of Huntington's critique is the recognition that, irrespective of the degree of homogeneity of a nation, an unfavourable ratio of political "institutionalization" to political participation may lead to political decay.

Finally, the radicalization theories dealing with the political effects of rapid social mobilization in developing nations has also been criticised as being overstated and loosely articulated. As Joan M. Nelson (1969: 44-45) remarks:

The problem lies not with the broad outlines of the theory, but with its failure to consider rates and leakages. If expectations [among the urban poor] rise more slowly than aspirations, and if small improvements

are felt as real progress, or if the society is viewed as essentially open despite individual disappointments, then frustration may grow more slowly than the theorists assume. If political awareness spreads gradually, discontinuously, and unevenly among the urban poor; if the connection between political awareness and political action is less automatic and more influenced by the political and social setting than the theory implies; and if the urban poor are less disposed to blame the government for their troubles than are the more privileged, then the likelihood that frustration will be channeled into political protest is reduced regardless of the level of frustration. A great deal of discontent will "leak" out of the political system described by the model into other, apolitical responses. [Moreover], the probability that political protest will take the specific forms of violence and/or radicalism is strongly conditioned by the existing political climate and institutions.

There is no fully articulated theory of relationships between social mobilization and "factional" phenomenon. However, one could extrapolate or infer from findings on a number of related or analogous phenomena. At a more abstract level, one general political consequence of social mobilization is that, as a population undergoes changes related to social mobilization in its environment, people living in such environments tend to develop an associational or organizational life different from that characterizing more traditional settings (Nie, Powell, and Prewitt 1969). Possibly the most comprehensive way of thinking about this dimension is in terms of David Apter's (1965: 123-24) theorization about the most direct impact of modernization on traditional societies being "the formation of new roles associated with the modernizing process". Conceiving role as "a functionally defined position in a social system" embodying "norms of conduct and expectations",

he delineates three broad types of roles - "traditional", "accommodationist", and "new" or modern - and asserts that the essence of modernizing politics is the result of conflicts between these three types of roles. "The claims put forward", writes Apter (1965: 123-24), "by competing political groups, each representing some portion of the total stratification system, are the means by which role malintegration is transformed into political conflict".

More concretely, extrapolating from the literature on voting for leftist political parties,⁷ one could hypothesize that the strength of leftist or liberal parties and factions ought to be associated with higher levels of social mobilization, especially where such mobilization includes industrialization and second or third-generation urban migrants. For industrialization provides a more hospitable setting for the development of class consciousness among workers. And the more recent migrants to the city "who come directly from rural areas are likely to have little political interest and awareness, and may bring with them ingrained attitudes of fatalism and habits of deference to authority" (Nelson 1969: 21).

If the level of social mobilization in a society is relatively low, the lower-strata groups may be more amenable to manipulation by upper-strata groups, leading to a transportation of patron-client relationships from the social plane to the political. In such a situation, upper social groups may compete among themselves as factions or parties,

with the subordinate groups playing a secondary role. Political competition among elites will take place without much reference to ideological or policy issues; the real issues will be whether there are enough positions of power to be allotted and who will get them. This was, for example, the nature of factional conflict in the Bihar Pradesh Congress during the 1950s and most of the 1960s when political competition within the predominant party could be described basically in terms of conflict and coalition among the four elite castes - Bhunihar Brahmans, Rajputs, Brahmans, and Kayasthas, with lower-caste leaders playing a secondary role (Roy 1966: Ch. 7). The same is more or less true for other state Congress parties.

However, with increasing social mobilization, new pressures for meaningful political participation on behalf of the newly politicized groups emerge. With such a development, party and factional conflicts tend more and more to get linked with social stratification and ideological and policy issues assume greater salience. Such trends have tended to become more evident in the Indian National Congress as well as in most state Congress parties, though the nature of factional conflict has hardly become predominantly "ideological".

To take the political tack, which I have already partly touched upon above, this dimension does not exist in isolation; it is, in fact, typically associated with the socio-economic aspects of the environment. As the socio-economic context

changes, it leads to concomitant changes in the style and content of political activity and organization. At an abstract level, the process is probably best summarized by Eisenstadt (1966: 15):

Perhaps the most important aspect of [political modernization] is that . . . new problems and forms of political organization tend to develop continually and new groups are continually drawn into the central political orbit; and that their problems, interests, and demands tend more and more to impinge on the central political institutions, on the selection of rulers, on the creation and crystallization of central political symbols, and on the choice and implementation of different major policies.

In terms of political parties, the central political infrastructures of modern and modernizing societies, this would mean the emergence of a complex spectrum of interest group and associational activity, increased mass participation and a more competitive, though not necessarily more institutionalized, party system.

The question of primary interest to us here is: To what extent patterns of factional affiliation within a party, especially in a majority party, are related to variations in the political environment operationalized in terms of party system variables? Again there is little in the literature having a direct bearing on this question. I will therefore again attempt to cull some relevant themes from the political party literature and extrapolate from them. To this end, I will consider the following three important aspects of party system: (1) the degree of interparty competition; (2) the political colouration of the competition, defined by the

ideological and policy orientations of the principal competing parties; and (3) mass electoral turnout or participation.

It seems reasonable to hypothesize that the greater the interparty competition, the greater the likelihood of pressure on parties to mobilize support among the lower socio-economic status groups by recruiting and coopting leaders from lower strata and by following more liberal policies. For example, Key (1951: 298-314) in his seminal work on the southern party systems in the United States suggests that the states with lower degrees of competition tend to follow conservative policies in the interests of upper socio-economic groups. Similarly, Lockard (1959: 320-340) in his study of the New England states concludes that greater interparty competition was associated with more liberal public policies, especially in the welfare service area.

The evidence seems to be a bit contradictory about the hypothesized effects of party competitiveness on leadership recruitment. For instance, Heuwinkel and Wiggins (1973), on the basis of data on American state party systems, conclude that party competitiveness appeared to have little or no association with demographic traits of party leaders, which were better predicted by contextual urbanism and personal party identification. However, other studies at the sub-state levels in the United States have found that whereas the dominant party attracts a larger proportion of upper socio-economic status leaders, in situation of greater competitiveness,

parties were more prone to recruit leaders who were, in proportionate terms, a more mixed lot; alongside leaders from upper social strata there were sizeable proportions of leaders who were young, of lower socio-economic status, and of "marginal" ethnic or religious backgrounds (Patterson 1963, Pomper 1965, Bowman and Boynton 1966, and Conway and Feigert 1968). These findings easily lead to the hypothesis that in factional groupings within the majority party, leaders from more competitive contexts ought to be more prone to affiliate with the liberal faction and those from less competitive situations with the conservative faction.

Now, coming to the ideological content and direction of the pattern of interaction among parties, it is easy to conclude, from all we know about the conventional wisdom regarding the right/left ideological axis in politics, that a majority party legislator coming from a context where the main source of opposition is rightist parties ought to feel a pressure to move toward the conservative faction within his own party, while the one who faces a leftist main opposition in his constituency should feel a pressure toward the liberal faction.

It is rather difficult to offer a single, clear-cut hypothesis about the relationship between mass electoral participation in the legislator's environment and his factional affiliation. Normally, one would expect that, since social mobilization generates pressures for political participation, a more participant context would exert a more

liberal local pressure on the legislator. Areas of low turnout from this perspective would typically be more traditionally oriented and conservative in political style. On the other hand, several studies in India have shown that a high voting turnout might stem from such factors as personal or dominant group influence or patron-client relationships (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967 and Elkins 1974). In such a context, high participation may, in fact, reflect the continuing force of tradition and influence of patron-brokers. As Weiner (1971: 185) remarks, at least initially

the spread of political participation in underdeveloped, former colonial societies generally means an increase in the power of what is typically described as "traditional" social groups as opposed to "modern" elites.

The Settings

Coming finally to the structural and cultural settings at the level both of polity and party within which the members of a party work, these are certainly important in terms of sensitizing one in a general, inferential sort of way as to the theoretical expectations about the prospects for party cohesion and patterns of factionalism in a certain party, given the nature of the political system and that of the party itself. Zariski (1960), for instance, has attempted to offer some hypotheses about the differential effects of the electoral system, the party system, the party organization, and the social structure on bi- and multi-factional patterns of

intraparty competition.

There seems to have been no attempt to specify what subcultural cleavages under what conditions are likely to be party-forming and what likely to be manifested in factionalism, although Lipset and Rokkan (1968) indirectly concern themselves with this problem in attempting to identify four critical cleavages (viz., the center-periphery, state-church, land-industry, and owner-worker) and four corresponding crucial junctures in national histories (viz., the Reformation-Counterreformation, National Revolutions, Industrial Revolution, and Russian Revolution) affecting the bases of European party systems.

These are interesting theoretical insights, but it is apt to point out that an approach based on these, although by no means without merit if used comparatively, is not a particularly enlightening perspective as a means of explanation for the problem of our primary concern here, namely, patterns of factional affiliation among the party elites. The reason is methodological. Since this study is intended to be a case study of a single party rather than a comparative study of a variety of parties, there is no way to vary the structural and cultural factors and systematically examine their differential impacts on party affiliation pattern. For this reason, therefore, the main explanatory burden in this paradigm must rest with elite background and contextual variables.

However, the settings of this kind might affect the freedom of play of influences on factional affiliation within a party. That is, one would assume that a party or party system in which institutionalized norms and procedures have temporarily broken down, which certainly was the case at the time of the Congress split in 1969, might give more scope for pressures and influences on members, and greater scope for individual members or groups to operate.

The Methodology

The quantitative parts of this study of the 1969 Congress split at the national level seek to analyse factional or splinter party affiliation of the Congress members of the Lok Sabha. The choice of focus on the Congress Parliamentary Party (excluding Rajya Sabha, the upper house) members was dictated, in addition to the easier availability of data, by the cross-sectional representative character of this body as well as the centrality of the Parliament in the parliamentary-federal system of India.⁸ Two alternative research populations at the national level - the All-India Congress Committee and

the Congress Working Committee - were ignored, the former because of the lack of sufficiently detailed and exhaustive information of non-survey origin about this rather large rank and file body (N = 711), and the latter because it is too small in size (N = 21) to permit any meaningful analytical elaboration. Besides, the most powerful national leaders of the party usually hold overlapping membership in the Congress Working Committee as well as in the Parliamentary Party.

The universe of parliamentarians to be analyzed consists of all Congress and Syndicate Congress members of the fourth Lok Sabha elected in 1967. In 1967, the pre-split Congress elected 297 members, of whom 60 went with the Syndicate when the split occurred in 1969 (excluding nominated members and those who died before the split).

The data used in this analysis were compiled from the usual major sources of non-survey data, namely, the press reports and standard biographical publications for elite backgrounds and census and other government and non-government sources of aggregate data on ecological variables.⁹

While the conceptualization and operationalization of the set of independent variables employed in the study will be unfolded as the analysis proceeds, the measurement of the central dependent variable, factional or splinter-party affiliation, may be best introduced here. As the description of the party schism in Chapter 3 indicated, during the six-month crisis that eventually split the party, there were

several important points at which the members could have exercised their option to affiliate with either of the two major factions of the party. These were the Bangalore AICC session (second week of July, 1969), when the conflict between the two factions first openly flared up; Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai's "resignation" and Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi's bank nationalization decision (third week of July); the Presidential election (mid-August); the formal breach in the CWC or the "High Command" reflected in two parallel meetings (November 1); the Lok Sabha voting division (November 18), in which the Syndicate MPs voted with the opposition; and the parallel AICC sessions toward the year-end. In measuring the dependent variable, an attempt was made, with the help of press reports, to ascertain the factional affiliation of all Congress Lok Sabha members and stratify them along the time dimension in terms of early-to-late identifiers for each of the two major factions. However, gaps in information about a substantial number of MPs in the early phases of conflict forced me to fix the major cut-off point at the November 18 Parliamentary (Lok Sabha) division, at which time an exhaustive listing of the 57 members of the pre-split congress party voting against the Congress government (plus three absentees also reportedly affiliated with the Syndicate) became available (The Times of India, November 19, 1969, p. 7). However, in the case of some MPs (N = 23), it could be reliably established that they had changed sides either prior to or after

the November 18 parliamentary division. Using all of this information, the variable "factional affiliation" has been so measured and constructed as to present a scale of decreasing loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi: (1) the "strongly pro-Indira" or those who remained loyal to her throughout (N =); (2) the "pro-Indira waverers" or those who switched over to her faction from the Syndicate (N =); the "pro-Syndicate waverers" or those who left her faction to join the Syndicate (N =); and (4) the "strongly pro-Syndicate" or those who consistently remained with the Syndicate (N =). In the analysis the strong identifiers and waverers belonging to the same faction will often be combined where they do not show a markedly different pattern of relationship with the independent variable and when, in controlling for several variables, we run out of cases or are left with a very small number of cases.

Notes to Chapter V

¹For a brief review of and references pertaining to current theories of political recruitment, see Budge and Farlie (1975). They have succinctly summarized this theoretical perspective as follows: "Resources, motivations and political opportunities constitute the major elements in [the] paradigm [of political recruitment, which] regard[s] social characteristics as providing the resources for activism, psychological predispositions the motivations, and political structure the opportunities".

²See Festinger and Aronson, in Cartwright and Zander, eds. (1968: 125-26); and Bem (1970).

³For a comprehensive review and application of cross-pressures" theories, see Peter W. Sperlich (1971).

⁴For a comprehensive review of the political socialization research, see Dawson and Prewitt (1969); for an anthology of some of the more influential empirical works on political socialization, see Dennis, ed. (1973).

⁵In a study of informal social interaction among the Indian MPs, it was found that "neither national ties among M.P.s through party relationships nor state ties among M.P.s across party lines were the predominant patterns. In fact, the predominant patterns of association were cross-state, regional patterns. That is, strong associations among M.P.s from Madras and Andhra, from Madras and Kerala, from West Bengal and Orissa, from Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, from Uttar Pradesh and Delhi were found to occur even more frequently than associations among M.P.s from the same state" (Brass 1961 unpublished, cited in Brass 1967: 266).

⁶The literature on the topic is too vast to be fully referenced here; see especially Blondel (1966), the Miller and Stokes paper in Patterson, ed. (1968), and Patterson and Wahlke, eds. (1972).

⁷Although a bit dated, Lipset (1963: ch. 7) is still the most comprehensive review of this literature.

⁸On the theme of the evolution of the parliament as a central and autonomous center of power within the Indian political system, a development unusual among the new states, see Hart (1971).

⁹Among newspapers, the most carefully combed source was The Times of India (New Delhi); also checked, though less systematically, were The Statesman Weekly (Calcutta), The Asian Recorder (New Delhi), and the Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London).

The biographical data were collected from Lok Sabha secretariat, Parliament of India: Fourth Lok Sabha: Who's Who, 1967, and Parliament of India: Fifth Lok Sabha: Who's Who, 1971 (New Delhi 1967 and 1971, respectively, both 1st ed.), and The Times of India Directory and Yearbook 1969 (Bombay: The Times of India Press, 1969).

The primary sources of demographic data used were the vast array of 1961 census volumes published by the union and state governments, especially, A. Mitra, Census of India 1961, Vol. I, Part I-A (i) Text and Part I-A (ii) Tables, Levels of Regional Development in India (Delhi: Manager of Publications, Government of India, 1965 and 1966).

The major sources of electoral data were Chandidas and others, India Votes: A Sourcebook on Indian Elections (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1968) and Baxter, District Voting Trends in India: A Research Tool (New York: Southern Asian Institute, School of International Affairs, Columbia University, 1969), which are more handy and more directly useable for the period covered than the official publications of the Indian Election Commission.

CHAPTER VI

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ELITE BACKGROUNDS

AND THE CONGRESS SPLIT

In this chapter, I will survey certain socio-economic and political career background characteristics of the pro-Indira Congress and Syndicate members of the CPP (fourth Lok Sabha). The enterprise is both descriptive and explanatory - descriptive inasmuch as it locates and compares the backgrounds of the leaders of the two factions, and explanatory inasmuch as it does approach this task with certain expectations derived either from theory or previous research regarding the "pressures" of the background variables on the member's factional affiliation. But such expectations are hardly hypotheses as the word is more restrictively understood.

The chapter is divided into two broad parts. The first part is devoted to the analysis of socio-economic backgrounds of the MPs and the second part to their political career patterns. The analysis of personal social and political backgrounds of the members in this chapter and their socio-political contexts in the one following it are carried out, for analytical convenience, in isolation from each other. A combined analysis of personal backgrounds and contextual variables will be carried out in chapter 8.¹

Socio-Economic Background

From my discussion in earlier chapters it was evident that, although both pro-Indira faction and the Syndicate were basically pragmatic, the former was more liberal and the latter conservative in temperament. In Chapter 5, a brief review of the theory and previous research suggested that the nucleus of the leadership of right-wing parties and factions typically comes from established community or class leaders, while that of the liberal and left-wing parties and factions comes from marginal groups with inconsistent status in the society and from lower status groups. It was also pointed out that women are likely to be more conservative and that aging is associated with a shift to conservative political attitudes. This chapter attempts to expand on some of these themes empirically and analyse the 1969 Congress split in the light of these hypotheses. The primary objective is to see if the schism in the party can be traced to the differences in the personal backgrounds of the leaders.

Age and Generation

Table 6.1 shows that there is a curvilinear relationship between age and factional affiliation. Although in all age groups the pro-Indira elements predominate, this predominance is greater among the youngest and the oldest MPs. Among the Syndicate's adherents, the modal category is that of medium-high age, with sizeable proportions falling

into high and medium-low categories. Support for it was weakest among the youngest age-group.

TABLE 6.1

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY AGE

<u>Year of Birth</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation (%)</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
1882-1912	78.5	21.5	(93)
1913-1920	71.1	28.9	(76)
1921-1927	77.4	22.6	(62)
1928-1946	88.3	11.7	(60)
Cramer's V = .14			
Gamma = -.14			

Age, is however, a complex or global independent variable encompassing a host of components and overlapping with several other variables such as cohort (generational) differences in socialization. The sources of the confounding effects of generational differences in socialization may be very diverse. Age might reflect the fact of living through a particular time in history and common experiences, orientations, and memories thus acquired (e.g., participation in the Indian national independence movement). Alternatively, it

might stem from differences on other aspects of career patterns (e..g, parliamentary seniority, ministerial or party-organizational position, etc.). While I will return to the theme of career patterns in a succeeding section, the generational interpretation can be explored right here.

In chapter 5, it was pointed out that participation in the Indian nationalist movement prior to independence can be treated as a significant, historically specific political generational experience. The movement was very eclectic and therefore presumably divergent in its esoteric culture, inasmuch as it comprised people with all kinds of backgrounds and attitudes. However, there was a considerable degree of commonality among them, or at least one gets this impression from the image of the typical participants of the movement that emerges from the literature: urban, English-educated, belonging to one of the modern intellectual professions, nationalist, liberal, and motivationally oriented toward "intrinsic" rewards in politics such as public service. This is generally contrasted with the image of the post-independence elites recruited by the Congress as the ruling party: rural, less highly educated and increasingly through vernacular media; more appreciative of India's regional diversity; conservative; and motivationally oriented toward "extrinsic" political rewards such as social prestige, influence, income and career opportunities. Several scholars have noted the gradual displacement of the nationalist generation by the

post-nationalist one in the Congress, especially at the state-level but also at the national.

In terms of factional affiliation, one would expect the participants of the nationalist movement more than the non-participants to align with the liberal pro-Indira faction. The category of non-participants, who did not join the movement for the reason of then being too young, must be separated from the older non-participants. For whereas the latter could have joined the movement but chose not to, the former did not have a choice (I have taken 1930 as the cutting-off year on the assumption that the youngest among those born prior to 1930 would have been about 17 during the latest nationalist campaigns during the 1940s and still in a position, age-wise, to exercise the choice). The older non-participants, one would expect, ought to be more likely to affiliate with the conservative Syndicate. The post-nationalist generation, on the other hand, ought to be more likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi. The assumption behind this expectation is, besides the tendency of the younger generation to be more liberal, their generally low status in the party and the chances of speedy career advancement in case Mrs. Gandhi's revolt against the party oligarchs succeeded.

As Table 6.2 shows, though the majority in all generational categories affiliated with the pro-Indira Congress, the post-independence generation MPs fell most solidly behind Mrs. Gandhi, closely followed by the participants of the

nationalist movement. The major component of the Syndicate's adherents came from the non-participating pre-independence generation MPs. The support for the Syndicate was weakest among the post-independence generation MPs.

TABLE 6.2

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY PARTICIPATION
IN NATIONAL MOVEMENT

<u>Movement</u> <u>Participation</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation (%)</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
Participants	79.1	20.8	(120)
Non-Participants (Born Pre-1930)	74.6	25.3	(134)
Post-Independence Generation (Born Post-1930)	88.9	11.2	(36)
Cramer's V =			

If participation in the nationalist movement increases the probability of support for Mrs. Gandhi, then the variation in the degree of involvement in the movement should also be reflected in the factional affiliation of the MPs. That is, a greater involvement in the movement ought to further increase the likelihood of alignment with the pro-Indira Congress. Comparisons on these lines showed that the jail-going participants were slightly more likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi

(79.9%) than the non-jail-going participants (76.4%).

There may be some overlap between the generational differences here considered and some aspects of political career such as parliamentary seniority, etc. I will return to this matter in a subsequent section.

Social stratification

The social stratification system of contemporary India, with its mixtures of traditional and modern criteria of status, is determined both by ascription (e.g., caste) and achievement (e.g., education, occupation, income, etc.). While the ascriptive principles still continue to be partially operative, they are increasingly being supplanted by achievement principles, and in the process, getting reduced to the position of being no more than contributory factors to status by affecting the life-chances and life-styles of the offspring. Many more avenues of upward mobility for the low status groups - education, employment outside the traditionally defined hereditary occupations, mostly in modest but also in higher status modern occupations, and politics itself (with highly prized positions) - are now available, supplanting or replacing typical and usually less effective older methods of upward mobility such as sanskritization, sanyas, or religious conversion.²

To what extent did the split occur along lines of the social stratification system? Three different indices of

social status are employed to examine this: caste, education, and occupation. For lack of data, I had to exclude income, a highly useful measure of status inasmuch as it could have allowed us to come to grips with sub-stratifications within, say, occupations.

The relationships of the three facets of status employed in this study with the dependent variable of primary concern are presented in Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. Caste is shown to be inversely related to factional affiliation; that is, loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi, though substantial in all caste groups, on the whole, tended to increase with the decreasing levles of caste. Education exercised a positive influence on factional affiliation; there was a modest trend for those with low or no formal education to fall less solidly behind Mrs. Gandhi.

There is an appreciable degree of association between occupation and factional affiliation. The first-order relationship revealed by the table is that those with upper-class occupations, though not very sizeable in number, were, as might have been expected, the only occupational group to give majority support to the Syndicate; in the rest of the occupational categories the pro-Indira MPs predominated. However, within this broad pattern, a second-order curvilinear relationship can be identified. The pro-Indira Congress shows considerable differences with respect to the proportion of its adherents in various occupational categories; modern middle-class

TABLE 6.3

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY CASTE

<u>Caste</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
Upper Castes	74.3	25.7	(113)
Middle Castes	84.7	15.2	(46)
Scheduled Castes	78.8	21.2	(52)
Cramer's V = .10			
Gamma = -.15			

NOTES: Cases were grouped into upper, middle, and Scheduled castes on the basis of their Varna status. That is, upper castes correspond with the Dwija ("twice-born") castes, middle castes with "clean" Shudra (servicing) castes, and Scheduled castes with "unclean" Shudras.³

TABLE 6.4
 FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS
 BY EDUCATION

<u>Education</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
High ^a	78.9	21.1	(204)
Medium ^b	80.5	19.5	(41)
Low ^c	71.0	28.9	(38)
Cramer's V = .07			
Gamma = .10			

NOTES: a. High = University or college graduate (Indian/foreign university).

b. Medium = Mentions attendance at college or university or private education, but not the degree attained.

c. Low = High school or below.

TABLE 6.5

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS

BY OCCUPATION

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Occupation</u>		Total
	Traditional	Modern	
Upper Class	36.4 (11)	33.3 (3)	35.7 (14)
Middle Class	76.7 (120)	89.0 (109)	84.4 (229)
"Professional Politicians" & Social Workers			68.6 (35)
Lower Class			100.0 (4)
Cramer's V = .31			

NOTES: Traditional Upper Class = Ex-princes. Modern Upper class = Industrialists. Traditional Middle Class Agriculturist, merchants or businessmen, monks and sadhus (saints), and Ayurvedic doctors. The category "agriculturist" is hazy and does not permit distinction between owner-farmers and tenant-cultivators. Modern Middle Class = Lawyers, doctors, university or college teachers, journalists, former civil servants, former diplomats, former military officers, writers or authors, engineers, movie-makers and stars, students, chartered accountants, insurance agents and officers. "Professional Politicians" and Social Workers = MPs who report their occupation as such. It gives little idea as to the source of their regular income, but probably they are dependent on joint families and are more likely to have farming background. Lower Middle Class = School teachers, salaried employees such as clerks, accountants, etc., of government and private agencies, cooperatives, etc.

and lower-class MPs swung in line with Mrs. Ganshi's moderate radicalism much more than the traditional middle-classes and professional politicians. This again might have been expected, given the overall secular trends in the composition of the Congress elite discussed in an earlier chapter. The rise of the Syndicate itself is generally attributed to the gradual displacement of the English-educated, urban, modern middle-class leaders of the nationalist movement phase of the Congress by the post-independence breed of rural-based and conservative, traditional middle-class politicians who first captured the party organization outside the legislatures and then made their way into the legislative and governmental wings.

Another aspect worth exploring is whether there are any variations in factional affiliation related to such factors as intra-occupational differentiations based on prestige accruing from greater professional success, especially within the minimally professionalized modern middle-class occupations. It was assumed that those graduating from more prestigious universities should be likely to be more successful within their professions as compared to their other professional colleagues graduating from less prestigious institutions. For carrying out this comparison, universities and colleges attended by the MPs were divided into three broad categories; (1) foreign and/or "A"-grade modern Indian universities and colleges, covering the oldest, nineteenth century Indian

universities, "central" or federal universities, premier state universities, and technological universities and institutes; (2) "B"-class modern Indian universities and colleges of recent origin; (3) "Nationalist" universities (originating during the independence movement in reaction against the Western-style universities) and theological schools (all Muslim or Buddhist). In cases of overlap, the member was coded according to the institution of his graduation.

When the type of university was held constant, some interesting patterns emerged. As Table 6.6, displays, although there are not sufficient cases to generalize from in many cells of the table, concentrating on the ones with enough cases, one finds that attendance at a foreign or an A-grade Indian university decreased the likelihood of alignment with Mrs. Gandhi among the MPs in the upper class and the traditional middle-class occupational categories, but it had an opposite effect among the modern middle-class and professional politicians.

To sum up, the three indices of social stratification here utilized - caste, education, and occupation - were differently related to factional affiliation. Caste was negatively associated with loyalty for Mrs. Gandhi, education positively, and occupation had a more complex pattern of relationship with the dependent variable. Whereas MPs in the upper-class occupations of both modern and traditional type were more likely to align with the Syndicate and those

TABLE 6.6.

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY OCCUPATION,
CONTROLLING FOR TYPE OF UNIVERSITY

<u>Type of University</u>	<u>Upper Class</u> <u>(Trad. & Modern)</u>			<u>Modern</u> <u>Middle Class</u>			<u>Occupation</u> <u>Traditional</u> <u>Middle Class</u>			<u>Professional</u> <u>Politicians</u>			<u>Lower</u> <u>Middle</u> <u>Class</u>		
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%
Foreign/A-Grade Modern Indian	33.3	(12)	93.4	(86)	76.6	(47)	70.6	(17)	*	*					*
B-Grade Modern Indian	*	*	88.4	(15)	85.2	(27)	83.4	(6)	100.0	(1)					
"Nationalist" & Theological	*	*	0.0	(1)	85.0	(8)	*	*	100.0	(3)					
Non-University	50.0	(2)	100.0	(4)	69.0	(29)	40.0	(5)	*	*					*
Total ^a	35.7	(14)	89.0	(109)	76.7	(120)	68.6	(35)	100.0	(4)					

NOTE: a. In some cases, Ns do not add up to the N in the total because of missing observations in the control variable.

in the lower middle-class occupations with the pro-Indira Congress, the MPs in the traditional and modern components of the middle-class occupations were found to be divergent in their factional affiliation pattern. Although Mrs. Gandhi received the majority support among both the modern and traditional middle-class MPs, the former were more likely to align with her and the latter with the Syndicate. The Syndicate also made an appreciable dent into Mrs. Gandhi's support among the MPs who saw themselves as "professional politicians"; in fact, this group was next only to the former princes and industrialists in the proportion of its support for the Syndicate.

Since the three indices of social stratification here considered are differently associated with factional alignment, they do not fulfill Lazarsfeld's (1967: 190) criterion of "interchangeability of indices" such that they can be treated as interchangeable empirical referents of the broader concept of social status. Nor can they be combined, for the same reason, into one composite index to examine the joint effects of them all. However, there may be some overlap between caste, education, and occupation. To check for these confounding influences, I will re-examine the relationships between caste and occupation, on the one hand, and factional affiliation, on the other, controlling in each case for education. For education may well be responsible for the vague modern/traditional division in the personal backgrounds of the MPs and its implications for their factional affiliation.

When education was controlled, it failed to wipe out the original negative association between caste and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi among those with the highest or lowest education, though the relationship, for some strange reason, turned positive among those with medium education (Table 6.7). However, though education employed as a test factor here did not yield consistently explicable results, within each group of castes higher levels of education led to a greater probability of alignment with Mrs. Gandhi.

In the case of occupation and factional affiliation Table 6.8 reveals that, with education held constant, in practically every cell of the table with sufficient cases to generalize there was either a slight increase in the likelihood of support for Mrs. Gandhi among the better educated MPs or no appreciable departure from the patterns in the source table. Thus, both occupation and education independently influenced factional affiliation in a manner that, though the modern middle-class and lower middle-class MPs were more likely than those in the upper and traditional middle classes or those who were professional politicians to align with Mrs. Gandhi, higher education moderately reinforced this likelihood in most occupations.

Religion

Although some regard racial and ethnic minorities as "nonstatus groups" (Jackson and Curtis 1968: 125), most stratification theorists seem to consider minority group

TABLE 6.7

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY CASTE,

CONTROLLING FOR EDUCATION

<u>Education</u>	<u>Upper</u>		<u>Caste</u>		<u>Scheduled</u>		<u>Cramer's V</u>	<u>Gamma</u>
	<u>Castes</u>		<u>Middle</u>		<u>Castes</u>			
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)		
High	74.4	(82)	85.3	(34)	84.4	(27)	.13	-.27
Medium	76.5	(17)	100.0	(5)	62.5	(8)	.28	.15
Low	62.5	(8)	71.4	(7)	70.0	(10)	.10	-.11
Total ^a	74.3	(113)	84.7	(46)	78.8	(52)	.10	-.15

NOTE: a. In some cases, Ns do not add up to the N in the total because of missing observations in the control variable.

TABLE 6.8

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY OCCUPATION,
CONTROLLING FOR EDUCATION

<u>Education</u>	<u>Occupation</u>						<u>Cramer's V</u>				
	<u>Upper Class (Traditional & Modern)</u>	<u>Modern Middle Class</u>	<u>Traditional Middle Class</u>	<u>Professional Politicians</u>	<u>Lower Middle Class</u>						
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)			
High	36.4	(11)	88.0	(100)	75.8	(62)	71.4	(21)	100.0	(3)	.31
Medium	0.0	(2)	100.0	(5)	84.0	(25)	71.4	(7)	100.0	(1)	.50
Low	100.0	(1)	100.0	(3)	70.4	(27)	50.0	(6)	*	*	.28
Total ^a	35.7	(14)	89.0	(109)	76.7	(120)	68.6	(35)	100.0	(4)	.31

NOTE: a. In some cases, Ns do not add up to the N in the total because of missing observations in the control variable.

affiliation as an important secondary dimension of social stratification (Barber 1968: 290-93). Studies of variations in some aspects of political differentiation within different religious groups have lent support to this view. For example, the "outgroup" minority communities, such as Catholics, Jews, and Blacks in the United States, irrespective of social class, typically identify with or support political parties with a liberal political outlook (Campbell and others 1964: ch. 6; Lipset 1970: ch. 9, Lenski 1963: ch. 4). These considerations easily lead to the expectation that the Congress split will leave a disproportionately larger number of Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Parsees, Buddhists, and Scheduled Tribes⁴ on the side of the pro-Indira Congress, rather than with the Syndicate.

Classification of factional identification according to religious affiliation, as displayed in Table 6.9, shows that, although the pro-Indira Congress could claim a majority support within all religious communities, this support was not of the same magnitude. It had a relatively smaller proportion of affiliates among the Hindus and the Scheduled Tribes (the figure for the Parsees, with only one case, should be ignored) than among other religious groups. With the exception of the Scheduled Tribes, the members belonging to minority religious communities - whether socially advanced (the Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs) or socially backward (the Buddhists and many Christians, being converts from low-status Hindu Scheduled Castes or from Scheduled Tribes) - were more

TABLE 6.9
FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS
BY RELIGION

<u>Religion</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation (%)</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
Hindu ^a	77.4	22.6	(239)
Muslim	100.0	0.0	(13)
Christian	100.0	0.0	(6)
Sikh	85.7	14.3	(7)
Parsee	0.0	100.0	(1)
Buddhist	100.0	0.0	(3)
Scheduled Tribes ^b	69.6	30.4	(23)
Cramer's V = .20			

NOTE: a. Includes three cases of Jains, 100% of whom aligned with Mrs. Gandhi.

b. The category Scheduled Tribes, though a distinct ethnic group subsuming the aboriginal tribes, is not strictly a religious category.

united in their support for Mrs. Gandhi than the members of the majority community.

Organized Interest Group Activity

The infrastructure of the organized interest group system in India is increasingly becoming an important factor in the politics of the country. Quite a few interests are still in the process of crossing the threshold of latency. Some have become politicized without being stably organized, often articulating their demands anomically, and some among those that have, in fact, become politically manifest and organized lack autonomy, being "colonized" by political parties, and are fragmented along party lines. Caste and community associations exist side by side with functional interest groups, though the latter have tended to become more salient. Typically, the more active organized groups have emerged in relatively more economically productive sectors such as farming, business, the middle-class "salarariat" and the industrial proletariat, and the more socially backward and geographically less mobile groups such as landless farm labourers are among the most exploited and lest organized, especially in the areas unaffected by the so-called Green Revolution. The industrial labour force is more unionized and better paid and protected, but frequently led by middle-class and upper-caste leaders. Added to these aspects of uneven growth is the handicap of the Indian political culture, shared more or less by both the elite and the mass, in which the

organized groups must function: group politics is even more suspect and subject to basic distrust by most Indians than even majoritarian democratic politics because of the fundamental tensions between these modern values and the idealized traditional norms of consensus and the sacrifice of self-interest for the common interest. With the increasing exposure to the actual operation of democratic and interest group politics, this orientation may, however, be changing.⁴

Being a success-oriented, catch-all, and predominant party, the Congress has a signal advantage in attracting interest groups, and although organized group activity is not the typical route to the top party organizational and ministerial positions (only 30 % of the CWC members and 25% of the ministers or junior ministers reported organized group affiliation), attachment with at least some functionally organized group is characteristic of nearly 62% of Congress Lok Sabha (4th) members.

Does affiliation with organized group activities generally, or affiliation with specific types of organized groups, affect the patterns of factional affiliation among the members? Table 6.10 shows that affiliation with some or at least one organized functional or "horizontal" group leads to a moderate rise in the likelihood of support for Mrs. Gandhi. The Syndicate leadership lost badly in its bid for the loyalty of the pre-split Congress Lok Sabha members, whether attached to some organized group or to none at all, but it did slightly

better among the latter. This would seem to indicate the Syndicate's reliance on patron-client or machine-style politics, typically marked by a low salience of concern for broad policies and manipulation of political support through patronage or primordial loyalties.

TABLE 6.10

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY ORGANIZED
FUNCTIONAL INTEREST GROUP INVOLVEMENT

<u>Organized Group</u> <u>Affiliation With</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation (%)</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
More than One Group	80.0	20.0	(80)
At Least One Group	80.0	20.0	(95)
None	76.2	23.7	(118)
Cramer's V =			

The Syndicate, then, probably ought to do better among those affiliated with organized "vertical" interest groups (e.g., caste and religious associations). However, the data presented in Table 6.11 reveal that the two factions do not differ in terms of the proportion of support among the MPs involved in either functional or primordial pressure groups. The support for Mrs. Gandhi is strongest among the

MPs simultaneously active in both functional and primordial groups, while the Syndicate's support is strongest among those not involved in organized group activity of any kind.

Another interesting aspect worth exploring is whether the member's factional affiliation varies with their involvement in specific organized interest groups. Here again the

TABLE 6.11

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY INVOLVEMENT IN
ORGANIZED FUNCTIONAL/PRIMORDIAL GROUPS

<u>Involved In</u>	<u>% Pro-Indira</u>	<u>(N=)</u>
Both Functional and Primordial Groups	84.4	(45)
Functional Groups Only	78.5	(130)
Primordial Groups Only	78.3	(23)
Neither (No Group Affiliation)	75.8	(95) ^a

Cramer's V = .10

NOTE: The disparity between N for "no group affiliation" in this table and that in Table 6.10 results from the fact that whereas in the preceding table only functional groups were considered, in the present table both functional and primordial groups are considered.

picture is not very different from the one discussed above. As Table 6.12 shows, in all categories of specific types of interest groups the members report themselves to be affiliated with, the pro-Indira Congress received the support of the overwhelming majority. However, comparisons of variations of factional loyalty according to the specific type of interest group in which the members were involved reveal that the proportions of pro-Indira members were slightly higher among those active in modern middle-class professional associations, industrial and non-industrial workers' unions, and minority religious associations. Conversely, the Syndicate suffered less badly among those active in farmers' associations, chambers of commerce and industries, small-scale producers' groups, women's organizations, and Hindu caste associations. The relatively higher proportions of pro-Indira waverers among those associated with farmer and business groups also indicates a greater incidence of the subsequent shifting of loyalty from the Syndicate to the pro-Indira Congress within these groups under the bandwagon effect.

Attitudes and Orientations

Although we lack direct survey data on the MPs' attitudes, an attempt was made to tap at least some broad aspects of their ideological leaning and orientations and relate them with their factional affiliation. Three such attitudinal aspects were tapped: (1) cosmopolitanism; (2)

TABLE 6.12
PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY INVOLVEMENT
IN ORGANIZED INTEREST GROUPS

<u>Organized Groups</u>	<u>% Pro-Indira</u>	<u>(N=)</u>
Farmer's Associations	80.0 ^a	(60)
Modern Middle-Class Professional Associations	80.0	(25)
Chambers of Commerce & Industry	75.0 ^a	(12)
Small-Scale Producer's Groups	71.9	(32)
Lower Middle-Class Employees' Associations	85.3	(34)
Consumer Groups	79.4	(34)
Ex-Service Men's Associations	77.8	(9)
Trade Unions	84.7	(39)
Non-Industrial Workers' Unions	85.2	(27)
Women's Organizations	65.0	(20)
Caste Associations	79.2	(38)
Religious Associations:		
Hindu	84.2	(19)
Non-Hindu	<u>100.0</u>	<u>(8)</u>
Average Total	79.9	354 ^b

NOTES: a. Includes a rather high (slightly over 8%) proportion of pro-Indira waverers or late switch-overs to Mrs. Gandhi from the Syndicate.

b. Multiple classification of MPs; some members belong to more than one type of groups.

"constructive" political orientation, a legacy of Gandhian saintly politics, and (3) ideological leaning along the right-center-left dimension.

Cosmopolitanism is inferred from two different measures: the MPs' publications in English and/or various Indian languages, and (2) their foreign travels.

"Constructive" political tradition, as already mentioned, is a Gandhian legacy, and is well summarized by Ostergaard and Currell (1971: 3) as follows:

The Constructive Programme is central to the understanding of 'Gandhism'. It was a programme that Gandhi developed piecemeal, beginning with Khadi (home-spun, hand-woven cloth) in 1922, proceeding to Hindu-Muslim communal unity in 1925, to prohibition in 1930, to the abolition of untouchability in 1932, to the promotion of village industries in 1935, and so on. From one narrow perspective the programme of constructive activities initiated by Gandhi may be seen as a means by which the Indian National Congress sought to build up support among the masses. In addition, these activities provided a training ground for independence fighters and a necessary outlet for their energies at times when a halt had to be called to direct confrontation with the British Raj. The shrewd Gandhi no doubt appreciated this role of the constructive programme in the independence movement, but the programme for him - whatever it may have been for the politicians in the movement - was never simply a matter of expediency. On the contrary, it was for him the heart of the matter. In 1931 he wrote: "My work of social reform was in no way less than or subordinate to political work. The fact is that when I saw that to a certain extent my social work would be impossible without the help of political work, I took to the latter and only to the extent that it helped the former. I must therefore confess that the work of social reform or self-purification of this nature is a hundred times dearer to me than what is called purely political work". This view he held to the end.

The final testament of Gandhi's innate distaste for power-oriented politics was his musing on the attainment of India's independence that, with its overriding objective achieved, the Indian National Congress should be transformed into a Lok Sevak Sangh (Public Service Association), leaving it for Congressmen with political ambitions to form one or more parties of their choice as a vehicle of electoral politics (Kothari 1970: 155n).

Although the "constructive" political tradition, subsequent to independence, branched out as a separate social movement called the Sarvodaya ("Welfare of all"), with no formal ties with the Congress, men with blends of "constructive" and "power-politics" orientations are still found in the Congress.

Ideological leaning of the members is based on the usual mass-media (basically press) image of the top leaders and on press reports pertaining to the views of other party activists on some selected policy issues. The period covered is 1967-1971. Two kinds of press reports were found to be especially useful in this regard: (1) individual and/or joint statements of members on the selected issues issued to the press and newspaper coverage of intra-party groupings such as the informal "Young Turks" and the semi-formal Congress Forum for Socialist Action (the "Ginger Group"); and (2) their speeches and stands on various public issues in the meetings of the AICC, CPP, and CWC, and, in some cases, cabinet

deliberations. Though only the first of these bodies meets and deliberates in the presence of the press and public, the top Indian newspapers seem to have fairly detailed information about the closed-door meetings of the other bodies too.

The issues selected for measuring ideological leanings were (1) the relative roles of public versus private enterprise and the curb on private industrial monopolies, and (2) ceiling on urban and rural property and the abolition of princely privileges.

Clearly these issues represent some aspects of the general concept of economic liberalism. An attempt to tap in a similar manner some aspects of political liberalism among the Congress elites was abandoned. For, although one occasionally hears politically illiberal opinions from some Congress leaders (e.g., favouring a ban on Hindu and other communal parties and secessionist organizations), the chorus of approval, on the whole, for minority rights, civil rights, etc., appears too unanimous to permit analysis of variations in a meaningful way. That is not to say, however, that such variations do not really exist. Indeed, the Congress elites contain elements within their fold that shade into religion (Hindu)-linked traditionalism of the Jana Sangh, into the secular political liberalism-cum-economic conservatism of the Swatantra Party, and into political liberalism-cum-economic radicalism of the Socialists and communists.

The source of our data admittedly introduces an element of bias in that it helps locate only the important leaders and active rank and file members of the Congress Parliamentary Party in terms of right-center-left leanings. However, the measurement here used seems to be the next best thing short of a survey based on personal interviews, and the findings here offered must be viewed with these limitations in mind.

Table 6.13 demonstrates that foreign travel does not clearly discriminate between the affiliates of the two major factions. However, as Table 6.14 shows, publication does, to some extent, account for the factional affiliation of the MPs; publicists, irrespective of the language of publication, were more likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi than the non-publicists. In addition, it is also notable that fully 32% of the pro-Indira MPs had publications to their credit, compared to only 18% of the pro-Indira ones (these percentages are not presented in the table).

Table 6.15 shows that factional affiliation and "constructive" political orientation are unrelated. Although the majority of those involved in "constructive" political activities aligned with Mrs. Gandhi, they did not differ in this respect from Congressmen not involved in such activities.

TABLE 6.13
FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS
BY FOREIGN TRAVEL

<u>Foreign Travel</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
Extensive	79.1	20.9	(91)
Limited to India's Neighbors	79.1	20.9	(72)
None	77.5	22.5	(129)
Cramer's V = .02			

TABLE 6.14
FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS
BY PUBLICATIONS

<u>Publications in</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
English and/or Indian Languages	86.3	17.7	(51)
Indian Languages Only	86.6	13.3	(30)
None	75.3	27.7	(206)
Cramer's V = .12			

TABLE 6.15
FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY INVOLVEMENT
IN "CONSTRUCTIVE" POLITICS

<u>Factional</u> <u>Affiliation (%)</u>	<u>Constructive Politics</u>	
	<u>Involved</u>	<u>Not Involved</u>
Pro-Indira	78.1	78.8
Pro-Syndicate	21.9	21.1
(N =)	151	142
Phi = .0005		

Table 6.16 shows that ideological position exercised a significant influence on factional affiliation of the MPs. More specifically, there was an inverse relationship between rightness of ideological leaning and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi. Though the majority in all ideological categories went along with her, the proportions of the pro-Indira MPs generally increase from the right through the centre to the left, ranging from 57.1% in the case of the right wingers to 88.3% in that of the left wingers. Also, whereas only 29% of the pro-Indira MPs who could be rated were rightists or centrists, 53% of the pro-Syndicate ones were (these percentages are not presented in the table).

TABLE 6.16

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS
BY IDEOLOGICAL LEANING

<u>Ideological</u> <u>Leaning</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation (%)</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
Right	57.1	42.8	(35)
Centre	85.7	14.3	(7)
Signatories to the August 9 Memorandum of the Young Turks ^a	76.8	23.3	(43)
Left	88.3	11.8	(34)

Cramer's V =

NOTE: a. Refers to the genral memorandum, initiated by the Young Turks but signed by many nondescript MPs, calling upon the senior leadership of the party to expeditiously implement the socialist resolutions and policies of the Congress. This is a residual category of signatories, consisting of those who could not be classified into other categories; the Young Turks themselves, for example, were classified as leftists. The list of signatories was published in The Times of India, August 10, 1967.

Summing up, the analysis of the socio-economic backgrounds of the MPs along with some indirect measures of attitudes and orientations in relation to their factional alignment seems to reveal, as much as anything, a vague "modern-versus-traditional" cleavage on the personal plane, with some overlap with such factors as caste and class. The

probability of alignment with the pro-Indira faction was found to be greater with the following configuration of background variables: higher education, modern middle-class and lower middle-class occupational status, intellectual or cosmopolitan orientation, and leftist ideological leaning. The configuration favourable to alignment with the Syndicate was generally lower education, upper-class and traditional middle-class occupational status, "professional" involvement in politics, low intellectual or non-cosmopolitan orientations, and rightist ideological leaning.

Political Career Backgrounds

In Chapter V, a review of the literature indicated that there could be several career-related bases of factional divisions within parties: a recruitment and socialization internal to the party versus lateral recruitment from a high position outside the party, predominant career and position-holding in the parliamentary versus external wing of the party, strataarchical (local/state/national) differentiations in career and position-holding, and generational differences. It is, however, very difficult to clearly specify what pattern of political career would be typical of what kind of party faction beyond a few reasonable hunches hinted in Chapter 5. Hence, with spotty and often conflicting findings in the previous research, it seems safe to approach our analysis of political career backgrounds and factional affiliation with an open mind.

In the following pages will be compared political career backgrounds of the pro-Indira Congress and the Syndicate members of the fourth Lok Sabha. With the available data, the comparison is structured around the following important dimensions of political career and socialization:

(1) past party affiliation, if any, prior to joining the Congress; (2) experience and position-holding in the mass membership party organization outside the parliament; (3) parliamentary party career; (4) local-level political experience, and (5) personal electoral proficiency.

Past Party Affiliation

A consensus-oriented predominant party, the Congress attracts candidates from a wide variety of sources, which are diverse not only in terms of social composition but also politically. One-third (33.4%) of the Congressmen in the fourth Lok Sabha, prior to their joining the Congress, had belonged to a host of non-Congress parties of every possible variety. The recruitment pattern of Congress MPs thus shows a dual process: for the bulk of its legislative elites, the party relies on its own first-hand primary political recruitment, but the initial recruitment of a sizeable part of its parliamentary contingent, preparatory to their subsequent absorption by the Congress, is first performed by the opposition parties which later suffer a sort of political "brain-drain" in the process.

Moreover, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that in the Indian party system, factionalism in the ruling party is so closely linked with the non-Congress opposition parties (which, with a few exceptions, have often failed to establish an independent base and identity of their own and are practically dependent on what happens to the Congress) that Rajni Kothari (1964: see also 1974) treats the latter as an integral part of what he calls the "Congress system". Congress factional leaders have often gone on a sojourn to a non-Congress party until the balance of forces in the ruling party changed in their favour, or, alternatively, opposition party leaders and factions have often joined the Congress en block to strengthen specific factions or tendencies in the ruling party.

It is a reasonable expectation that the previous party affiliation of the Congressmen would have some bearing on their factional identification within the Congress. As Table 6.17 reveals, even though the majority in all categories of previous party affiliation rallied round Mrs. Gandhi, Congressmen previously associated with left-wing, minority-communal, and regional parties were more committed in their support for her than those coming from right-wing parties or those who were regular Congressmen.

If some specific previous party backgrounds increase the probability of the MPs; alignment with a particular faction, then higher status or position-holding within that party should

TABLE 6.17
 FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY
 PREVIOUS PARTY AFFILIATION

<u>Past Party Affiliation^a</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation (%)</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
Regular Congress- men	76.4	23.6	(195)
Left-Wing Parties	81.0	19.0	(42)
Right-Wing Parties	55.6	44.4	(9)
Minority-Communal Parties	86.2	13.8	(29)
Regional Parties	88.9	11.1	(9)
Combinations of Preceding Categories	100.0	0.0	(9)
Cramer's V = .16			

NOTE: a. For the names of parties grouped under various categories of past party affiliation, see text footnote 5.

lead to a further increase in the likelihood of affiliation with that faction. For a deeper involvement in and integration with the relevant party of origin would mean a greater socialization into and internalization of the appropriate norms and attitudes that create the supposed pressures in favour of alignment with a particular faction of the party of destination. One would thus expect that among the Congressmen with past affiliation and position holding in left-wing, minority-communal, and regional parties the likelihood of support for Mrs. Gandhi should further increase, whereas position-holding in right-wing parties ought to lead to an increase in the proportion of support for the Syndicate.

To test the hypothesis outlined above, comparisons were carried out by dividing the members with non-Congress backgrounds into those who had held authoritative positions in the organizational/legislative wing of the previous party at national/state/district levels and those who had not held such positions. It was found that position-holding in the previous party tended to accentuate the relationship between past party association and present factional affiliation reported above. For example, among the Congressmen with a leftist party background, the proportion of support for Mrs. Gandhi was nearly 10% higher for the members who held important positions than among those who did not; for those previously associated with minority-communal parties, an increase of 7.5%

was recorded. But no such variation was found among those coming to the Congress via regional parties. Conversely, among Congressmen previously affiliated with right-wing parties the proportion of support for the Syndicate rose by 80% if the members enjoyed higher intra-party status in the party of origin than if they did not (but with a total N of only 9 this steep rise needs to be qualified).

Mass Membership Party Organization

An electoral, success-oriented and catch-all party following an open recruitment system, the Congress usually does not require of its candidates long years of apprenticeship as a party militant. This is clear from the fact that the majority of the party's Lok Sabha members have not been organizational activists; nearly 67.5% have never been either executive members or general-body⁶ members of the party organization at national, state, or district level.

Do variations in career patterns and experience within the party organization affect the factional affiliation of members? Two measures of party organizational experience are here employed. The first simply measures the highest position attained by the member in the party organization by 1969, and the second refines this measurement to take account of the number of years put in that position. Separate measurements are made for positions in the party organization at national, state, and district levels. The results are presented in Table 6.18.

TABLE 6.18

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY SENIORITY IN NATIONAL,
STATE, AND DISTRICT PARTY ORGANIZATIONS

<u>Seniority in Years</u>	<u>National Party</u>			<u>State Party</u>			<u>District Party</u>		
	<u>CWC</u>	<u>AIOC</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>PCWC</u>	<u>PCC</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>DCWC</u>	<u>DOC</u>	<u>None</u>
	<u>Members</u>	<u>Delegates</u>		<u>Members</u>	<u>Delegates</u>		<u>Members</u>	<u>Delegates</u>	
3 or more	55.6 (11)	92.3 (26)		71.4 (21)	78.2 (23)		92.3 (39)	80.0 (5)	
1-2	100.0 (4)	83.9 (31)		86.6 (15)	81.5 (22)		75.8 (29)	40.0 (5)	
Total	64.3 (14)	88.1 (67)	76.2 (210)	79.6 (44)	80.7 (57)	77.2 (189)	83.8 (74)	69.2 (13)	76.8 (203)

NOTE: Cases with missing values were excluded from analysis. Also excluded were cases with unspecified values of seniority in positions within the national, state, and district party organizations; such cases were included in the computations for the "total" row.

It is clear from the table that, although the pro-Indira Congress ended up having the majority support in all categories of party organizational position-holding at all levels, the organizational activists at the district level were relatively more likely to be allegiant to Mrs. Gandhi than at the national and state levels. Moreover, delegates and non-position-holders flocked more solidly around Mrs. Gandhi than executive members at all levels of party organization, except at the lowest, where the proportion of support for the pro-Indira Congress was slightly higher among the position-holders.⁷

Table 6.19 also shows that the overall patterns of relationships between organizational position in the national, state, and district party units, on the one hand, and factional affiliation, on the other, generally remain unaltered even when we differentiate intra-party organizational position in terms of length of incumbency. However, the introduction of the length of experience or seniority in the measurement of intra-party organizational position does reveal some new internal variations within each category of intra-party organizational status. Both in the national and state party organizations, seniority has a negative effect on loyalty for Mrs. Gandhi among the top executive (CWC and PCWC) members and a positive effect on it among the general body (AICC and PCC) delegates. The situation is different at the local- or district-level party organization, where both among the executive (DCWC) members and the general body (DCC) delegates support for Mrs. Gandhi varies positively with seniority.

Thus at the lowest level of the party organization there is a sort of cumulative pattern in that both level and length of service are positively related to alignment with Mrs. Gandhi. In other words, the greater the integration of the member with the party, the greater the likelihood of his support for the pro-Indira Congress.

There is a more varied pattern in the state-level party organization. Greater integration of the member with the party organization on the plane of length of service leads to greater likelihood of support for the Syndicate. But whereas higher position increases the probability of alignment with the Syndicate among the longer-serving members, it increases the probability of alignment with Mrs. Gandhi among those with less service.

A yet more varied pattern is discernible in the national-level party organization. Seniority is positively associated with support for the Syndicate among the CWC members but with loyalty for Mrs. Gandhi among the AICC delegates. Position-holding leads to greater likelihood of alignment with the Syndicate among the members with longer service but with alignment with the pro-Indira Congress among the younger ones.

There may be some confounding influences here due to some overlap between party-organizational position-holding and ministerial status in the Congress government. The members concurrently holding positions of power in both the

party and the government may well behave differently in terms of factional alignment than those holding positions in one of these two organs only. This problem will be examined in a subsequent section after we have observed the independent effect of cabinet status.

Another important aspect to be considered is how some combinations of the MPs' status in the external party organization at national, state, and district levels correlate with factional affiliation. The findings so far have indicated that, except at the lowest level of the party organization, the greater the integration of the member with the extra-parliamentary party organization (measured by his membership in the party executive committee and his seniority in that position), the greater the likelihood of his alignment with the Syndicate. The external party organization thus appears to be an important base of support and context for career-formation of the Syndicate faction. If this is true one would expect that the MPs who have been executive members at more than one level of party organization ought to be less likely to align with the pro-Indira Congress than those who have held executive positions at fewer levels or none at all.

To carry out these comparisons, the MPs were categorized in terms of position-holding at different levels of external party organization separately and in combinations. The results presented in Table 6.19 reveal that position-holding at more than one level of the party organization generally

TABLE 6.19

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY POSITION IN EXTERNAL
PARTY ORGANIZATION AT VARIOUS LEVELS

<u>Executive</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
<u>Members in</u>	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
National, State, & District Party	75.0	25.0	(4)
National & State Party	50.0	50.0	(4)
State & District Party	73.9	26.1	(23)
National Party Only	66.7	33.3	(6)
State Party Only	100.0	-	(13)
District Party Only	89.4	10.6	(47)
None	75.6	24.4	(193)
Average Total		Total N = 290	
Cramer's V = .19			

decreased the probability of the MPs' alignment with Mrs. Gandhi. Position-holding at only one level proved conducive to a pro-Indira factional alignment, except at the national where it led to an opposite outcome.

Parliamentary Party Career

The discussion in the preceding section has shown that greater integration of the MPs into the external party organization was, on the whole, negatively associated with their alignment with Mrs. Gandhi. More specifically, the higher the status and seniority of the MPs in the external party, especially at the highest and at more than one level of the party organization, the greater the likelihood that they would take an anti-Indira factional stance. In this section, I will analyse the influence of career patterns in the parliamentary party on the patterns of factional alignment of the MPs. Four broad aspects of parliamentary party career of the members will be considered: (1) parliamentary seniority, (2) ministerial status, (3) CPP executive committee membership, and (4) experience with parliamentary committees.

To begin with parliamentary seniority, as Table 6.20 shows, there is a generally negative association between parliamentary seniority and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi. The most marked contrast is between the veterans with eleven or more years of parliamentary membership, on the one hand, and those with five to ten years of service and the 1967 freshmen, on the other. The veterans were less likely than

the five-to-ten-year seniors and freshmen to align with the pro-Indira Congress. The difference between the two junior levels of parliamentary seniority is marginal.

Is age responsible for the association found between parliamentary seniority and factional affiliation? This does not seem to be the case, for when age is held constant, it fails to wipe out the original relationship; all that happens is that the contingent association for the older members (born between 1882-1920) emerges slightly stronger ($\text{Gamma} = -.28$) than in the source table and that for the younger members (born between 1921-1946) is considerably reduced ($\text{Gamma} = -.14$). Thus, while age does exercise some independent effect of its own, it does not fully account for the relationship found between parliamentary seniority and factional affiliation.

Another confounding factor here may be the generational differences. We have already noted that among the MPs the younger, post-independence generation and the nationalist movement participants of the pre-independence generation were more likely to support Mrs. Gandhi than the non-participating pre-independence generation. Perhaps an overlap of these generational differences with parliamentary seniority is reflected in the bivariate relationship between the latter and factional affiliation just observed. When the generational differences were held constant, the original negative association between parliamentary seniority and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi was maintained among the MPs participating in the

nationalist movement as well as among those not participating in it, although the strength of this association was considerably reduced in the case of the former (Gamma = $-.17$ and $-.36$, respectively). Among the post-independence generation MPs, parliamentary seniority varied positively with loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi (Gamma = $.61$). Thus, although participation in the nationalist movement tended to weaken the negative association between parliamentary seniority and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi, it did not fully "explain away" the impact of parliamentary seniority.

Is the negative association between parliamentary seniority and loyalty for Mrs. Gandhi, then, due to party-organizational status in the national/state Congress units, which, as already noted, varied inversely with support for her? This possibility must also be excluded, for when position-holding in the external party was controlled, the original association was remarkably maintained in the case of position-holders as well as in that of non-position-holders (Gamma = $-.30$ and $-.29$, respectively).

Besides parliamentary seniority, ministerial status is another very significant aspect of the parliamentary career. In fact, it is the focal point of career aspiration or political ambition for all parliamentarians. As Table 6.21 shows, ministerial status and seniority varied positively with alignment with Prime Minister Gandhi. Although in all categories of the independent variable the pro-Indira elements

clearly predominated, their proportions clearly rose with the increasing levels of the length of ministerial service. This is hardly surprising; it simply confirms the conventional wisdom about satisfaction regarding career aspirations and loyalty to the dispenser of career rewards among the aspirants.

Career aspiration is, however, not a static object. It varies with time. A freshman legislator, for example, would be content with his status as a backbencher but not a senior parliamentarian, who normally expects to be rewarded with a cabinet position at an appropriate point in his parliamentary career. In other words, lack of ministerial status would lead to a smaller amount of career frustration and dissidence among the junior parliamentarians as compared to parliamentary seniors. One would thus expect that, although ministerial status ought, irrespective of parliamentary seniority, to lead to an increase in the likelihood of support for Mrs. Gandhi, backbench status should lead to a relative increase of support for the Syndicate among the senior MPs but not so much among the juniors. As Table 6.22 shows, this indeed is the case.

It was noted above that parliamentary seniority varied inversely with alignment with Mrs. Gandhi. Does ministerial status affect this relationship in any way? When federal ministerial experience was held constant, the original negative association between parliamentary seniority and alignment with

TABLE 6.20

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY
UNION PARLIAMENTARY SENIORITY

<u>Parliamentary Seniority</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation (%)</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
11 Years or More	68.8	31.2	(93)
5-10 Years	84.9	15.1	(106)
First Elected in 1967	80.6	19.4	(93)
Cramer's V =	.17		
Gamma =	-.22		

TABLE 6.21

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY
UNION MINISTERIAL STATUS

<u>Ministerial Status</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation (%)</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
Minister/Junior Minister	85.7	14.3	
Backbencher	76.5	23.5	
Cramer's V =			
Gamma =			

TABLE 6.22

SUMMARY STATISTICS OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MINISTERIAL
STATUS AND ALIGNMENT WITH MRS. GANDHI, CONTROLLING
FOR PARLIAMENTARY SENIORITY

<u>Parliamentary Seniority</u>	<u>Gamma</u>
Eleven Years or More	.29
Five to Ten Years	.64
1967-Freshmen	.75

Mrs. Gandhi turned positive and practically approached unity among those who had been ministers throughout the pre- and post-split periods; a similar pattern was discernible among those who were to be promoted to ministerial status following the split. The original association remained negative among those who had been ministers only prior to or until the party split and among the backbenchers, though the strength of the association is greatly increased among the former (Gamma = $-.60$) and moderately reduced among the latter (Gamma = $-.24$) as compared to the relationship in the source table. Thus, parliamentary seniority exercised a negative effect on loyalty for Mrs. Gandhi only in the condition where it was divorced from ministerial position; where such seniority was coupled with ministerial status, it, in fact, increased the likelihood

of alignment with Mrs. Gandhi.

In contrast to the MPs' federal ministerial experience which varied positively with their loyalty for Mrs. Gandhi, the members' possession of ministerial experience at the state level tended to reduce the likelihood of support for Mrs. Gandhi. As Table 6.23 shows, though the majority of members, irrespective of state-level legislative or ministerial experience, extended their loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi, the proportion of pro-Indira elements is considerably lower among those having been ministers than among those having been MLAs at the state level and among those who did not go through such an experience prior to their entry into the Lok Sabha.

Two other aspects of parliamentary experience here considered - CPP executive committee membership and parliamentary committee/presiding experience - have overall opposite influences on factional affiliation (Tables 6.24 and 6.25). Even though in all categories of both these variables support for the Syndicate does not rise over one-fifth, the proportion of support for Mrs. Gandhi is clearly higher among members with parliamentary committee and presiding experience than among members with CPP executive committee experience. Both these bodies have been, among other things, the principal training grounds for future ministers and important refuges for former ministers; their members have often been outspoken and zealously watchful critics of the government. It is not

TABLE 6.23
 FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY STATE-LEVEL
 LEGISLATIVE AND MINISTERIAL EXPERIENCE

<u>State-Level</u> <u>Legislative &</u> <u>Ministerial</u> <u>Experience</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
Ministers	72.7	27.3	(33)
MLAs	80.5	19.5	(77)
None	78.7	21.3	(183)
Cramer's V = .05			
Gamma = -.04			

TABLE 6.24

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY PARLIAMENTARY
PARTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE EXPERIENCE

<u>Members of</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation (%)</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
CPP Executive	84.8 ^a	15.2	(33)
CPP	77.6	22.4	(259)
Cramer's V =			

NOTE: a. Includes a rather high proportion (21.2%) of late defectors from the Syndicate.

TABLE 6.25

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY PRESIDING/
PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEE EXPERIENCE

<u>Parliamentary</u> <u>Experience</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation (%)</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
Speaker/ DY. Speaker/ Panel of Chairmen/ Chairmen of Parlia- mentary Committee(s)	95.0 ^a	5.0	(20)
Member, Parliamentary committee(s) Parlia- mentary Consultative Committee(s)	83.1	16.9	(65)
None	75.4	24.6	(207)
Cramer's V =			

NOTE: a. Includes 15% of late defectors from the Syndicate.

entirely clear why experience in one (CPP executive) should have a negative effect and that in another (Parliamentary committees) a positive one on alignment with Mrs. Gandhi.

Summing up, parliamentary party career has a complex pattern of relationship with factional affiliation. Positions of high status within the parliamentary party are positively associated with alignment with Mrs. Gandhi in the case of ministerial status and parliamentary committee membership, but negatively related with it in the case of CPP executive committee membership. Moreover, seniority as minister leads to increased likelihood of support for Mrs. Gandhi but to an opposite outcome in the case of parliamentary seniority as such. To put these findings beside those relating to the extra-parliamentary party career, it is evident that, broadly, a higher status within the parliamentary party is associated with alignment with Mrs. Gandhi, while a higher status in the external party, especially at the national level, is related to alignment with the Syndicate.

The above findings naturally lead to the question of combined effects of parliamentary party and external party careers on factional affiliation. To carry out such comparisons, the MPs were classified into four major categories: (1) those with high status within both the party and government, (2) those with high status within the party only, (3) those with high status within the government only, and (4) those who did not enjoy such status in either the party or the government,

The results presented in Table 6.26 show that, although Mrs. Gandhi was supported by majority in all categories of the independent variable, the MPs holding positions either in the party alone or concurrently in the party and the government were less likely to align with her than the position-holders in the government and those who did not hold positions in either the party or the government.

Local Level Experience

The system of local government in India is nearly a century old and the present urban municipal government and rural Panchayati Raj are basically built on older foundations with a greater "democratic decentralization" than in the past. Urban Municipalities and rural District Boards had served as the training ground for the Indian political leadership during the British period, though with the increasing militancy and broadening mass base of the nationalist movement under Mahatma Gandhi,

local leaders, who in Gokhale's day might have devoted their time to the local board, now gave their allegiance to the District Congress Committee, . . . [and] instead of serving as the school of political education, local government became a mere annex to the national political stadium, where the struggle for independence was moving towards its climax (Tinker 1967: 161).

The local-level government continues to perform the function of political recruitment and apprenticeship following independence perhaps with greater salience than ever before. Of late, particularly significant has been the modified

TABLE 6.26

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY POSITION
IN UNION GOVERNMENT (MINISTRY) AND/OR EXTERNAL
PARTY ORGANIZATION (NATIONAL)

<u>Position-Holders</u> <u>in</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation (%)</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
Party as well as Government	66.7	33.3	(9)
Party Only	75.0	25.0	(4)
Government Only	88.9	11.1	(54)
None	76.6	23.4	(222)
Cramer's V = .13			

NOTES: Position-holding in the party refers to the membership in the party's national executive, the Congress Working Committee.

Position-holding in the government refers to the membership in the union Council of Ministers.

three-tier rural Panchayati Raj, consisting of the Gram (Village) Panchayat at the base, the Panchayat Samiti at the Block level, and the Zila (district) Parishad at the top. These bodies seem to have developed into sufficiently differentiated and autonomous political structures, and the local level leadership controlling these bodies holds important keys to successful elections to state legislatures and national parliaments, so that these leaders are usually courted by the serious candidates for higher office. The Zila Parishad presidents and members, more often than not, of late themselves contest or aspire to contest elections to higher-level bodies (Sirsikar 1964: 929-939; and International Study in Values, p), and they are beginning to be described as the new emerging "organization men" in state politics.⁸

In a perceptive study of local politics in Orissa during the 1950s, Baily (1963) conceptualized three major "arenas" - the village, the Vidhan Sabha electoral constituency and the state - in which the competing groups interact and develop within- and between-arena linkages, with the constituency serving as the major meeting ground for village- and state-level politicians for the purposes of bargaining and exchanging electoral support and favourable policy outputs or patronage. However, since the introduction of the Panchayati Raj in the early 1960s, the

two new emerging arenas, the block level and the district level through their councils, are gradually absorbing these functions of the constituency (Papachristou 1971: 269-270).

This section seeks to compare the local government experience of the pro-Indira Congress and Syndicate members. Two aspects of local government experience are here considered: (1) position-holding in local self-governing institutions in general, and (2) position-holding in rural Panchayati Raj.

Table 6.27 shows that the two factions did not differ much in terms of local self-governing experience in general. However, as Table 6.28 demonstrates, though there was not much difference in the factional affiliation between the MPs with Panchayati Raj experience and those lacking it, the members having connections with the old pre-independence rural District Boards were less solid in their support for Mrs. Gandhi than those holding positions in the post-independence Panchayati Raj or those who held positions in both the old and new schemes of rural local self-government. This may partly be attributed to the fact that the old rural local self-governing institutions were mainly an affair of the uppermost stratum of the rural gentry, whereas the new Panchayati Raj has increasingly come to be dominated by the dominant middle band of the rural notables. This overwhelming support of the rural notables for Mrs. Gandhi's moderate radicalism might come as a surprise to some, but it can perhaps

TABLE 6.27

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY POSITION IN
LOCAL SELF-GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS

<u>Factional</u> <u>Affiliation (%)</u>	<u>Position in LSG</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Position-Holders	Non-Position Holders	
Pro-Indira	79.6	77.9	(98)
Pro-Syndicate	20.4	22.1	(195)
Cramer's V =			

be explained partly in terms of the populist rather than purely leftist ideology of Mrs. Gandhi. As already mentioned in Chapter 3, the dominant middle band of the rural sector was, in effect, either left virtually unaffected or actually stood to gain from Mrs. Gandhi's radical policy shifts such as bank nationalization abolition of princely privileges and privy purses, etc.; Mrs. Gandhi's leftist rhetoric sounded more ominous to the urban corporate interests.

Personal Electoral Proficiency

Although, despite the recency of mass democracy, party identification in the Indian mass public is quite high - 70% as compared to 90% in Britain and 74% in the United States⁹ - in India it seems safe to assume the existence of a good deal of "candidate-voting" as opposed to "party-voting". The phenomenon of split-ticket voting, reflected by considerable

TABLE 6.28

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY ASSOCIATION
WITH RURAL LOCAL SELF-GOVERNING INSTITUTIONS

<u>Associated</u> <u>With</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation (%)</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
Pre-Independence District Board/ Local Board	72.0	28.0	(25)
Post-Independence Panchayati Raj	87.1	12.9	(31)
Both	100.0	0.0	(8)
Neither	77.2	22.8	(228)
Cramer's V = .12			

differences in votes cast for candidates belonging to the same party in double-member constituencies in the 1952 and 1957 elections) and by voting for one party in the Vidhan Sabha election and another for the Lok Sabha, seems quite common (Beteille 1965: 217). The voters, especially in the rural areas but even in some urban areas, seem to be influenced more by the ethnic affiliation and personality of the candidates than by their party labels, and "outside some urban areas there are few safe party seats in which any candidate with the 'right' party label is virtually assured of success" (Forrester 1968: 1085). Some survey data too point in the same direction; in a 1967 study, for example, only 50% of a national sample of voters was found to be identifying with and voting for the same party (Eldersveld and Kubota 1973: 20). To be sure, 1967 was, to borrow Campbell's (1966: 69) concept, a "deviating" election in several Indian states. But it seems safe to assume that India fits the American theory of mass party identification, which distinguishes between party identification as psychological attachment to a party and voting as a behavioural component, and asserts that the former is more durable than the latter (Campbell and others 1964: ch. 5).

For all these reasons, the percentage vote polled by the party in a constituency is normally strongly dependent on the candidate's own personal resources and proficiency. In terms of the implications of this phenomenon for factional

affiliation among the MPs, one would hypothesize that support for the Indira-led revolt against the Syndicate should be positively correlated with the size of the members' electoral victory in the preceding election (1967). For those with greater personal electoral resources ought to feel freer to take a rebellious stand against the party oligarchs.

As Table 6.29 indicates, factional affiliation is largely unrelated to the size of the MPs' electoral victory in the 1967 elections, though the waverers of both pro-Indira and pro-Syndicate variety show an above average mean percentage vote polled. The factional categories of primary interest - the strongly pro-Indira and strongly pro-Syndicate - do not differ much in this regard from each other or from the mean percentage vote for the entire population.

However, there is a remarkable difference between the two factions in terms of electoral fortunes in the 1971 elections following the party split and specifically called during mid-term by Prime Minister Gandhi to seek a mandate for her radical policies. The pro-Indira MPs consistently polled higher than average percentage of vote for the entire population, while the strongly pro-Syndicate MPs' mean percentage vote slumped to a low of 31.6. It seems to suggest that in 1971 the campaign by Mrs. Gandhi for the Congress splinter aligned with her resulted in a transfer of her charismatic appeal to the party she led and to the voting process itself.¹⁰

TABLE 6.29

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF MEMBERS' ELECTORAL PROFICIENCY
(% VOTE POLLED IN CONSTITUENCY)

<u>Factional Affiliation</u>	<u>Mean % Vote Polled</u>		
	<u>1967</u>	<u>1971</u>	
	%	(N)	% (N)
Strongly Pro-Indira	45.4	(199)	55.5 (165)
Pro-Indira Waverers	50.0	(16)	68.1 (12)
Pro-Syndicate Waverers	52.0	(5)	53.7 (3)
Strongly Pro-Syndicate	44.5	(55)	31.6 (44)
Total	45.6	(275)	51.5 (224)

NOTE: The Ns for the two elections do not match, for among the Congress MPs elected in 1971, only those who were also members of the dissolved Lok Sabha were included in the analysis.

Summary

The analysis of social and political background of the congress MPs in this chapter has indicated that, although the party split of 1969 was very unequal inasmuch as the pro-Indira congress carried the majority in practically every conceivable category of elite backgrounds, some background configurations were more strongly correlated with alignment with Mrs. Gandhi than others. The pro-Indira MPs were generally younger, mostly entering into their adolescence in the early post-independence years; among the older MPs those participating in the nationalist movement were more likely to align with her than the non-participants. In terms of general social stratification variables, the correlates of pro-Indira factional alignment were better education, membership in middle and lower Hindu castes and non-Hindu religious minorities and modern middle-class and lower-middle-class occupational status. Support for the Syndicate was associated with older age, non-participation in the nationalist movement, medium or low education, upper Hindu caste membership, and upper-class (both traditional and modern) and traditional middle-class occupational status. In attitudes and orientations, Mrs. Gandhi's supporters were more frequently intellectually oriented and of leftist or centrist ideological posture. In terms of organized group affiliation, they were more likely to be involved in pressure group politics generally and in modern middle-class professional associations, industrial

and non-industrial workers' unions, and minority religious associations in particular. They did not differ much from the Syndicate group in terms of affiliation with local self-governing institutions in general, but those associated with the pre-independence rural District Boards were less likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi than those active in either post-independence rural Panchayati Raj or in both District Boards and Panchayati Raj bodies.

The political career patterns more strongly correlated with alignment with the pro-Indira faction were associations, if any, with left-wing, minority-communal and regional parties more than with right-wing parties prior to the MPs' joining the Congress; and a greater integration and status within the parliamentary party, especially the Congress ministry and parliamentary committees than in the external party, especially at the national or at more than one level of the party organization. Parliamentary seniority as such, devoid of ministerial status, led to an increase in the support for the Syndicate. Finally, concurrent position-holding by the MPs in both the party and the government at the national level correlated with greater support for the Syndicate, while position-holding in one or none at all favoured a pro-Indira factional affiliation.

NOTES FOR CHAPTER VI

¹Mostly only bivariate source tables are reported in full tabular form; the patterns revealed by control tables when described in detail in the text itself will be omitted.

²For most perceptive analysis of social stratification in contemporary India, see Srinivas (1966) and Beteille (1965 and 1969). Heimsath (1964), Irschick (1969), Broomfield (1966), Reeves (1966) and Mukherjee and Leach (1970) address to some related problems historically.

³Caste is supposed to be an important variable in the study of Indian political behaviour but one very difficult to measure in a non-survey research situation. Only in the case of the Scheduled Castes or Harijans elected from constituencies reserved for them was it easy and fully reliable to ascertain caste of the members. For others, excepting the most prominent national leaders whose caste is generally of public knowledge, an attempt was made, in collaboration with one or more students or research or teaching staff at the University of Alberta from the respective Indian states (wherever possible), to identify members' caste on the basis of their surnames or the knowledge of the informants. Inferring caste from surnames is risky on account of the commonality of some surnames for more than one caste as well as the tendency of castes with lower varna status to take on surnames usually associated with upper castes.

⁴The scheduled tribes constitute a basically non-religious but distinct ethnic group of aborigines following diverse religious faiths ranging from some pagan tribal religion thru Hinduism to Christianity. They live mostly in hilly and forested tracts.

⁵Although a bit dated, Weiner (1962) still continues to be the most comprehensive study of interest group politics in India. A few intensive book-length studies of specific pressure groups, such, for example, as Kochanek's (1974) research on business groups in Indian politics, are now becoming available.

⁶The category "regular Congressmen" includes leaders directly recruited by the Congress, former independents now Congressmen, and members of the breakaway "Congress" parties

(e.g., Bangla Congress, Bihar Loktāntrik Congress Dal, Jana Congress, etc.) subsequently re-admitted to the Congress.

"Left-wing parties" include various socialist parties (Socialist Party, Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party, Praja Socialist Party, Samyukta Socialist Party, Socialist Party of India, Revolutionary Socialist Party, Forward Block, Peasants' - Workers' Party, All-India Mazdoor Kisan Party, Tamil Nadu Toilers' Party, Hindustan Socialist Republican Army, Radical Democratic Party) and the Communist Party of India.

"Right-wing parties" include the Swatantra Party, Ganatantra Parishad, Jana Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, and Ram Rajya Parishad.

"Minority-communal parties" include Muslim League, All-India Momin Conference, Jamiatul Ulema Hind, Scheduled Castes' Federation, Depressed Classes' League, Republican Party, Justice Party, Backward Classes' League, Akali Dal, All-India Khalsa Dal, Jharkhand Party, Naga and Mizo parties, and Kuki National Assembly of Manipur.

"Regional parties" include National Conference of Kashmir, Jammu and Kashmir National Congress, Goa Sewa Sangh, Praja Parishad parties affiliated with All-India (Princely) states People's Conference, Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti, etc.

⁷ Refers to the AICC, PCCs, DCCs at the national, state, and district levels of party organization.

⁸ We must consider the possibility that age and other social differences among the party organizational position-holders might be producing the patterns of relationships between position-holding and support for Mrs. Gandhi here revealed. For example, there is negative association between age and loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi, and the national party position-holders, the group most likely to align against her, have greater proportion of older MPs among them (82.9%) than state and district party position-holders (76.1% and 76.0%, respectively).

However, there does not seem to be an appreciable similar interaction effect of caste, education, and occupation. If caste, which is negatively associated with loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi, were producing the relationships found between party organizational position-holding at various levels and support for Mrs. Gandhi, one would expect a negative association between caste and position-holding at the district level, the only level of the party at which the position-holders were more likely to align with the pro-Indira Congress. This is not the case; position varied positively with caste at all levels of party organization ($\Gamma = .21, .12, \text{ and } .19$ for the national, state, and district party units, respectively).

Similarly, education, which is positively associated with alignment with Mrs. Gandhi, cannot account for the greater support for Mrs. Gandhi among position-holders in the district party organization than among those in the national and state party organizations. For, if anything, position-holding has a stronger negative relationship with education at the district level ($\text{Gamma} = -.35$) than at the national and state ($\text{Gamma} = -.07$ and $-.16$, respectively).

As to occupation, too, the distribution of occupational groups among position-holders at different levels of the party do not follow a neat pattern such that the relationships between position-holding and support for Mrs. Gandhi among party strata could be attributed to the effects of occupation as such. For example, though the professional politicians, one of the groups less likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi, are quite sizeable among national party position-holders and probably partly responsible for swinging the national party executive toward the Syndicate, the traditional middle-class MPs, otherwise more likely to align with the Syndicate, constitute the major component of the district party position-holders, who, on the whole, were more likely to be supportive of Mrs. Gandhi (see Table 6.30). It must therefore be concluded that party strata position-holding exercised some independent influence of its own on factional affiliation of the MPs.

TABLE 6.30

OCCUPATION OF PARTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBERS AT
NATIONAL, STATE, AND DISTRICT LEVELS

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Level of Party Organization</u>		
	National (CWC)	State (PCWC)	District (DCWC)
Upper Class	*	2.2	*
Modern Middle Class	23.1	26.7	27.0
Traditional Middle Class	30.8	46.7	55.4
Professional Politicians	46.2	24.4	17.6
Lower Middle Class	*	*	*
	(N=) (13)	(45)	(74)

⁹See "Maharashtra: New Organization Men", Economic and Political Weekly, VII-12 (March 18, 1972), pp. 611-612.

¹⁰Eldersveld and Kubota (1973: 10,20).

¹¹For such a logical extension of Max Weber's concept of charismatic authority, see Lipset (1963: 15-23).

CHAPTER VII

SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS

AND FACTIONAL AFFILIATION

In this chapter, I will analyse the contextual pressures upon factional affiliation of the Congress Parliamentary (Lok Sabha) Party members around the time of the 1969 party split. The assumption is that the socio-political milieu constitutes a significantly differentiated entity, and that residence in it and representation of that locale creates a set of personal orientations and perceptions of local political pressures in the representative that ought to exercise some influence on his behaviour.

The limitations of this method are widely recognized and hardly need a detailed recapitulation (see relevant contributions to Dogan and Rokkan, eds., 1969). The advantages of availability and measurability of data with greater ease are counterbalanced by the limitations imposed by the aggregate data of the kind employed here in that we can only demonstrate relationships between areas and certain aspects of political behaviour and cannot directly talk about the political behaviour of specific social groups or persons within an area, except by way of speculative inference.

As the theoretical discussion of contextual explanations of party or factional affiliation in Chapter 5 indicated,

two broad dimensions of the context or environment appear particularly relevant: socio-economic and political. The most important aspects of socio-economic environment in a "transitional" society such as India were identified as the ethnic composition and social mobilizational characteristics. A review of theory and previous research regarding the relationships between these dimensions of contextual characteristics and party or factional identification suggested that, in general, one would expect that the greater the proportion of minority or marginal communities in an area, the greater the likelihood that the legislator representing such constituencies will align with liberal factional forces within his party. Likewise, a higher level of social mobilization ought to exert a greater local pressure for alignment with more liberal rather than conservative parties or factions. Of the political contexts, the most significant aspects were conceived in terms of party system variables such as inter-party competitiveness, the nature of the main opposition party, and mass electoral participation. Speaking very broadly, it was suggested that local pressures for alignment with liberal factions among the majority party legislators ought to be greater in an environment characterized by a higher degree of interparty competition. A similar outcome can be expected in a locale where the bulk of the opposition vote goes to the left-wing parties. As to electoral turnout, it was pointed

out that, since higher turnouts may result from autonomous social mobilization as well as induced electoral mobilization by traditional patron-brokers, one cannot suggest an unconditional hypothesis relating local electoral turnout and the representatives' factional affiliation. To the extent that autonomous social mobilization can be assumed to be the major cause of increased electoral participation, the latter ought to operate as a liberal local pressure; but to the extent that it is related to traditional methods of vote mobilization, it should operate as a conservative influence on factional affiliation of the legislators.

There is a political context of a different order that must be mentioned here; it refers to the external party apparatus, with configurations of factional alignment of key political figures in it. The extra-parliamentary party organization of the Indian National Congress enjoys wide powers with regard to selection of party candidates and distribution of campaign funds. For this reason it seems a reasonable assumption that the factional alignment of the key organizational leaders from a particular state will exercise a considerable influence on the factional affiliation of the MPs from that state.

After a brief look at the specific regional and state differences in factional alignment of the MPs, the discussion will move to a more abstract plane and carry out the major part of the analysis with administrative-district data in the

case of socio-economic variables and with parliamentary constituency data in the case of the political ones (except for the contextual variables pertaining to the configuration of power in the mass membership party organization, which, for the reason of availability of information, have to be confined to the national and state party units). The use of smaller units is only partly dictated by the state of current political analysis of regionalism in India;¹ it is also appropriate because macro regions and most states in India are highly complex and bewilderingly large entities, concealing a wide spectrum of cross-regional and within-state variations with important political implications. As Brass (1967: 266) aptly remarks:

An exclusive focus on the states as the significant political regions in India . . . , even when qualified by a concern for uncovering subprovincial differences, would miss some significant areas for research in the political geography of India. For example, there appear to be cross-state regional patterns of politics whose importance might be underestimated in an examination of the politics of a single state. Thus, in and around the region of Chota Nagpur in Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Orissa, there is a large block of districts where political opposition to the Congress is heavily concentrated. In the politics of the three states, this opposition has taken different forms. The area includes the hill districts of Orissa (where the Ganatantra Parishad has been dominant), the southern districts of Bihar (where Swatantra and Jharkhand strength is concentrated), and the eastern districts of Madhya Pradesh (where opposition is expressed through the Hindu communal parties). Clearly any analysis of the politics of these states must take account of these various opposition forces as they expressed themselves in the politics of Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Orissa. However, it is possible that some significant information about the sources of discontent in modern

Indian politics might be discovered by examining patterns of politics in the Chota Nagpur region and its environs as a whole and by ignoring the state boundaries for the moment.

Although districts and constituencies too are fairly large, they are relatively more homogeneous as compared to regions and states, and an analysis based on these hopefully will permit within- and between-state variations. The impact of larger contexts defined by the region and state, in which varying kinds of districts and constituencies are embedded will, of course, also receive some attention.

Socio-Economic Context and Factional Affiliation

Table 7.1 displays patterns of factional affiliation of the MPs by some selected socio-economic features of their environment at the regional and state levels. It is clear that, leaving aside the islands because of the extremely low number of cases, there is, within certain limits, a distinct regional variation in the pattern of parliamentary party support for the two major factions. Although the pro-Indira Congress managed to carry the majority of Congress Lok Sabha members across all regions, the greater proportion of support for it came from Mrs. Gandhi's native Hindi heartland, followed - in that order - by the non-Hindi regions to its east, west, and south. The Syndicate's factional strength is disproportionately concentrated in the southern and western regions. In fact, it is only in some non-Hindi states such as Gujarat and Tamil Nadu that the Syndicate received the

TABLE 7.1

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY SELECTED
SOCIO-ECONOMIC FEATURES OF ENVIRONMENT

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation of Lok Sabha Congress Members, Fall 1969</u>			<u>Literacy Rate, 1961</u>	
	<u>Pro-Indira</u>	<u>Pro-Syndicate</u>	<u>(N=)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Rank</u>
<u>Hindi Region</u>	<u>83.6%</u>	<u>14.1%</u>	(135)	$\bar{X} = 11.6$	
Bihar	76.4	23.5	(34)	18.4	11
Haryana	85.7	14.3	(7)	24.2	8
Himachal Pradesh	100.0	0.0		N.A.	
Madhya Pradesh	86.4	13.6	(22)	17.1	13
Rajasthan	100.0	0.0	(11)	15.2	14
Uttar Pradesh	86.8	13.2	(53)	17.6	12
Delhi	100.0	0.0	(2)	N.A.	
<u>Non-Hindi Western Region</u>	<u>71.9</u>	<u>28.2</u>	(64)		<u>7.5</u>
Gujarat	23.1	76.9	(13)	30.5	3
Jammu and Kashmir	100.0	0.0	(5)	11.0	15
Maharashtra	80.5	19.5	(36)	29.8	4
Punjab	90.0	10.0	(10)	24.2	8
<u>Non-Hindi Eastern Region</u>	<u>77.1</u>	<u>22.9</u>	(35)		<u>6.7</u>
Assam	90.2	10.0	(10)	27.4	6
Nagaland	100.0	0.0	(1)	N.A.	
Orissa	66.7	33.3	(6)	21.7	9

TABLE 7.1 (Continued)

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation of Lok Sabha Congress Members, Fall 1969</u>			<u>Literacy Rate, 1961</u>	
	<u>Pro-Indira</u>	<u>Pro-Syndicate</u>	<u>(N=)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Rank</u>
<u>Non-Hindi Eastern Region</u>					
West Bengal	71.4	28.6	(14)	29.3	5
Manipur	100.0	0.0	(1)	N.A.	
Tripura	50.0	50.0	(2)	N.A.	
NEFA	100.0	0.0	(1)	N.A.	
<u>Non-Hindi Southern</u>					
<u>Peninsula</u>	<u>69.6</u>	<u>30.4</u>	<u>(56)</u>		<u>5</u>
Andhra Pradesh	73.3	26.6	(30)	21.2	10
Karnataka	71.4	28.6	(21)	25.4	7
Kerala	100.0	0.0	(2)	46.8	1
Tamil Nadu	-	100.0	(2)	31.4	2
Pondicherry	-	100.0	(1)	N.A.	
<u>Islands</u>	<u>66.7</u>	<u>33.3</u>	<u>(3)</u>		
Andman & Nicobar	100.0	0.0	(1)	N.A.	
Dadra & Nagar Haveli	0.0	100.0	(1)	N.A.	
Laccadive, Minicoy & Amindivi	100.0	0.0	(1)	N.A.	

TABLE 7.1 (Continued)

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Urbanization, 1961</u>		<u>Participation Rate in Traditional Sector (% Population Engaged in Agriculture, 1961)</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Rank</u>
<u>Hindi Region</u>		$\bar{X} = 12.8$		$\bar{X} = 9.4$
Bihar	8.4	16	76.8	7
Haryana	17.2	8	63.9	17
Himachal Pradesh	6.5	18	84.7	2
Madhya Pradesh	14.3	12	79.3	4
Rajasthan	16.4	10	77.7	5
Uttar Pradesh	12.9	13	75.2	8
<u>Non-Hindi Western</u>				
<u>Region</u>		4.7		12.5
Gujarat	25.8	3	68.1	15
Jammu and Kashmir	16.7	9	76.9	6
Maharashtra	28.2	1	69.9	12
Punjab	23.1	6	63.9	17
<u>Non-Hindi Eastern</u>				
<u>Region</u>		14.8		13.3
Assam	7.5	17	68.3	14
Nagaland	5.2	20	89.3	1
Orissa	6.3	19	73.8	9
West Bengal	24.5	4	53.8	19
Manipur	8.7	15	66.0	16
Tripura	9.0	14	71.8	10
NEFA	N.A.		6.2	24

TABLE 7.1 (Continued)

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Urbanization, 1961</u>		<u>Participation Rate in Traditional Sector (% Population Engaged in Agriculture, 1961)</u>	
	<u>%</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Rank</u>
<u>Non-Hindi Southern</u>				
<u>Region</u>		<u>6.2</u>		<u>16.6</u>
Andhra Pradesh	17.4	7	68.7	13
Karnataka	24.1	5	70.6	11
Kerala	15.1	11	38.3	21
Tamil Nadu	26.7	2	60.5	18
Pondicherry	N.A.		44.0	20
<u>Islands</u>				
				<u>16.7</u>
Andman & Nicobar	N.A.		21.8	22
Dadra & Nagar Haveli	N. A.		88.4	3
Laccadive, Minocoy & Amindivi	N. A.		1.1	25

TABLE 7.1 (Continued)

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Per Capita Net Domestic Product, 1969-70</u>		<u>Per Capita Income, 1969-70</u>	
	<u>Rupees</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Rupees</u>	<u>Rank</u>
<u>Hindi Region</u>	$\bar{X} = 12.8$		$\bar{X} = 8.5$	
Bihar	402.0	19	402.0	15
Haryana	902.0	2	788.0	3
Himachal Pradesh	724.0	5	N.A.	
Madhya Pradesh	495.0	16	569.0	6
Rajasthan	478.0	18	480.0	14
Uttar Pradesh	492.0	17	506.0	1
Delhi	N.A.	N.A.	1239.0	1
<u>Non-Hindi Western Region</u>	$\bar{X} = 5.7$		$\bar{X} = 7.5$	
Gujarat	740.0	3	567.0	7
Jammu and Kashmir	503.0	15	216.0	17
Maharashtra	736.0	4	731.0	4
Punjab	1000.2	1	881.0	2
Goa, Daman, & Diu	N.A.		N.A.	
<u>Non-Hindi Eastern Region</u>	$\bar{X} = 11.5$		$\bar{X} = 11$	
Assam	586.0	10	545.0	9
Nagaland	328.0	20	N.A.	
Orissa	545.0	12	325.0	16
West Bengal	706.0	6	562.0	8
Manipur	542.0	14	N.A.	

TABLE 7.1 (Continued)

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Per Capita Net Domestic Product, 1969-70</u>		<u>Per Capita Income, 1969-70</u>	
	<u>Rupees</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Rupees</u>	<u>Rank</u>
<u>Non-Hindi Eastern</u>				
<u>Region</u>				
Tripura	682.0	7	N.A.	
NEFA	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	
<u>Non-Hindi Southern</u>				
<u>Peninsula</u>		<u>10.2</u>		<u>9.7</u>
Andhra Pradesh	544.0	13	513.0	11
Karnataka	571.0	11	515.0	10
Kerala	643.0	8	505.0	13
Tamil Nadu	591.0	9	616.0	5
Pondicherry	N.A.		N.A.	
<u>Islands</u>				
Andman & Nicobar	N.A.		N.A.	
Dadra & Nagar Haveli	N.A.		N.A.	
Laccadive, Minicoy & Amindivi	N.A.		N.A.	

TABLE 7.1 (Continued)

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Proportion of Population Living in Districts at Higher (High and Medium-High) Levels</u>	<u>Rank</u>
	<u>%</u>	
<u>Hindi Region</u>		$\bar{X} = 9.6$
Bihar	21.1	13
Haryana	85.9	4
Himachal Pradesh	*	16
Madhya Pradesh	32.0	12
Rajasthan	44.8	10
Uttar Pradesh	40.7	11
Delhi	100.0	1
<u>Non-Hindi Western Region</u>		$\bar{X} = 6.5$
Gujarat	87.7	3
Jammu and Kashmir	14.5	14
Maharashtra	73.2	5
Punjab	85.9	4
Goa, Daman, & Diu	N.A.	
<u>Non-Hindi Eastern Region</u>		$\bar{X} = 14.4$
Assam	58.0	8
Nagaland	*	18
Orissa	*	17
West Bengal	62.1	7
Manipur	*	18
Tripura	*	15

TABLE 7.1 (Continued)

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Proportion of Population Living in Districts at Higher (High and Medium-High) Levels</u>	<u>Rank</u>
	<u>%</u>	
<u>Non-Hindi Eastern</u>		
<u>Region</u>		
NEFA	N.A.	18
<u>Non-Hindi Southern</u>		
<u>Peninsula</u>		4.5
Andhra Pradesh	55.7	9
Karnataka	65.4	6
Kerala	89.5	2
Tamil Nadu	100.0	1
Pondicherry	N.A.	
<u>Islands</u>		
Andman & Nicobar	N.A.	
Dadra & Nagar Haveli	N.A.	
Laccadive, Minicoy & Amindivi	N.A.	

SOURCE: Information on factional affiliation of Congress MPs based on press reports. Data on literacy rate from Das Gupta (1970:57). Data on urbanization, and percapita net domestic product taken from Om Prakash Mathur (1973: 92,89); on percapita income from Rao and Sundram (1973: 79); on participation rate in traditional sector from Census of India, Paper No. 1 of 1962, 1961 Census, Final Population Tables, p. 412-13; and on levels of development from A. Mitra, Census of India 1961, Vol. I, Part I-A(2) Text, Levels of Regional Development in India, p. 19.

backing of the majority of the party's Lok Sabha contingents from the state.

As one moves to the other columns of the table summarizing socio-economic features of the regions and states, one finds that, although none of the regions or states emerges as a highly "modernized" society in the global comparative perspective, within the overall framework of a "transitional" society, the major non-Hindi states, with a few exceptions, are more "developed" by most standard indices of such development than the major Hindi states. Comparatively, the former are, for example, characterized by higher levels of literacy and urbanization, lower participation rate in the traditional sector of economy, higher per capita net domestic product and income, and a greater proportion of population living in districts at upper levels of socio-economic development. In other words, there is a tendency for members from regions at relatively lower levels of socio-economic development to support Mrs. Gandhi's faction, whereas the reverse holds for the Syndicate.

With these preliminary observations, the analysis will now move to levels below that of the region and examine whether the decision of the CPP members to affiliate with one of the two splinters into which the party split in 1969 was influenced by, or could be predicted from, the characteristics of the socio-economic environment that the member represented. Four broad dimensions of socio-economic context, referring to

district-level 1961 census data (unless otherwise specified) are here analysed: (1) ethnic composition of the population, (2) occupational structure, (3) degree of social mobilization, and (4) level of overall socio-economic development.

While the index of level of overall socio-economic development is taken as such from the 1961 Indian census (cited below), the variables pertaining to the first three dimensions above were first subjected to factor analysis in an attempt to reduce the data to a smaller number of dimensions. Composite factor indices were then constructed to be used as summary independent variables.² (Factor correlation matrices and rotated factor matrices pertaining to the various factors for each dimension of socio-economic environment here considered are presented in Appendix I).

Ethnic Contextual Variables

Factor analysis of 1961 census data regarding some important aspects of the ethnic composition of districts, encompassing percent Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh, Buddhist, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes populations, yielded three major clusters of regularity in the interrelationships between the characteristics: (1) Hindu-Muslim polarity, with a high positive loading for percent Hindu population and a high negative loading for percent Muslim population (meaning that the two variables are negatively correlated and that in the composite index the higher values would indicate the increasing

proportion of Hindu population in the district and the lower values the increasing proportion of Muslim population); (2) depressed population, polarized along the Hindu/non-Hindu dimension, having a high positive loading for percent Scheduled Castes population, moderate positive loading for percent Hindu population and high negative loadings for percent Scheduled Tribes and percent Christian populations; and (3) Sikh-Hindu polarity, with a high positive loading for percent Sikh population and a high negative loading for percent Hindu population.³

Table 7.2 shows that there was a curvilinear relationship between the Hindu-Muslim population polarity in the CPP members' district and their factional affiliation, revealing a trend of higher support for Mrs. Gandhi's faction in both high-Hindu and high-Muslim population districts, although, one must hasten to add, her support structure is fairly broad-based through all categories of the independent variable. The Syndicate's support is relatively better among the members from districts with medium levels of Hindu-versus-Muslim balance.

The relationship between the index of Sikh-Hindu polarity in district population and the members' factional affiliation, presented in Table 7.2, again shows a curvilinear pattern, Mrs. Gandhi's Congress getting greater support from the MPs coming from districts with the extremes of both Sikh and Hindu population concentration and the Syndicate doing relatively better among members from the districts at medium

TABLE 7.2

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY INDICES OF DISTRICT
 HINDU-MUSLIM POPULATION POLARITY, DISTRICT HINDU-SIKH
 POPULATION POLARITY, AND DISTRICT HINDU/NON-HINDU
 DEPRESSED POPULATION POLARITY

<u>Indices of Population</u> <u>Polarity</u>	<u>% Pro-Indira</u>	<u>(N=)</u>
<u>Hindu-Muslim Polarity</u>		
High-Hindu	84.0	(81)
Mixed	67.4	(95)
High-Muslim	83.8	(117)
	Total N =	(293)
Cramer's V = .19		
<u>Hindu-Sikh Polarity</u>		
High-Hindu	80.9	(94)
Mixed	75.8	(99)
High-Sikh	79.0	(100)
	Total N =	(293)
Cramer's V = .05		
<u>Hindu-Non-Hindu Depressed</u> <u>Population Polarity</u>		
High-Depressed Hindu	85.0	(100)
Mixed	76.0	(96)
High Depressed Non-Hindu	74.0	(97)
	Total N =	(293)
Cramer's V = .21		

NOTES: In this and all subsequent tables cases with missing observations were excluded from the analysis. Another convention consistently followed in the tables is "*", indicating a vacuous cell, that is, absence of any case.

levels.

Table 7.2 also displays the relationship between the index of depressed population polarized along the Hindu/Non-Hindu dimension in the district and the member's factional affiliation. It is clear from the data that the MPs from districts with high Hindu depressed population (Scheduled Castes or Harijans) were more likely to support Mrs. Gandhi than those from districts with high levels of non-Hindu depressed population (Scheduled Tribes and Christians). (When raw percentages of Scheduled Tribes and Christian populations in the district were separately crosstabulated with factional affiliation of the members, it was found that the first produced a near zero relationship and the latter a clearly negative one with the members' loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi [$\text{Gamma} = -.17$]).

To sum up, the likelihood of alignment with the pro-Indira Congress was, on the whole, greater among the MPs coming from districts characterized by either a higher population concentration of the majority religious community or of the marginal or minority religious groups. The proportion of the Syndicate's supporters was relatively greater among the MPs coming from areas lying between these two extremes. In addition, the MPs from districts with high proportion of depressed Hindu castes (Scheduled Castes) were more likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi than those from districts with high proportions of non-Hindu depressed population (Scheduled Tribes and Christians). The latter is a rather baffling finding since

it departs from the general pattern of positive relationships between greater proportions of minorities in the district and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi among the MPs representing such districts. There may be regional and other factors confounding the relationships observed here. This problem will be attended to in a subsequent section of this chapter.

Developmental or Mobilizational Context

As already mentioned, the following three broad aspects of the developmental or mobilizational contextual variables and their effects on factional affiliation of the MPs will be analysed: occupational structure, social mobilization, and overall socio-economic development.

Two composite occupational indices were constructed on the basis of factor analysis of variables pertaining to the occupational structure of the population of the districts. These included the variables referring to the proportions of population engaged in (1) agriculture, (2) household industry, (3) industrial factories, (4) retail trading, and (5) manufacturing. This procedure identified two major factors. The first essentially delineated a dimension according to the incidence of employment in the "traditional" (i.e., agricultural) sector of the economy, and the second one of employment in the non-agricultural sector. Since the first index appeared to be just the obverse of the second - conceptually as well as in terms of the patterns of relationships with the dependent

variable - only the former is reported here.

As Table 7.3 shows, the MPs from predominantly agricultural districts were more likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi than those from districts with larger proportions of non-agricultural occupations, although support for her was sufficiently broad-based to preclude a deep rural/urban cleavage in the factional distribution of support.

An index of social mobilization was constructed on the basis of a single factor yielded by factor analysis of the following district data: (1) literates per 1,000 of population, (2) publication of newspapers and journals, (3) miles of surfaced road per 1,000 square miles of area, (4) population density per square mile, and (5) urbanization (percent of total population living in "urban" communities).

Table 7.3 shows a negative relationship between the index of district social mobilization and loyalty for Mrs. Gandhi among the MPs. This is a somewhat surprising finding in the light of Mrs. Gandhi's conscious attempt to link her faction with the aspirations of the new political arrivals or participants, and such groups should normally be more numerous in areas with higher levels of social mobilization.

The measure of the level of development of the district here employed was developed by the Indian census as a global composite index encompassing a battery of 63 variables grouped under the following six blocks: (1) general ecology, (2) agricultural infrastructure, (3) participation rates in

TABLE 7.3

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY INDICES OF DISTRICT
 AGRICULTURAL SECTOR EMPLOYMENT, DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION,
 AND DISTRICT SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

<u>Index of</u>	<u>% Pro-Indira</u>	<u>(N=)</u>
<u>Agricultural Sector</u>		
<u>Employment</u>		
High	85.9	(99)
Medium	75.8	(99)
Low	73.7	(95)
	Total N =	(293)
Cramer's V = .13		
Gamma = .24		
<u>Social Mobilization</u>		
High	73.0	(100)
Medium	78.5	(93)
Low	84.2	(76)
	Total N =	(269)
Cramer's V = .11		
Gamma = -.21		
<u>Socio-Economic Development</u>		
High	80.3	(71)
Medium-High	73.9	(69)
Medium-Low	79.2	(77)
Low	82.4	(68)
	Total N =	(285)
Cramer's V = .08		
Gamma = -.06		

NOTE: The total Ns do not match because of missing
 observations on some variables.

traditional sector, (4) potential of human resources, (5) distributive trade, manufacturing and infrastructure, and (6) organized industrial activity in the modern sector.⁴

As Table 7.3 shows, there was an overall negative association between district socio-economic development and the MPs' alignment with Mrs. Gandhi. There was, however, a mild curvilinearity in the data, as the support for the pro-Indira Congress was greater among the MPs coming from the most and least developed districts than among those coming from districts at the medium levels of development.

To sum up, contrary to our hypothesis that more modern and socially mobilized contexts ought to be more conducive to alignment with the liberal pro-Indira Congress faction, it was found that, in fact, the MPs from such areas were more likely to align with the conservative Syndicate (see Table 7.4 for summary statistics). It is pertinent to recall that, as the analysis in Chapter 6 indicated, a variant of this hypothesis positing a positive relationship between more modern and mobilized backgrounds and liberality or leftness of factional affiliation was indeed supported at the plane of the MPs' personal backgrounds. It is not entirely clear why this relationship should be reversed at the plane of contextual backgrounds. Presumably, it was indicative of the success of Mrs. Gandhi "in eroding the strategic position of local factional leaders and intermediate elites as the political mobilizers of the poor peasantry" (Frankel 1971: 214).

TABLE 7.4
SUMMARY STATISTICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SOCIO-ECONOMIC
CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES AND ALIGNMENT WITH
MRS. GANDHI AMONG CPP MEMBERS

Index of	Gamma
Agricultural Sector Employment	.24
Social Mobilization	-.21
Socio-Economic Development	-.06

Perhaps it is a reflection of the fact that the areas and states most mobilized in terms of urbanization, literacy, mass media, etc., are also the ones economically more prosperous and therefore more capable of absorbing and integrating the socially mobilized. In the areas of low economic development, on the contrary, even a smaller amount of social mobilization may result in a greater radicalization of politics mainly through the educated unemployed and restive consumers hit hard by inflation and shortages. Perhaps also the greater support for and popularity of Mrs. Gandhi in her native Hindi region, which happens to be less developed by most socio-economic indicators as compared to the non-Hindi regions, is partly responsible for this finding.

Having completed the analysis of the bivariate effects of the various independent variables on factional affiliation,

it is now possible to re-examine these relationships in order to test for spuriousness or confounding influences of extraneous variables. Since almost all students of Indian politics emphasize regionalism as a significant strand in the politics of the nation, I will concentrate on region as a standard control variable practically throughout. In addition, where there seem to be reasons to suspect the influence of other confounding variables, these will also be considered.

To begin with the ethnic characteristics of the districts, Table 7.4 reveals that when region is held constant, the original curvilinear relationships between the indices of Hindu-Muslim and Hindu-Sikh population polarities, on the one hand, and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi, on the other, are remarkably maintained in all regions, except for a slump in the support for Mrs. Gandhi among the MPs coming from high-Hindu districts in the western region, causing a departure from the curvilinear pattern. This might perhaps be explained by reference to the fact that the western region includes such states as the Sikh-majority Punjab and the Muslim-Majority Jammu and Kashmir and that the Hindu minorities in these states are usually more receptive to the religion-linked traditionalism of the right-wing Jana Sangh.

Moreover, as regards the index of Hindu/non-Hindu depressed population polarity, the original relationship, it will be recalled, was that the MPs from the high-Hindu

TABLE 7.5

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY INDICES OF DISTRICT HINDU-MUSLIM
POPULATION POLARITY, HINDU-SIKH POPULATION POLARITY, AND HINDU/NON-HINDU
DEPRESSED POPULATION POLARITY, CONTROLLING FOR REGION

Indices of District Population									
Polarity	Region								
	Hindi		West		East		South		Total
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	% (N=)
Hindu-Muslim Polarity									
High-Hindu	90.0	(50)	57.1	(7)	66.7	(9)	86.7	(15)	84.0 (81)
Mixed	76.3	(38)	61.5	(26)	60.0	(5)	61.5	(26)	67.4 (95)
High-Muslim	89.4	(47)	83.9	(31)	85.7	(21)	66.7	(15)	83.8 (117)
	N = (135)	N = (64)	N = (35)	N = (56)	N = (293)				
	V = .17	V = .26	V = .25	V = .23	V = .19				
Hindu-Sikh Polarity									
High-Hindu	88.9	(27)	60.0	(33)	88.2	(17)	66.7	(15)	80.9 (94)
Mixed	82.0	(50)	78.8	(21)	50.0	(6)	63.6	(22)	75.8 (99)
High-Sikh	87.9	(58)	81.0	(10)	75.0	(12)	78.9	(19)	79.0 (100)
	N = (135)	N = (64)	N = (35)	N = (56)	N = (293)				
	V = .09	V = .40	V = .33	V = .15	V = .05				

TABLE 7.5 (Continued)

<u>Indices of District Population</u>		<u>Region</u>							
<u>Polarity</u>	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>		<u>East</u>		<u>South</u>		<u>Total</u>	
%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
<u>Hindu / Non-Hindu Depressed</u>									
<u>Population Polarity</u>									
High-Depressed Hindu	89.1	(64)	91.7	(12)	57.1	(7)	76.5	(17)	85.0 (100)
Mixed	82.0	(50)	100.0	(5)	73.3	(15)	61.5	(26)	76.0 (96)
High-Depressed Non-Hindu	85.7	(21)	63.8	(47)	92.0	(13)	76.9	(13)	74.0 (97)
	N =	(135)	N =	(64)	N =	(35)	N =	(56)	N = (293)
	V = .09		V = .30		V = .30		V = .16		V = .29

depressed population districts were more likely to support Mrs. Gandhi than those from the non-Hindu depressed population district. When region was controlled, this pattern was maintained only in the western region; while it was reversed in the eastern region, a curvilinear relationship emerged in the Hindi and southern regions such that the MPs from both high-depressed Hindu and high-depressed non-Hindu districts were more likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi than those from the mixed ones (Table 7.5).

Now, coming to the mobilizational or developmental aspects, it will be recalled that the three indices employed in the foregoing analysis had indicated that, contrary to the relationships on the personal plane, on the contextual plane the MPs from districts with higher proportions of agricultural-sector employment and lower levels of social-mobilizational and socio-economic development were more likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi. As Table 7.6 shows, this overall pattern is subject to regional variations. Three interesting breakdowns in the data can be made. First, in the case of the relationships between the index of agricultural sector employment in the district and the MPs' loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi the original positive association is maintained in all regions, except the Hindi heartland where a curvilinear pattern emerges, indicating a greater probability of support for Mrs. Gandhi among the MPs from both high-and low-agricultural employment districts.

TABLE 7.6

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY INDICES OF DISTRICT AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT, DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION, DISTRICT SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
CONTROLLING FOR REGION

Index of	Region									
	Hindi		West		East		South		Total	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
<u>District Agricultural</u>										
<u>Sector Employment</u>										
High	86.5	(74)	77.8	(9)	91.7	(12)	100.0	(3)	85.9	(99)
Medium	80.6	(36)	73.9	(23)	72.7	(11)	72.4	(29)	75.8	(99)
Low	92.0	(25)	68.8	(32)	66.7	(12)	62.5	(24)	73.7	(95)
	N = (135)		N = (64)		N = (35)		N = (56)		N = (293)	
	Gamma = -.04		Gamma = .15		Gamma = .46		Gamma = .33		Gamma = .24	
<u>District Social Mobilization</u>										
High	81.0	(21)	68.9	(45)	75.0	(8)	73.1	(26)	73.0	(100)
Medium	85.2	(54)	62.5	(8)	75.0	(16)	66.7	(15)	78.5	(93)
Low	87.3	(55)	100.0	(4)	66.7	(3)	71.4	(14)	84.2	(76)
	N = (130)		N = (57)		N = (27)		N = (55)		N = (269)	
	Gamma = -.14		Gamma = -.19		Gamma = .08		Gamma = .05		Gamma = -.21	

TABLE 7.6 (Continued)

<u>Index of</u>	<u>Hindi</u>		<u>West</u>		<u>Region</u>		<u>South</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
<u>District Socio-Economic</u>										
<u>Development</u>										
High	91.7	(24)	78.1	(32)	50.0	(8)	85.7	(7)	80.3	(71)
Medium-High	78.9	(19)	60.0	(20)	100.0	(4)	76.9	(26)	73.9	(69)
Medium-Low	86.8	(38)	71.4	(7)	85.7	(14)	61.1	(18)	79.2	(77)
Low	85.2	(54) N = (135)	80.0	(5) N = (64)	80.0	(5) N = (31)	50.0	(4) N = (55)	82.4	(68) N = (285)
	Gamma = .06		Gamma = .16		Gamma = -.42		Gamma = .40		Gamma = -.06	

Second, in the case of the index of district social mobilization, when region was controlled, its original negative effect on the MPs' alignment with Mrs. Gandhi was either considerably reduced (in the Hindi and western regions) or it turned moderately positive (in the eastern and southern regions). Both these trends are consistent with the predictions of the social mobilization theories that contextual mobilization in transitional societies ought to lead to a greater support for liberal or leftist political forces. However, the first of these two trends qualitatively still remains discrepant with the above hypothesis.

Third, with region held constant, the original overall curvilinear relationship between the global composite index of socio-economic development and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi is largely maintained in the Hindi and western regions, but it turns out to be inexplicably negative in the eastern and positive in the southern regions.

Political Context and Factional Affiliation

In this section, I propose to analyse the impact of political contextual pressures on the factional affiliation of the CPP members. After a quick glance at regional and state patterns of relationships between some important aspects of their political milieu and their factional affiliation, the analysis will focus on factors at the parliamentary constituency level.

Table 7.7 presents factional alignment in relation to some important aspects of political environment at the regional and state levels. Several points emerge from this table. First, the pro-Indira Congress won greater support among the members from the Hindi heartland and non-Hindi eastern region, both areas of diminished Congress electoral fortunes. The major sources of opposition to the Congress in these regions are either the parties of the left or those of both right and left more or less matched in electoral strength. It is also interesting to note that it was in these two regions that the Congress suffered its greatest electoral reverses in 1967, leading to a spell of extremely unstable state governments (until Mrs. Gandhi's Congress regained control in the state elections during 1971-73).

The major proportions of the Syndicate's adherents came from the non-Hindi southern and western regions, both of which are marked by a high level of Congress vote, moderate levels of right-wing and regional parties' vote, and low levels of left-wing electoral strength. These are also the regions, one might add, that were previously intensely involved in the agitations for autonomous unilingual states during which the Congress momentarily suffered a notable decline of popularity in some states (e.g., Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Punjab) in the 1957 elections for its initial refusal to concede the demand for linguistic states. Subsequently,

TABLE 7.7
 FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY ASPECTS
 OF POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation of Lok Sabha Congress Members, Fall 1969</u>		
	<u>Pro-Indira</u>	<u>Pro-Syndicate</u>	<u>(N=)</u>
<u>Hindi Region</u>	<u>83.6%</u>	<u>14.1</u>	<u>(135)</u>
Bihar	76.4	23.5	(34)
Haryana	85.7	14.3	(7)
Himachal Pradesh	100.0	0.0	(6)
Madhya Pradesh	86.4	13.6	(22)
Rajasthan	100.0	0.0	(11)
Uttar Pradesh	86.6	13.2	(53)
Delhi	100.0	0.0	(2)
<u>Non-Hindi Western Region</u>	<u>71.9</u>	<u>28.2</u>	<u>(64)</u>
Gujarat	23.1	76.9	(13)
Jammu & Kashmir	100.0	0.0	(5)
Maharashtra	80.5	19.5	(36)
Punjab	90.0	10.0	(10)
Goa, Daman, & Diu	*		
<u>Non-Hindi Eastern Region</u>	<u>77.1</u>	<u>22.9</u>	<u>(35)</u>
Assam	90.0	10.0	(10)
Nagaland	100.0	0.0	(1)
Orissa	66.7	33.3	(6)

TABLE 7.7 (Continued)

<u>Regions & Territories</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation of Lok Sabha Congress Members, Fall 1969</u>		
	<u>Pro-Indira</u>	<u>Pro-Syndicate</u>	<u>(N=)</u>
<u>Non-Hindi Eastern</u>			
<u>Region</u>			
West Bengal	71.4	28.6	(14)
Manipur	100.0	0.0	(1)
Tripura	50.0	50.0	(2)
NEFA	100.0	0.0	(1)
<u>Non-Hindi Southern</u>			
<u>Peninsula</u>	<u>69.6</u>	<u>30.4</u>	<u>(56)</u>
Andhra Pradesh	73.3	26.6	(30)
Karnataka	71.4	28.6	(21)
Kerala	100.0	0.0	(2)
Tamil Nadu	0.0	100.0	(2)
Pondicherry	0.0	100.0	(1)
<u>Islands</u>	<u>66.7</u>	<u>33.3</u>	<u>(3)</u>
Andman & Nicobar	100.0	0.0	(1)
Dadra & Nagar Haveli	0.0	100.0	(1)
Laccadive, Minicoy, & Amindivi	100.0	0.0	(1)

TABLE 7.7 (Continued)

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Percentage Vote, 1967 Lok Sabha Elections</u>				
	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>%</u>
	<u>Congress Vote</u>	<u>Right Wing Vote</u>	<u>Left Wing Vote</u>	<u>Regional Parties' Vote</u>	<u>Vote for Independents^a</u>
<u>Hindi Region</u>	<u>30.0</u>	<u>22.0</u>	<u>18.0</u>	*	<u>30.0</u>
Bihar	35.1	14.5	35.0	*	15.4
Haryana	44.1	25.5	8.4	*	22.0
Himachal Pradesh	47.8	28.0	3.1	*	21.1
Madhya Pradesh	40.5	32.7	13.7	*	13.8
Rajasthan	39.3	38.4	5.8	*	16.5
Uttar Pradesh	33.5	26.8	15.8	*	23.9
Delhi	38.8	46.7	0.2	*	14.3
<u>Non-Hindi Western</u>					
<u>Region</u>	<u>46.0</u>	<u>17.0</u>	<u>14.0</u>	<u>6.0</u>	<u>17.0</u>
Gujarat	47.3	36.0	1.6	*	15.1
Jammu & Kashmir	50.5	20.3	*	28.6	0.6
Maharashtra	48.6	7.4	19.0	*	25.0
Punjab	37.0	17.7	6.5	26.8	12.0
Goa, Daman, & Dieu	5.47	*	4.0	53.9	36.7
<u>Non-Hindi Eastern</u>					
<u>Region</u>	<u>38.0</u>	<u>8.0</u>	<u>34.0</u>	<u>1.0</u>	<u>19.0</u>
Assam	45.8	6.4	24.9	3.8	19.1
Nagaland	*	*	*	*	Elected Unopposed
Orissa	27.8	27.7	20.4	*	24.1

TABLE 7.7 (Continued)

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Percentage Vote, 1967 Lok Sabha Elections</u>				
	<u>% Congress Vote</u>	<u>% Right Wing Vote</u>	<u>% Left Wing Vote</u>	<u>% Regional Parties' Vote</u>	<u>% Vote for Indepen- dents^a</u>
<u>Non-Hindi Eastern</u>					
<u>Region</u>					
West Bengal	39.8	2.2	32.7	*	25.3
Manipur	32.7	*	34.8	*	32.5
Tripura	58.2	*	41.8	*	*
NEFA	*	*	*	*	*
<u>Non-Hindi Southern</u>					
<u>Peninsula</u>					
Andhra Pradesh	44.0	12.0	6.0	13.0	25.0
Karnataka	48.9	13.7	19.4	*	18.0
Kerala	48.8	17.1	9.2	*	24.9
Tamil Nadu	36.2	3.7	45.9	*	14.2
Pondicherry	41.7	9.4	8.7	35.8	4.4
	39.8	*	*	*	60.2
<u>Islands</u>					
Andman & Nicobar	43.0	6.0	11.0	*	40.0
Dadra & Nagar Haveli	52.6	4.7	*	*	42.7
Laccadive, Mini- Coy & Amindivi	50.1	13.3	36.6	*	63.4
	*	*	*	*	*

TABLE 7.7 (Continued)

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Percent Electoral Turnout, 1967 Lok Sabha Elections</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>Factional Alignment of Key Political Figures From Given States in the Pradesh Congress Party Apparatus: CM/CLP Leader PCC President</u>
<u>Hindi Region</u>	$\bar{X} = 11.7$		<u>Pro-Indira 9 (75.0%): Pro- Syndicate 3 (25.0%)</u>
Bihar	51.5	16	Both Consistently Divided
Haryana	72.6	3	Both Switched Over From Syndicate to Indira
Himachal Pradesh	51.2	17	Both Consistently Pro-Indira
Madhya Pradesh	53.5	15	Both Switched Over From Syndicate to Indira
Rajasthan	58.3	12	Both Switched Over From Syndicate to Indira
Uttar Pradesh	54.5	14	Both Consistently Divided
Delhi	69.5	5	Earlier Both Pro-Syndicate But Later Divided
<u>Non-Hindi Western Region</u>	$\bar{X} = 8.5$		<u>Pro-Indira 7 (58.0%): Pro- Syndicate 5 (42%)</u>
Gujarat	63.8	9	Both Consistently Pro-Syndicate
Jammu & Kashmir	55.2	13	Both Consistently Pro-Indira
Maharashtra	64.8	8	Both Switched Over From Syndicate to Indira
Punjab	71.1	4	Both Consistently Pro-Indira
Goa, Soman, & Diu			Divided
<u>Non-Hindi Eastern Region</u>	$\bar{X} = 12$		<u>Pro-Indira 7 (88.0%): Pro- Syndicate 1 (13.0%)</u>
Assam	59.3	11	Both Switched Over From Syndicate to Indira

TABLE 7.7 (Continued)

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Percent Electoral Turnout, 1967 Lok Sabha Elections</u>		<u>Factional Alignment of Key Political Figures From Given States in the Pradesh Congress Party Apparatus: CM/CLP Leader PCC President</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>Rank</u>	
<u>Non-Hindi Eastern</u>			
<u>Region</u>			
Nagaland	*		Not Ascertained
Orissa	43.7	18	Both Switched Over From Syndicate
West Bengal	66.0	7	Both Consistently Divided
Manipur	32.5	Not Ascertained	Not Ascertained
Tripura	*	Not Ascertained	Both Pro-Indira
NEFA	*	Not Ascertained	Not Ascertained
<u>Non-Hindi Southern</u>			
<u>Peninsula</u>		<u>4.7</u>	<u>Pro-Indira 3 (30.0%): Pro- Syndicate 7 (70.0%)</u>
Andhra Pradesh	68.7	6	Both Switched Over from Syndicate
Karnataka	63.0	10	Both Consistently Pro-Syndicate
Kerala	75.6	2	Earlier Both Pro-Syndicate But Later Divided
Tamil Nadu	76.6	1	Both Consistently Pro-Syndicate
Pondicherry	Not Ascertained		Both Consistently Pro-Syndicate

TABLE 7.7 (Continued)

<u>Regions & States/Union Territories</u>	<u>Percent Electoral Turnout, 1967 Lok Sabha Elections</u>	<u>Factional Alignment of Key Political Figures From Given States in the Pradesh Congress Party Apparatus: CM/CLP Leader PCC President</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>Rank</u>
<u>Islands</u>		
Andman & Nicobar	Not Ascertained	Not Ascertained
Dadra & Nagar Haveli	Not Ascertained	Not Ascertained
Laccadive, Minicoy, & Amindivi	Not Ascertained	Not Ascertained

SOURCE: Information on factional Configurations within the Congress are based on press reports. Electoral data are computed from Chandidas et al. (1968).

NOTE: a. Includes the Republican Party, Muslim League, Janata Paksha, Lok Sevak Sangh, and Kerala Congress.

however, despite Congress reverses in 1967 in Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Punjab, the major parts of these two regions have provided unusually strong and stable Congress governments. And finally, these regions are also characterized by high electoral participation.

Second, the factional alignment of the key political figures in the external party apparatus, with their control over candidate-selection and party finances, seems to have exerted an appreciable influence on factional alignment of the MPs. Relatively larger proportions of state Chief Ministers and Pradesh Congress presidents in the Hindi and eastern regions opted, sooner or later, to affiliate with the pro-Indira Congress - a trend paralleled by the pattern of factional affiliation in the CPP. The Syndicate's state party base was strongest in the western region, which corresponds with the regional distribution of its parliamentary party strength.

The number of the party's High Command (CPB/CEC) members is rather small and mostly restricted to the larger states, but an analysis of these limited cases projected to the regional level reveals a similar trend (these data are not presented in the table). The High Command members gave majority support (60%) to Mrs. Gandhi only in the Hindi region, which also came to be the mainstay of her strength in the CPP. The proportions of the pro-Indira High Command members in the eastern, western, and southern regions were 50%, 33%,

and 33%, respectively. In these regions, the parliamentary strength of the pro-Indira Congress consistently decreased with the diminishing proportion of support for her among the High Command members.

With these general observations at the regional and state levels, the focus of the following analysis will now move to the parliamentary constituency level, basically employing data concerning the configurations of party systems at this level. Although the universe of constituencies here being analysed is confined to those controlled by the Congress, the constituencies do vary in terms of at least three important dimensions of the party system obtaining at this level: (1) the size of Congress majority or plurality, (2) the source of main opposition to the Congress, and (3) electoral turnout. Each of these and their associations with factional affiliation will be examined in turn.⁵

Table 7.8 shows that factional alignment of the MPs was largely unrelated to the size of Congress majority in the constituency in the preceding election. Irrespective of the size of vote polled for the party, the pro-Indira Congress received an overwhelming support among the CPP members.

Another important aspect of Congress-controlled constituency party systems is the source of main opposition to the winning party. One might assume that the Congress MPs come from a similar milieu and therefore there would be similar pressures from constituency interests on the MPs.

TABLE 7.8

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY SIZE OF
CONGRESS VOTE IN CONSTITUENCY, 1967

<u>Size of Congress Vote</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
High	79.2	20.8	(96)
Medium	78.0	22.0	(100)
Low	78.4	21.6	(97)
Cramer's V = .01			
Gamma = .02			

But in terms of political complexion, the nature of main opposition to the Congress varies from the parties of the right through those of left and regional to the non-party independent candidates.⁶ It is rather difficult to pinpoint the exact direction in which these various opposition pressures would operate on the factional alignment of the Congress MPs. It seems reasonable, however, to assume that, given the moderate leftist orientation of the pro-Indira Congress and conservative temperament of the Syndicate, the MPs from the leftist opposition constituencies ought to be more likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi and those from the rightist opposition constituencies with the Syndicate.

Table 7.9 shows that this expectation is not borne out by the data. Mrs. Gandhi received the bulk of support from the MPs irrespective of the nature of main opposition to the Congress in the constituency, but surprisingly the proportion of this support is slightly lower among those from the constituencies where the bulk of opposition votes goes to candidates belonging to left-wing parties than to parties of the right. But relationships found here are very weak.

It was hypothesized that the size of Congress majority in the constituency ought to operate as a contingent variable here. For it seems plausible to argue that the larger the size of Congress majority, the lower the felt pressure of the opposition vote on the MP. One would thus expect the hypothesized constituency pressures to be stronger in the condition of low margins of Congress electoral victory. When the original relationship between the source of main opposition and factional affiliation was re-examined, controlling for the size of Congress percentage of vote, it failed to produce consistently supportive evidence for the above hypothesis. The original association, as expected, remained basically unchanged among the MPs who had received higher majorities, and the original hypothesis was supported among MPs with somewhat lower majorities, but for those among whom the predicted relationship should have been most evident, those with bare pluralities, the finding does not support the hypothesis.

TABLE 7.9

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY SOURCE OF MAIN
OPPOSITION TO CONGRESS IN CONSTITUENCY, 1967

<u>Source of Main</u> <u>Opposition</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
Right-Wing Parties	78.2	21.8	(101)
Left-Wing Parties	74.2	25.8	(97)
Regional Parties	100.0	0.0	(4)
Independents	80.3	19.7	(76)
Cramer's V = .09			

As already mentioned, the relationship between mass electoral turnout and factional affiliation in the context of a late modernizing society is not amenable to an invariant, unconditional hypothesis; there are alternative hypotheses as to the possible influences of this independent variable. To the extent that voting turnout can be assumed to result naturally from social-mobilizational forces, one ought to expect a greater likelihood of the MPs from high-turnout constituencies aligning with Mrs. Gandhi. But to the extent that turnout stems from personal influence, patron-client relationships, etc., one might expect this to relate more to the Syndicate's strength. Several studies have pointed to the

existence of the latter situation in India, where traditional social institutions such, for example, as dominant castes, work-teams patterned after the traditional jajmani system, etc., account for higher levels of electoral turnout (the Rudolphs 1967, and Elkins 1974). Unfortunately, the data provide no way to make these distinctions in our study.

The data presented in Table 7.10 show that there is an overall negative association between electoral turnout and factional affiliation, with some degree of curvilinearity evident in this relationship. Thus, although support for Mrs. Gandhi was weakest among the MPs from constituencies with the highest turnout, she did better among those from medium-high and medium-low turnout constituencies than among those from constituencies with the lowest turnout.

An important aspect that deserves some attention here is the possible confounding influences of some socio-economic contextual variables on the patterns of relationships between the political contextual variables and factional affiliation. The composite index of district social mobilization was picked up as a summary test factor for this purpose mainly because of its potentiality for illuminating contingent or conditional relationships. Insofar as increasing social mobilization in a transitional society brings hitherto submerged social groups into the political arena, it ought to operate as a contextual pressure for a more liberal politics. This has some interesting implications for the effects of the

TABLE 7.10
 FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY ELECTORAL
 TURNOUT IN CONSTITUENCY, 1967

<u>Turnout</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
High	73.5	26.5	(98)
Medium	82.1	17.9	(95)
Low	78.7	21.3	(94)
Cramer's V = .10			
Gamma = -.10			

various characteristics of the constituency party system on the factional affiliation of the MPs analysed above. First, as to the size of the Congress vote, it would seem reasonable to assume that the vote polled for the party in highly mobilized environments would be less reflective of the traditional personalistic influences than in areas low on social mobilization and therefore more likely to be correlated with alignment with Mrs. Gandhi. Similarly, high electoral turnout in a highly mobilized milieu can be less justifiably attributed to traditional patron-client networks than in an area low on social mobilization and hence more likely to be positively associated with support for Mrs. Gandhi.

Finally, leftist main opposition parties would be likely to be stronger in areas with greater social mobilization and ought to operate as a more potent liberal pressure on Congress MPs from such environments.

The data presented in Table 7.11 only partly support these expectations. The near absence of any relationship between the size of Congress vote in the constituency and the MPs' factional alignment with Mrs. Gandhi found earlier remains largely unaltered among those from low-mobilization districts; it tends, as hypothesized, to take a positive direction among those from moderately mobilized districts, but it turns negative, against our expectation, among those from highly mobilized districts.

As to the relationship between constituency electoral turnout and the MPs' alignment with Mrs. Gandhi, the original negative association, as hypothesized, turned positive among those from highly mobilized districts, and it remained negative in accordance with our expectation among those from moderately mobilized districts, but for those among whom the relationship should have been most strongly negative, those from least mobilized areas, the finding did not support our expectation (Table 7.11).

As regards the relationship between the source of main opposition to the Congress and factional affiliation of the MPs, the members in whose constituencies the bulk of opposition vote went to the leftist parties were more likely to align

TABLE 7.11

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSTITUENCY PARTY SYSTEMS,
1967, CONTROLLING FOR INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Characteristics of</u>		<u>Index of Social Mobilization</u>							
<u>Constituency Party</u>		<u>High</u>		<u>Medium</u>		<u>Low</u>		<u>Total</u>	
<u>Systems, 1967</u>		%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
<u>Size of Congress Vote</u>									
High	70.3	(37)	84.6	(26)	81.8	(22)	79.2	(96)	
Medium	65.8	(38)	80.8	(26)	86.7	(30)	78.0	(100)	
Low	88.0	(25)	73.2	(41)	83.3	(24)	78.4	(97)	
	N = (100)		N = (93)		N = (76)		N = (293)		
	Gamma	= -.24	Gamma = .24		Gamma = -.03		Gamma = .02		
<u>Main Opposition to Congress</u>									
Rightist	67.7	(31)	77.4	(31)	83.9	(31)	78.2	(101)	
Leftist	71.0	(31)	71.1	(38)	87.5	(24)	74.2	(97)	
Regional	100.0	(3)	*	*	*	*	80.3	(76)	
Independent	72.4	(29)	90.5	(21)	88.9	(9)	80.3	(76)	
	N = (94)		N = (90)		N = (71)		N = (278)		
	V = .12		V = .18		V = .10		V = .09		

TABLE 7.11 (Continued)

<u>Characteristics of Constituency Party Systems, 1967</u>	<u>Index of Social Mobilization</u>					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Medium</u>		<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
<u>Electoral Turnout</u>						
High	73.7	(57)	70.4	(27)	100.0	(6)
Medium	77.1	(35)	85.3	(34)	82.6	(23)
Low	42.9	(7)	77.4	(31)	83.0	(47)
	N = (99)		N = (92)		N = (287)	
	Gamma = .13		Gamma = -.12		Gamma = -.10	

with Mrs. Gandhi in the most and least mobilized districts; this pattern was not maintained in the moderately mobilized districts, where those facing the main opposition from right-wing parties were more likely to extend support to her (Table 7.11).

Moreover, since districts and constituencies are embedded into larger regional contexts which may act as overriding factors or considerations at the lower levels, it would be worthwhile to re-examine the relationship between political contextual variables and factional affiliation while holding region constant. As Table 7.12 shows, the lack of any association between the size of Congress constituency vote and the MPs' factional affiliation found earlier was subject to regional variations. For while the original lack of relationship remained basically unchanged in the southern region, a clearly positive relationship between size of Congress vote and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi emerged in the eastern, Hindi, and western regions. It is difficult to pinpoint what it is about the southern region that makes it deviate from the pattern found in other regions. Perhaps it can be attributed to the fact that in the 1967 elections challenges to the Congress predominance were less formidable in the major parts of the southern region, so the Congressmen there generally felt less of a pressure to go along with Mrs. Gandhi's attempt to radicalize the party's image, purporting to improve its electoral prospects, than those in

TABLE 7.12

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSTITUENCY

PARTY SYSTEMS, 1967, CONTROLLING FOR REGION

<u>Characteristics of Constituency Party Systems, 1967</u>	<u>Hindi</u> %	<u>Region</u>				<u>Total</u> %
		<u>West</u> %	<u>East</u> %	<u>South</u> %	<u>Total</u> %	
	(N=)	(N=)	(N=)	(N=)	(N=)	(N=)
<u>Size of Congress Vote</u>						
High	92.0 (25)	75.8 (33)	90.0 (10)	69.2 (26)	79.2 (96)	
Medium	84.1 (44)	63.2 (19)	86.7 (15)	72.7 (22)	78.0 (100)	
Low	84.8 N = (135)	75.0 N = (64)	50.0 N = (35)	62.5 N = (56)	78.4 N = (293)	
	Gamma = .14	Gamma = .11	Gamma = .64	Gamma = .03	Gamma = .02	
<u>Main Opposition to Congress</u>						
Rightist	89.7 (58)	60.9 (23)	100.0 (4)	56.3 (16)	78.2 (101)	
Leftist	76.1 (46)	81.3 (16)	52.9 (17)	88.2 (17)	74.2 (97)	
Regional	* (4)	100.0 (4)	* (4)	* (4)	100.0 (4)	
Independent	93.3 N = (134)	60.0 N = (58)	100.0 N = (31)	63.2 N = (52)	80.3 N = (278)	
	V = .21	V = .27	V = .53	V = .29	V = .09	

TABLE 7.12 (Continued)

<u>Characteristics of Constituency Party Systems, 1967</u>		<u>Region</u>									
		<u>Hindi</u>		<u>West</u>		<u>East</u>		<u>South</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	(N=)
<u>Electoral Turnout</u>											
High	93.3	(15)	73.7	(38)	66.7	(9)	66.7	(33)	73.5	(98)	
Medium	90.9	(44)	66.7	(18)	84.6	(13)	75.0	(20)	82.1	(95)	
Low	81.6	(76)	66.7	(6)	70.0	(10)	50.0	(2)	78.7	(94)	
	N = (135)		N = (62)		N = (32)		N = (55)		N = (287)		
	Gamma = .40		Gamma = .15		Gamma = -.04		Gamma = -.10		Gamma = -.10		

the eastern and Hindi regions where the Congress suffered considerable electoral reverses in 1967. The western region, where the Congress in 1967 remained considerably strong, does not, as it should according to this interpretation, fall into the southern pattern, but it is notable that the strength of the positive association between Congress vote and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi is weakest in this region as compared to the eastern and Hindi regions.

The regional control did not prove particularly illuminating in the case of the relationships between the source of main opposition to the Congress and factional affiliation of the MPs. The distribution of cases, as it stands, appears to defy any meaningful analytical interpretation (Table 7.12).

Now, coming to the negative association between constituency electoral turnout and the MPs' alignment with Mrs. Gandhi found at the aggregated national level, Table 7.12 shows that, when region was held constant, the original relationship was maintained in the southern region, but it got reversed in the Hindi and western regions and virtually disappeared in the eastern. It seems rather difficult to make any persuasive analytical sense of this criss-cross regional pattern.

Focusing on the aggregated national level, the analysis of the relationships between the characteristics of the constituency party system and the Congress MPs' factional

alignment has thus far revealed that, while factional alignment was largely unrelated to the size of constituency Congress vote, the contexts more likely to favour a pro-Indira factional affiliation were characterized by low or medium levels of mass electoral turnout, with high turnout, presumably produced by the patron-brokers or "vote banks", typically associated with the Syndicate's strength. Moreover, the pro-Indira Congress constituencies displayed a wide range in terms of their political colouration, but they were moderately more likely to be non-party independent and right-wing than left-wing.

However, the relationships between the constituency political contexts and the MPs' factional alignment were generally very weak, sometimes inexplicable, and often subject to wide regional variations. For this reason, it was decided to explore state-level political-contextual variables, which may well be the more significant environments overriding constituency contexts.

Table 7.13 shows the relationship between proportions of Congress vote in states and factional alignment of the MPs. As against the lack of any overall relationship between constituency Congress vote and factional affiliation, a clearly negative association between the Congress vote-share in the state party systems and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi was shown to exist. While support for her was fairly strong across all categories of the independent variable, it was

TABLE 7.13

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY SIZE OF
CONGRESS VOTE IN STATE, 1967

<u>Congress Vote</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation (%)</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
High (47.8 - 100.0%)	77.7	22.3	(103)
Medium (37.0 - 47.3%)	75.5	25.4	(94)
Low (0.0 - 36.2%)	82.3	17.7	(96)
Cramer's V = .07			
Gamma = .10			

relatively greater among those from low Congress vote states. It would thus appear that the Congressmen from more "threatening" states in terms of narrower margins of electoral victory were more likely to go along with Mrs. Gandhi's bid to refurbish the party's popular image by giving it a more radically leftist and populist orientation.

If the above interpretation is correct, then one would also expect to find a positive relationship between the longitudinal trend of decreasing level of electoral support for the Congress and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi. Using state-level electoral figures, an attempt was made to build a composite index of party support trend on the basis of factor analysis of data pertaining to differences in average percentage votes, 1960s/1950s, for the Congress, for the parties of the right, left and regional categories, and for non-party independent candidates. Two factors were yielded by this procedure. The first delineated the dimension of an overall decreasing level of mass electoral support for the Congress over the four Lok Sabha elections of 1952, 1957, 1962, and 1967, and the second that of the states where the Congress had, on the whole, held its own or increased its vote over the same period (see Appendix I). Since the two composite indices based on these factors were, conceptually as well as in terms of their effects on the dependent variable, the obverse of each other, only one of them, the index of non-Congress success trend in the state party systems, will be

reported here. As Table 7.14 clearly shows, high levels of non-Congress success consistently increased the probability of the MPs' alignment with Mrs. Gandhi, while the opposite held for the members coming from states where the Congress party's position was not so threatened.

Table 7.15 displays the relationship between the source of main opposition to the Congress in states and factional affiliation of the MPs. As at the constituency level, there was slightly greater likelihood of support for Mrs. Gandhi among Congressmen from rightist-main-opposition states than among those from leftist-main-opposition states; the two groups together were more supportive of her than those who, in a few instances, came from the states or union territories where the bulk of opposition vote had gone to regional parties or independents. But the relationship, on the whole, remained negligible.

TABLE 7.14

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY NON-CONGRESS SUCCESS
PATTERN IN STATE PARTY SYSTEMS, 1960s/1950s

<u>Non-Congress Success Pattern</u>	<u>% Pro-Indira</u>	<u>(N=)</u>
High	86.6	(97)
Medium	73.4	(94)
Low	75.5	(102)
Cramer's V = .10		
Gamma = .22		

TABLE 7.15

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY SOURCE OF MAIN
OPPOSITION TO CONGRESS IN STATE, 1967

<u>Source of Main</u> <u>Opposition</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
Right-Wing Parties	79.3	20.7	(140)
Left-Wing Parties	77.8	22.2	(135)
Regional Parties	75.0	25.0	(12)
Independents	75.0	25.0	(4)
Cramer's V = .03			

Table 7.16 presents the relationship between state electoral turnout and factional affiliation. As at the constituency level, the electoral turnout at the state level varied negatively with the MPs' alignment with Mrs. Gandhi.

Summary

The analysis of socio-political contextual pressures on factional alignment of the Congress MPs in this chapter is suggestive of a number of conclusions. To begin with the ethnic contextual variables, the types of districts most likely to favour a pro-Indira factional alignment among the MPs were marked out by high concentrations of either Hindu or

TABLE 7.16

FACTIONAL AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS BY ELECTORAL
TURNOUT IN STATE, 1967

<u>Turnout</u>	<u>Factional Affiliation</u>		<u>(N=)</u>
	Pro-Indira	Pro-Syndicate	
High	77.4	22.6	(53)
Medium	73.3	26.7	(105)
Low	84.1	15.9	(126)
Cramer's V = .12			
Gamma = -.19			

non-Hindu religious communities, with the Syndicate's strength being correlated with more mixed settings. In other words, pro-Indira Congress has typically done better in areas of segmented or quarantined ethnic pluralism of both Hindu and non-Hindu variety than in ethnically mixed locales where communal parties like the Muslim League, Hindu Mahasabha, and the Jana Sangh have usually flourished. Moreover, the MPs from districts with higher proportions of depressed Hindu population (Scheduled Castes) were generally more likely to support Mrs. Gandhi than those from districts with higher proportions of non-Hindu depressed populations (Scheduled Tribes and

Christians), though in some regions the latter too followed the same pattern as the former.

Second, in terms of developmental or mobilizational contextual variables, the support for the pro-Indira Congress, although it remained quite high among the MPs from more urban districts, was, on the whole, likely to be stronger among those from more rural districts. Since traditional middle-class status, which essentially represents the upper echelons of the rural status system, was found in Chapter 6 to be negatively associated with alignment with Mrs. Gandhi at the personal background plane, the higher support for her among the MPs from more rural districts generally seems indicative of the success of her faction in undercutting the domination of intermediate and local elites as the political mobilizers of the numerically preponderant poor peasantry.

Finally, in terms of political-contextual variables, the analysis has shown, first, that, while the nature of the main opposition to the Congress, at either constituency or state level, did not, on the whole, appreciably account for factional affiliation patterns, electoral strength of the Congress at the state (but not at the constituency) level and voting turnout at both constituency and state levels were shown to be notable influences on the factional alignment of the members. The weaker the electoral strength of the Congress and the lower the voting turnout, the greater the likelihood that the Congress MPs from that state would align

with the pro-Indira faction. Moreover, it must also be noted that the relationships between state political-contextual variables and factional alignment of the MPs were generally stronger than those between the constituency political-contextual variables and factional affiliation.⁷

Notes to Chapter VII

¹In introducing a recent symposium volume on the study of regionalism in south Asia, its editor bemoaned: "Problems of definition, of conceptualization and of method were exacerbated by the state of knowledge concerning the subject. Vague allusions, imprecise usages, and emotion-laden anecdotes surround the topic of regions in the south Asian setting. In clearing the underbush for the proposed stock-taking, we found that our deliberations tended to suffer from these flaws" (Crane ed. 1967: 1). For a brief review of studies of regionalism in India, see Mandelbaum 1974:).

²Only source variables having a loading of $\pm .25$ or above on a factor were included in the construction of the new composite variables.

For an excellent and not too technical introduction to factor analysis, see Rummel 1967. On the procedure of building composite indices from factor-score coefficient matrix, see the Statistical Package for Social Sciences by Nie and others 1970: 226-7).

³A fourth factor having a moderate positive loading for percent Scheduled Castes population and a low negative loading for percent Buddhist population was also delineated. This factor was, however, ignored as an artifact of the census. For the relatively recent conversion of some members of the Scheduled Castes into Buddhism, notably in Maharashtra, is responsible for this artificial polarity.

Conversion into a non-Hindu religion has been an old way of escaping indignities stemming from their hopelessly lowly status in the Hindu community for the Scheduled Castes on account of the "Pollution" barrier. However, until recently such conversions were restricted to Christianity, Sikhism, and Islam. The more recent discovery of Buddhism as a new refuge for status-seeking Scheduled Castes owes to the leadership of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, who himself embraced Buddhism at a mass conversion ceremony in 1956. Since Buddhism is an indigeneous religious faith but now practically non-existent in India, it neither carries the implications of conversion into a "foreign" faith nor does it encounter an attempt by the established community elites in the religion of destination to keep the new converts "in their place".

A brief background to Buddhist conversion of Mahar ex-untouchables of Maharashtra can be found in Miller (1967) and Patterson (19). For excellent analyses of the politics of Jatav ex-untouchables in Agra city, see Lynch (1969) and Rosenthal (1970).

⁴See A. Mitra, Census of India 1961, Vol. I. India, Part I-A(2) Text, Levels of Regional Development in India (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1965), Ch. II. The chief merit of the ranking index here devised is that it seeks to combine not only the dominant natural features but the main demographic variables in relation to the nature and level of economic activity in the district. The main inadequacy of the index seems to be an indiscriminate combination of a large number of variables. As the compiler himself points out: "At the outset it is important to point out that I do not pretend that all the indices are either essential or the best that could be chosen. On the contrary, I was compelled to abandon certain more obvious and significant indices merely because they were difficult to collect with reference to a particular point of time. Not having yet devised a system of statistical weights, I chose safety in large number of indices. I believe it will be possible in later exercises to weed out a number of indices by means of component analysis and replace some of the present ones by more significant ones" (p. 11).

Apart from the index, the primary utility of this volume is in providing a mine of accompanying district-wise raw data on each variable employed in building the global index of development. It is from this source that I have drawn the data of socio-economic nature relating to districts for statistical analysis carried out in this chapter. Data on political contextual variables utilized in this chapter are drawn from Chandidas and others (1968).

⁵For lack of information on power configurations within the external party apparatus at sub-state levels, this part of analysis cannot be pursued at lower levels.

⁶An interesting side question that may be raised here refers to the relationships between past party affiliation of Congressmen and the kind of main opposition they faced in the constituency in 1967. Data on this aspect are presented in the following table:

TABLE 7.17
PAST PARTY AFFILIATION OF CPP MEMBERS AND THE NATURE
OF MAIN OPPOSITION IN CONSTITUENCY, 1967

<u>Past Party Affiliation</u>	<u>Nature of Main Opposition</u> <u>Party</u>			
	Left	Right	Regional	Indepen- dent ^a
Regular Congressmen (N = 190)	33.7	37.4	1.6	27.4
Left (N = 41)	41.5	34.1	0.0	24.4
Right (N = 9)	33.3	55.6	0.0	11.1
Minority-Communal (N = 27)	33.3	29.6	3.7	33.3
Regional (N = 6)	50.0	16.7	0.0	33.3
Combinations of Above (N = 8)	25.0	37.5	0.0	37.5

NOTE: a. Includes some minor parties.

⁷The correlation coefficients pertaining to these relationships at the constituency and state levels are as follows:

TABLE 7.18
SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
POLITICAL CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES AND LOYALTY
TO MRS. GANDHI AMONG CPP MEMBERS

<u>Relationship</u> <u>Between</u>	<u>Constituency</u>		<u>State</u>	
	Gamma	V	Gamma	V
Size of Congress Vote and Loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi	.02	.01	.10	.07
Source of Main Opposition and Loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi		.09		.03
Electoral Turnout and Loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi	-.10	.10	-.19	.12
Non-Congress Electoral Success Pattern			.22	.10

CHAPTER VIII

PERSONAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUNDS AND FACTIONAL AFFILIATION

In the preceding chapters, I have analysed the impact of two of the background variables on factional affiliation of CPP members: (1) personal socio-political backgrounds of members that serve as the more immediate context of political socialization, and (2) their broader, distal socio-political contexts that constitute the wider milieu for their socialization and intervening situational antecedents of political behavior. But I have postponed thus far the analysis of the combined influence of these two blocs of variables. It is to this task that I will now turn.

My approach in analysing these variables in combination is informed by the theoretical position that the personal and contextual backgrounds do not form mutually exclusive sets of phenomena; the former are themselves to a great extent contextually determined. Hence instead of trying to find out which one of the two is "more important" in predicting or explaining factional affiliation, by an indiscriminate use of statistical controls without reference to theoretical status of the variables, my approach will be to treat the two sets of independent variables as complementary rather than completing sources of explanation.

Three aspects of personal background will be considered in varying socio-political context to examine the environmental effects on the patterns of factional affiliation. These are (1) social stratification, (2) organized group affiliation, and (3) political career patterns within the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary party organization.

SOCIAL STRATIFICATION AND FACTIONAL AFFILIATION

It will be recalled that within the parliamentary party as a whole there was some evidence that factional positions adopted by the MPs were associated with age, religion, caste, education, and occupation of the member. Contrary to education, which showed a positive relationship with alignment with Mrs. Gandhi, age and caste varied negatively with it. In addition, the MPs belonging to the minority religious communities were more solid in their support for Mrs. Gandhi than those who were Hindus. Finally, the modern middle-class and lower middle-class MPs were more likely to align with the pro-Indira Congress than those belonging to the Upper-class or traditional middle-class occupations.

Age

Table 8.1 shows that, with region controlled, the negative association between age and loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi was more or less maintained in all regions, though its strength was considerably weakened in the Hindi and non-

TABLE 8.1

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY AGE,
CONTROLLING FOR REGION

<u>Age (Year of Birth)</u>	<u>Region</u>						<u>Total</u>
	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>	<u>South</u>			
	% (N=)	% (N=)	% (N=)	% (N=)	% (N=)	% (N=)	
1882-1910	90.3 (31)	68.8 (16)	72.7 (11)	57.1 (14)		76.4 (72)	
1911-1918	75.7 (37)	80.0 (20)	83.3 (6)	78.6 (14)		76.9 (78)	
1919-1924	96.4 (28)	55.6 (18)	66.7 (9)	45.5 (11)		73.1 (67)	
1925-1941	84.2 (38) (134)	90.0 (10) (64)	87.5 (8) (34)	88.2 (17) (56)		86.5 (74) (291)	
Cramer's V =	.22	.27	.19	.36		.12	
Gamma =	-.01	-.04	-.14	-.29		-.13	

Hindi western regions. The wider support for Mrs. Gandhi in these two regions, irrespective of the MPs' age, may be attributed to her greater presence and influence in her native Hindi region and to the territorial concentration of some non-Hindu religious minorities, with their known preference for the Congress left wing in some states of the non-Hindi western region.

When district social mobilization was controlled, the original negative relationship between age and alignment with the left-wing Congress splinter led by Mrs. Gandhi was, as one would expect, considerably strengthened among the MPs from least mobilized districts, slightly reduced among those from moderately mobilized districts, and tended to take a mildly positive turn among those from the most mobilized districts (Table 8.2).

Stratified by another contextual control variable, source of main opposition to the Congress in the constituency in the preceding election, the original inverse relationship between age and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi's faction was largely maintained among the MPs facing the principal challenge from the non-party independents, but considerably reduced in strength among those facing leftist parties as their main opposition (Table 8.3).

Religion

The pattern of greater likelihood of support for the

TABLE 8.2

PERCENT OF PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY AGE, CONTROLLING FOR
INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Age (Year of Birth)</u>	<u>Index of Social Mobilization</u>				
	<u>High</u>	<u>Medium</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	% (N=)
1882-1910	74.1	(27)	82.6	(23)	76.5 (17) 76.4 (72)
1911-1918	81.5	(27)	65.4	(26)	84.2 (19) 76.9 (78)
1919-1924	52.4	(21)	84.0	(25)	82.4 (17) 73.1 (67)
1925-1941	80.0	(25) (100)	84.2	(19) (93)	90.9 (22) (75) 86.5 (74) (291)
Cramer's V =	.25		.20		.14 .12
Gamma =	104		-.12		-.26 -.13

TABLE 8.3

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY AGE, CONTROLLING FOR
SOURCE OF MAIN OPPOSITION TO CONGRESS IN CONSTITUENCY, 1967

Age (Year of Birth)	Source of Main Opposition to Congress						Total
	Rightist Parties % (N=)	Leftist Parties % (N=)	Regional Parties % (N=)	Independents % (N=)	% (N=)		
1882-1910	76.9 (26)	74.1 (27)		(1)	80.0 (15)	76.4 (72)	
1911-1918	76.7 (30)	69.6 (23)		(1)	81.0 (21)	76.9 (78)	
1919-1924	71.4 (21)	76.9 (26)		*	66.7 (18)	73.1 (67)	
1925-1941	87.0 (23) (100)	76.2 (21) (97)		(2) (4)	90.5 (21) (75)	86.5 (74) (291)	
Cramer's V =	.13	.06			.21	.12	
Gamma =	.11	.06			.11		

pro-Indira Congress among the MPs belonging to non-Hindu religious minorities as compared to those with Hindu religious affiliation, was remarkably maintained in all regions, except the non-Hindi western one, where, for some inexplicable reason, this trend was mindly reversed (Table 8.4).

Moreover, the earlier finding indicating the greater probability of support for the pro-Indira Congress among the non-Hindu MPs was also, on the whole, maintained when the indices of Hindu-Muslim and Hindy-Sikh population polarity were introduced as control variables, although the likelihood of support for Mrs. Gandhi was consistently higher among those districts with greater concentration of either Hindu or non-Hindu population than among those from mixed districts. This latter pattern of more solid backing for Mrs. Gandhi among the MPs respresenting districts with high-Hindu or high-Muslim/Sikh population polarity was also characteristic of the Hindu MPs compared among themselves, excluding the non-Hindus (Table 8.4)

Further, controlling for the index of depressed Hindu/non-Hindu population polarity in district, one finds that irrespective of the variation along this dimension, the non-Hindu MPs were more solid in their support for Mrs. Gandhi than the Hindu. In addition, within-group comparison of Hindu and non-Hindu MPs revealed that while the proportions of alignment with Mrs. Gandhi among the latter did not show any noticeable impact of the district depressed Hindu/non-

TABLE 8.4

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY RELIGION, CONTROLLING FOR REGION,
 INDICES OF HINDU-MUSLIM, HINDU-SIKH, DEPRESSED HINDU/NON-HINDU POPULATION
 POLARITY IN DISTRICT, AND INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Control</u> <u>Variable</u>	<u>Religion^a</u>				<u>Phi</u>
	<u>Hindu</u> %	(N=)	<u>Non-Hindu</u> %	<u>Total (N)</u>	
<u>Region</u>					
Hindi	84.6	(117)	94.1	(17)	(134) .06
West	73.3	(45)	68.4	(19)	(64) .01
East	75.0	(24)	81.8	(11)	(35) .002
South	66.7	(51)	100.0	(5)	(56) .14
<u>Hindu-Muslim</u>					
<u>Population Polarity</u>					
High-Hindu	85.1	(67)	78.6	(14)	(81) .02
Mixed	68.2	(85)	60.0	(10)	(95) .02
High-Muslim	80.5	(87)	93.1	(29)	(116) .12

TABLE 8.4 (Continued)

Control Variables	Religion ^a				Phi
	Hindu %	(N=)	Non-Hindu %	Total (N)	
<u>Hindu-Sikh</u>					
<u>Population Polarity</u>					
High-Hindu	78.0	(82)	83.3	(18)	.02
Mixed	76.1	(88)	70.0	(10)	.004
High-Sikh	78.3	(69)	88.0	(25)	.07
<u>Depressed Hindu/Non-Hindu</u>					
<u>Population Polarity</u>					
Dep. Hindu	85.2	(88)	81.8	(11)	.12
Mixed	75.0	(84)	83.3	(12)	.03
Dep. Non-Hindu	69.7	(66)	83.3	(30)	.12
<u>Social Mobilization</u>					
High	72.0	(82)	77.8	(18)	.02
Medium	80.2	(81)	66.7	(12)	.07
Low	82.0	(61)	92.9	(14)	.07
TOTAL	77.4	(239)	83.0	(53)	.04

Hindu population polarity, among the Hindu MPs those from depressed-Hindu and mixed districts were considerably more likely to align with her than those from the depressed non-Hindu districts (Table 8.4).

Finally, when district social mobilization was held constant, it was found that, contrary to the predictions of the standard social mobilization theories, both among the Hindu and non-Hindu MPs, those from less mobilized districts were generally more likely to align with the pro-Indira Congress than those from more mobilized districts (Table 8.4). This pattern seems to be the product of the confounding influence of the regional variable. For both the Hindu and non-Hindu MPs in Mrs. Gandhi's native Hindi region, which happens to be the least mobilized, were more solid in their support for her than in other regions. And the pattern prevailing in the Hindi region, aided by its size and bulk, was apparently overlaid on the overall pattern.

Caste

Table 8.5 shows that the negative association between caste and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi observed in the parliamentary party as a whole was more or less maintained in all regions, except the non-Hindi eastern one where the finding should be largely discounted because of the very small number of cases. Also noticeable is the fact that, although the direction of this relationship remains negative, it is

TABLE 8.5

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY CASTE,
CONTROLLING FOR REGION

<u>Caste</u>	<u>Region</u>						<u>Total</u>
	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>		<u>East</u>		<u>South</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%
Upper Castes	82.9	(70)	56.5	(23)	85.7	(7)	53.8
							74.3
Middle Castes	100.0	(8)	92.3	(13)	*	*	76.0
							84.7
Scheduled Castes	83.3	(30)	85.7	(7)	80.0	(5)	60.0
		(108)		(43)		(12)	(10)
							78.8
Cramer's V =	.12		.38		.75		.21
					(Phi)		
Gamma =	-.09		-.66		.20		-.12
							-.15
							(211)

considerably weakened and tends to disappear in the Hindi region, indicating a greater universality of appeal of Mrs. Gandhi in this region as compared to the others. One must, however, hasten to add that even in other regions support for Mrs. Gandhi was quite broadbased across all caste groups.

When factional affiliations were related to caste, controlling for the level of social mobilization of the district, it was found that the original inverse association between the two variables emerged more strongly negative among the MPs from the least mobilized districts, turned positive among those from moderately mobilized districts, but unexpectedly reverted to the negative direction among those from the most mobilized districts (Table 8.6).

Now, let us examine the relationship between caste and factional affiliation, controlling simultaneously for region and district social mobilization. Doing this, we find a rather general pattern of a curvilinear relationship between caste and factional alignment, except where the number of cases is too small, and that is for the middle-caste MPs to be more strongly behind her than those of higher or lower caste membership. However, this pattern is mildly reversed in moderately mobilized districts in the two regions with a decent number of cases left (Table 8.7).

Comparisons of the effects of the source of main opposition to the Congress on the relationship between caste and factional alignment show that the original negative

TABLE 8.6

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY CASTE, CONTROLLING
FOR INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Caste</u>	<u>Index of Social Mobilization</u>					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Medium</u>	<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>		
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
Upper Castes	67.5	(40)	82.4	(34)	76.7	(30)
					74.3	(113)
Middle Castes	85.7	(21)	83.3	(18)	85.7	(7)
					84.7	(46)
Scheduled Castes	82.4	(17)	66.7	(15)	83.3	(18)
		(78)		(67)	78.8	(52)
						(211)
Cramer's V =	.20		.16		.09	.10
Gamma =	-.36		.25		-.19	-.15

TABLE 8.7

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY CASTE, CONTROLLING SIMULTANEOUSLY
FOR REGION AND INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Index of Social Mobilization/ Caste</u>	<u>Region</u>					
	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>		<u>South</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
<u>High Mob.</u>						
<u>Caste</u>						
Upper	81.8	(11)	57.9	(19)	100.0	(3)
Middle	100.0	(1)	88.9	(9)	*	*
Scheduled	85.7	(7)	80.0	(5)	*	*
		(19)		(33)		(3)
	Gamma = -.17		Gamma = -.54		Gamma = a	Gamma = -.38
<u>Medium Mob.</u>						
<u>Caste</u>						
Upper	83.9	(31)	0.0	(1)	*	*
Middle	100.0	(6)	100.0	(3)	*	*
Scheduled	70.0	(10)	*	*	100.0	(3)
		(47)		(4)		(3)
	Gamma = .19		Gamma = a		Gamma = a	Gamma = 1.0

TABLE 8.7 (Continued)

<u>Index of Social Mobilization/ Caste</u>	<u>Region</u>					
	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>		<u>South</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
<u>Low Mob.</u>						
<u>Caste</u>						
Upper	80.0	(25)	*	100.0	(2)	33.3 (3)
Middle	100.0	(1)	100.0	*	*	80.0 (5)
Scheduled	92.3	(13)	100.0	(1)	(1)	66.7 (3)
		(49)		(2)	(3)	(11)
	Gamma = -.51		Gamma = ^a	Gamma = ^a	Gamma = -.40	

NOTE: a. Too few cases to yield a meaningful Gamma statistics.

association between caste and loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi is considerably strengthened among the MPs representing constituencies with left- or independent-oriented opposition; but this pattern was reversed among those constituencies with a rightist main opposition (Table 8.8). The deviant pattern that emerges among the upper-caste MPs from the rightist-main-opposition constituencies is an interesting one. Perhaps it reflects the fact that where the principal opposition to it is rightist, the Congress itself is dominated by the more conservative upper-strata social groups, which with their local power base more or less unshifting and secure, felt less constraint in aligning with the left-leaning but politically more successful pro-Indira Congress at the national level.

Education

As already noted, within the parliamentary party as a whole education is positively correlated with alignment with Mrs. Gandhi. Table 8.9 shows that this relationship is subject to regional variations; while the original pattern emerges considerably strengthened in the non-Hindi eastern and southern regions, it is for some reason reversed in the remaining two. Can this be attributed to variations in the levels of social mobilization in different regions?

District social mobilization by itself shows some influence on the relationship between education and factional

TABLE 8.8

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY CASTE, CONTROLLING FOR

SOURCE OF MAIN OPPOSITION TO CONGRESS IN CONSTITUENCY, 1967

Caste	Source of Main Opposition to Congress									
	Rightist		Leftist		Regional		Independent		Total	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
Upper Castes	83.7	(43)	64.9	(37)	100.0	(2)	72.4	(29)	74.3	(113)
Middle Castes	58.3	(12)	96.0	(25)	*	*	87.5	(8)	84.7	(46)
Scheduled Castes	61.5	(13)	80.0	(15)	100.0	(1)	85.0	(20)	78.8	(52)
		(68)		(77)		(3)		(57)		(211)
Cramer's V	= .26		.33				.16		.10	
Gamma	= .46		-.48				-.33		-.15	

TABLE 8.9

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY EDUCATION,

CONTROLLING FOR REGION

<u>Education</u>	<u>Hindi</u> %	<u>West</u>		<u>Region</u>		<u>South</u>		<u>Total</u>	
		(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%
High	83.5	(91)	68.1	(47)	80.8	(26)	78.9	(38)	78.9 (204)
Medium	85.7	(21)	80.0	(5)	75.0	(8)	71.4	(7)	80.5 (41)
Low	94.4	(18) (130)	80.0	(10) (62)	0.0	(1) (35)	25.0	(8) (53)	71.0 (38) (283)
Cramer's V =	.11		.11		.32		.42		.07
Gamma =	-.28		-.29		.39		.64		.10

affiliation. For example, when social mobilization is controlled, the positive association between education and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi virtually disappears in the least mobilized districts, tends to re-emerge weakly in the moderately mobilized districts, and it reappears more strongly in the most mobilized districts (Table 8.10).

Controlling simultaneously for region and district social mobilization, we find that within each region higher social mobilization does not necessarily lead to a greater positive relationship between education and alignment with the left-wing Congress splinter (Table 8.11). The unspecified regional context does therefore retain an independent effect of its own on the patterns of factional affiliation in the CPP.

Occupation

As Table 8.12 shows, the overall, national pattern of relationship between occupation and factional affiliation is more or less maintained when region is held constant. Within each region, the modern middle-class and lower middle-class MPs were, on the whole, more likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi than those belonging to traditional middle-class and upper-class occupations as well as those who saw themselves as "professional politicians."

The original relationships between occupation and factional affiliation also remain basically unaltered when

TABLE 8.10

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY EDUCATION, CONTROLLING
FOR INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Education</u>	<u>Index of Social Mobilization</u>					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Medium</u>		<u>Low</u>		<u>Total</u>
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
High	74.3	(74)	78.3	(69)	83.3	78.9 (204)
Medium	66.7	(12)	85.7	(14)	84.6	80.5 (41)
Low	66.7	<u>(12)</u> (98)	62.5	<u>(8)</u> (91)	82.4	<u>71.0</u> (283)
Cramer's V =	.07		.13		.02	.07
Gamma =	.17		.07		.01	.10

TABLE 8.11

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY EDUCATION, CONTROLLING SIMULTANEOUSLY
FOR REGION AND INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Index of Social Mobilization/ Education</u>	<u>Region</u>					
	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>(N=)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>East</u>	<u>South</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>(N=)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N=)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N=)</u>
<u>High Mob.</u>						
<u>Education</u>						
High	78.6	(14)	66.7	(33)	85.7	(7) 80.0 (20)
Medium	100.0	(4)	66.7	(3)	0.0	(1) 50.0 (4)
Low	50.0	(2)	75.0	(8)	*	* (2) (2)
		(20)		(44)		(8) (26)
	Gamma = 0.0		Gamma = -.15		Gamma = 1.0	Gamma = .56
<u>Medium Mob.</u>						
<u>Education</u>						
High	85.4	(41)	40.0	(5)	75.0	(12) 72.7 (11)
Medium	71.4	(7)	100.0	(2)	100.0	(3) 100.0 (2)
Low	100.0	(4)	100.0	(1)	0.0	(1) 0.0 (2)
		(52)		(8)		(16) (15)
	Gamma = .06		Gamma = -1.0		Gamma = .14	Gamma = .54

TABLE 8.11 (Continued)

<u>Index of Social Mobilization/ Education</u>	<u>Region</u>					
	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>		<u>South</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
<u>Low Mob. Education</u>						
High	80.6	(31)	100.0	(3)	100.0	(1)
Medium	90.0	(10)	*	(2)	85.7	(7)
Low	100.0	(12)	50.0	(2)	100.0	(1)
			*	*	25.0	(4)
		(53)		(3)		(12)
	Gamma = -.69		Gamma = a		Gamma = .83	

NOTE: a. Too few cases to yield a meaningful Gamma statistics.

TABLE 8.12

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY OCCUPATION,

CONTROLLING FOR REGION

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Region</u>						<u>Total</u>
	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>		<u>East</u>		<u>South</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%
							(N=)
Upper Class (Traditional and Modern)	50.0	(6)	28.6	(7)	0.0	(1)	* 35.7 (14)
Modern Middle Class	88.6	(44)	91.3	(23)	86.4	(22)	90.0 (20) 89.0 (109)
Traditional Middle Class	88.7	(62)	85.0	(20)	42.9	(7)	56.7 (30) 76.7 (120)
Professional Politicians	78.6	(14)	50.0	(12)	100.0	(3)	60.0 (5) 68.6 (35)
Lower Middle Class	100.0	(2)	*	*	100.0	(1)	100.0 (4) (128) (56) (282)
Cramer's V =	.25		.51		.54		.53 .31

district social mobilization is controlled (Table 8.13). Also, when region and district social mobilization are controlled simultaneously, within each region, irrespective of the level of social mobilization, the modern middle-class and lower middle-class MPs were disproportionately more likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi than their counterparts belonging to other occupational groups. In addition, within each region, with the increasing levels of social mobilization, the ratio of modern middle-class to traditional middle-class MPs consistently rose until in the most mobilized districts where traditional middle-class MPs constituted the modal category (Table 8.14).

Organized Group Affiliation and Factional Alignment

As already observed in Chapter 6, within the parliamentary party as a whole, the MPs with organized group affiliations, of either functional or primordial types, were more likely to align with the pro-Indira Congress than those unattached to organized interest groups. This seemed to provide some indirect evidence for the prevailing impression of the observers that the Syndicate was more given to a clientelist style of politics based on dispensation of immediate, concrete material rewards and patronage rather than concerned with broader policy issues.

When region is held constant, the original relation-

TABLE 8.13

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY OCCUPATION, CONTROLLING

FOR INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Index of Social Mobilization</u>							
	<u>High</u>	<u>Medium</u>		<u>Low</u>		<u>Total</u>		
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)		
Upper Class (Traditional and Modern)	20.0	(5)	25.0	(4)	50.0	(4)	35.7	(14)
Modern Middle Class	87.0	(46)	88.2	(34)	94.4	(18)	89.0	(109)
Traditional Middle Class	71.4	(28)	78.0	(41)	81.4	(43)	76.7	(120)
Professional Politicians	60.0	(15)	55.6	(9)	87.5	(8)	63.6	(8)
Lower Middle Class	*	<u>*</u>	100.0	<u>(3)</u>	100.0	<u>(1)</u>	100.0	<u>(4)</u>
		(94)		(91)		(74)		(282)
Cramer's V =	.38		.36		.27		.31	

TABLE 8.14

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY OCCUPATION, CONTROLLING SIMULTANEOUSLY
FOR REGION AND INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Index of Social Mobilization/Occu- pation</u>	<u>Region</u>					
	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>	<u>South</u>		
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
High Mob. Occup. ^a						
UC	*	*	20.0	(5)	*	*
MMC	80.0	(10)	93.8	(16)	83.3	85.7
TMC	83.3	(6)	83.3	(12)	0.0	55.6
PP	100.0	(1)	50.0	(10)	100.0	66.7
LMC	*	*	*	*	*	*
		(17)		(43)		(26)
	V = .12		V = .56		V = .67	V = .32

TABLE 8.14 (Continued)

<u>Index of Social Mobilization/Occup-</u> <u>pation</u>	<u>Region</u>					
	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>	<u>South</u>		
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
<u>Medium Mob.</u>						
<u>Occup.^a</u>						
UC	50.0	(2)	0.0	(1)	*	*
MMC	88.9	(18)	100.0	(1)	81.8	100.0
TMC	88.5	(26)	75.0	(4)	50.0	55.6
PP	66.7	(6)	50.0	(2)	*	0.0
LMC	100.0	(1)	*	*	100.0	100.0
		(53)		(8)		
	V = .29		V = .58		V = .52	V = .58
<u>Low Mob.</u>						
<u>Occup.^a</u>						
UC	50.0	(4)	*	*	*	*
MMC	92.3	(13)	100.0	(2)	100.0	100.0
TMC	89.7	(29)	100.0	(2)	0.0	63.6
PP	83.3	(6)	*	*	100.0	100.0
LMC	100.0	(1)	*	*	*	*
		(53)		(4)		
	V = .32			(3)	V = .33	(14)

374

NOTE: a. UC = Upper Class; MMC = Modern Middle Class; TMC = Traditional Middle Class; PP = Professional Politicians; LMC = Lower Middle Class

ships between organized group affiliation and factional identification are largely maintained in all regions. Within each region, the MPs associated with organized groups of any kind were, by and large, more in support of Mrs. Gandhi than those without involvement in organized group activities (Table 8.15).

Assuming that organized group politics are more characteristic of areas at higher levels of social mobilization, one would expect a greater proportion of MPs with organized group affiliations to come from more mobilized districts. And the combined effects of these two variables, involvement in interest group organizations at the personal level and higher social mobilization at the contextual level, ought to augment the proportions of MPs aligning with the pro-Indira Congress as compared to the relationships for the entire population of MPs. As Table 8.16 reveals, the incidence of organized group connections is, in fact, higher among the MPs from more socially mobilized districts relative to the less mobilized ones. But the effects of organized group affiliation--or what lies behind it--are hardly any greater in the more socially developed districts than in the more backward ones. This underlines the problems involved in generalizing about such heterogeneous categories as "organized groups." As already noted in Chapter 6, among the organized functional groups, the MPs associated with modern middle-class professional associations and industrial and

TABLE 8.15

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY ORGANIZED

GROUP AFFILIATION, CONTROLLING FOR REGION

<u>Organized Group</u> <u>Affiliation</u>	<u>Hindi</u>		<u>West</u>		<u>Region</u>		<u>East</u>		<u>South</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
Both Functional & Primordial Groups	96.0	(25)	75.0	(12)	100.0	(1)	57.1	(7)	84.4	(45)		
Functional Groups Only	85.5	(55)	71.9	(32)	78.6	(14)	75.0	(28)	78.5	(130)		
Primordial Groups Only	76.9	(13)	80.0	(5)	100.0	(1)	75.0	(4)	78.3	(23)		
None	83.3	(42) (135)	66.7	(15) (64)	73.7	(19) (35)	64.7	(17) (56)	75.8	(95) (293)		
	V = .15		V = .08		V = .15		V = .14		V = .10			

TABLE 8.16

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY ORGANIZED GROUP AFFILIATION

CONTROLLING FOR INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

Organized Group Affiliation	Index of Social Mobilization							
	High %	(N=)	%	Medium (N=)	%	Low (N=)	%	Total (N=)
Both Functional & Primordial Groups	81.3	(16)	76.9	(13)	92.9	(14)	84.4	(45)
Functional Groups Only	72.9	(48)	81.4	(43)	84.4	(32)	78.5	(130)
Primordial Groups Only	71.4	(7)	75.0	(4)	80.0	(10)	78.3	(23)
None	69.0	<u>(29)</u> (100)	75.8	<u>(33)</u> (93)	80.0	<u>(20)</u> (76)	75.8	<u>(95)</u> (293)
	V = .09		V = .07		V = .13		V = .10	

agricultural workers' unions were more solid in their support for Mrs. Gandhi than those active in farmers' associations and chambers of business and industries.

The trend of greater support for Mrs. Gandhi among the MPs with organized group backgrounds does not show any marked influence of varying political context, at least in terms of the source of main opposition to the Congress in the constituency. With this variable held constant, the original relationships were maintained whether the main opposition came from the rightist or leftist parties or from non-party independents (except for a slight dip in proportionate support for Mrs. Gandhi among the MPs associated with primordial groups and challenged by either rightist or leftist opposition parties). (See Table 8.17.)

Political Career Patterns and Factional Affiliation

The analysis of political career patterns of the Congress MPs in relation to their factional affiliation, carried out in Chapter 6, revealed two broad patterns. First, position-holding within the external party organization at the national level, or at more than one level conjointly, tended to increase the likelihood of the MP's alignment with the Syndicate. On the other hand, position-holding at lower levels of the party organization or lack of such positions were found to be associated with alignment with the pro-Indira

TABLE 8.17

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY ORGANIZED GROUP AFFILIATION, CONTROLLING
FOR SOURCE OF MAIN OPPOSITION TO CONGRESS IN CONSTITUENCY, 1967

<u>Organized Group Affiliation</u>	<u>Source of Main Opposition to Congress</u>					
	<u>Rightist</u>	<u>Leftist</u>	<u>Regional</u>	<u>Independent</u>	<u>Total</u>	
	% (N=)	% (N=)	% (N=)	% (N=)	% (N=)	
Both Functional & Primordial Groups	80.0 (15)	100.0 (11)	100.0 (2)	66.7 (12)	84.4 (45)	
Functional Groups Only	78.0 (50)	76.6 (47)	100.0 (1)	82.2 (29)	78.5 (130)	
Primordial Groups Only	75.0 (12)	33.3 (3)	*	100.0 (7)	78.3 (23)	
None	79.2 (24) (101)	66.7 (36) (97)	100.0 (1) (4)	78.6 (28) (76)	75.8 (95) (293)	
	V = .03	V = .28	V = a	V = .21	V = .10	

NOTE: a. Too few cases to yield a meaningful Cramer's V statistics.

Congress. Second, in the case of careers in the parliamentary party, seniority as such was inversely related to loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi, a strong correlation between ministerial status and pro-Indira factional stance was observed. In this section, these relationships will be re-examined in varying environmental contexts.

Career in the External Party

Table 8.18 shows that the overall trend of significant position-holding in, and consequently greater integrations into, the external party organization at the highest or at more than one level being associated with a more autonomous factional posture against Prime Minister Gandhi is subject to regional variations. Whereas the original overall relationship is largely confirmed in the non-Hindi western and southern regions, there are departures from this pattern in the Hindi and non-Hindi eastern regions. In the Hindi regions, the support for Mrs. Gandhi emerges as fairly uniform across all categories of external party position-holding, which may be attributed to her greater hold and appeal in her "home" region. In the eastern region, on the other hand, contrary to the overall, national pattern, non-position-holders and position-holders in the local, district-level party organization were shown to be less likely to align with her than the state-level or multiple-level position-holders. However, the pattern in the eastern region

TABLE 8.18

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY POSITION IN
EXTERNAL PARTY ORGANIZATION, CONTROLLING FOR REGION

Position-Holders in External Party Organization at	Region									
	Hindi		West		East		South		Total	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
N+S+D/N+S/S+D Levels ^a	90.0	(10)	75.0	(8)	100.0	(3)	40.0	(10)	71.0	(31)
N Level Only ^a	80.0	(5)	0.0	(1)	*	*	*	*	66.7	(6)
S Level Only ^a	100.0	(5)	100.0	(3)	100.0	(2)	100.0	(3)	100.0	(13)
D Level Only ^a	92.9	(28)	87.5	(8)	50.0	(2)	87.5	(8)	89.4	(47)
None	82.4	(85)	67.4	(43)	75.0	(28)	71.4	(35)	75.6	(193)
		(133)		(63)		(35)		(56)		(290)
Cramer's V =	.15		V = .28		V = .26		V = .35		V = .18	

NOTE: a. N = National-Level Party Organization; S = State-level Party Organization; D = District-

NOTE: a. N = National-Level Party Organization; S = State-level Party Organization; D = District-Level Party Organization.

should, I think, be discounted because of the small number of cases in most of the categories.

When district social mobilization was held constant, it was found that, though the overall national pattern was, by and large, maintained in all cases, there was a slight departure from it in the most mobilized districts (inasmuch as there remained hardly any difference in the proportions of support for Mrs. Gandhi among the multiple-level organizational activists and non-position-holders). In addition, as one would expect, with the increasing level of district social mobilization, a consistent rise in the proportions of support for Mrs. Gandhi among the multiple-level organizational activists was noticeable. For some strange reason, this trend was reversed in the case of non-position-holders (Table 8.19).

When one controls simultaneously for region and district social mobilization, the findings do not appear to be easily interpretable. Within the Hindi region, party organizational activists emerge as more likely than the non-position-holders to support Mrs. Gandhi in the most and least mobilized districts, whereas they are less prone to align with her in moderately mobilized districts. Outside the Hindi region, the numbers of cases are too small for meaningful analysis (Table 8.20).

With the source of main opposition to the Congress held constant, the overall pattern was most clearly maintained

TABLE 8.19

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY POSITION IN EXTERNAL PARTY ORGANIZATION,
CONTROLLING FOR INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Position-Holders in External Party Organization at</u>	<u>Index of Social Mobilization</u>					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Medium</u>		<u>Low</u>		<u>Total</u>
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
N+S+D/N+S/S+D Levels ^a	71.4	(14)	66.7	(9)	60.0	71.0 (31)
N Level Only ^a	*	*	50.0	(4)	100.0	(2) 66.7 (6)
S Level Only ^a	100.0	(3)	100.0	(4)	100.0	(5) 100.0 (13)
D Level Only ^a	75.0	(12)	100.0	(15)	88.9	(18) 89.4 (47)
None	71.4	(70)	75.0	(60)	82.2	(45) 75.6 (193)
		(99)		(92)		(75) (290)
Cramer's V =	.11	V = .30		V = .23		V = .18

NOTE: a. N = National-Level Party Organization; S = State-Level Party Organization; D = District-Level Party Organization.

TABLE 8.20

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY POSITION IN EXTERNAL PARTY ORGANIZATION,
CONTROLLING SIMULTANEOUSLY FOR REGION AND INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Index of Social Mobilization/Position- Holding in External Party Strategy</u>	<u>Region</u>					
	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>	<u>South</u>		
	%	%	%	%	(N=)	(N=)
<u>High Mob.</u>						
<u>Position in ^a</u>						
N+S+D/N+S/S+D	100.0	71.4	100.0	50.0	(2)	(4)
N Only	*	*	*	*	*	*
S Only	100.0	100.0	*	100.0	*	(1)
D Only	100.0	80.0	0.0	50.0	(1)	(2)
None	73.3	64.5	80.0	78.9	(5)	(19)
					(44)	(26)
Cramer's V =	.31	V = .15	V = .68	V = .30		

TABLE 8.20 (Continued)

<u>Index of Social Mobilization/Position- Holding in External Party Strategy</u>	<u>Region</u>					
	<u>Hindi</u>		<u>West</u>		<u>East</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
<u>Medium Mob.</u>						
<u>Position in^a</u>						
N+S+D/N+S/S+D	75.0	(4)	*	*	100.0	(1) 50.0 (4)
N Only	66.7	(3)	0.0	(1)	*	* (4)
S Only	100.0	(1)	*	*	100.0	(2) 100.0 (1)
D Only	100.0	(11)	100.0	(1)	100.0	(1) 100.0 (2)
None	82.4	(34)	66.7	(6)	66.7	(12) 62.5 (8)
Cramer's V =	.25	(53)	V = .54	(8)	V = .33	(16) V = .37 (15)
<u>Low Mob.</u>						
<u>Position in^a</u>						
N+S+D/N+S/S+D	100.0	(3)	*	*	*	0.0 (2)
N Only	100.0	(2)	*	*	*	* (2)
S Only	100.0	(3)	100.0	(1)	*	100.0 (1)

TABLE 8.20 (Continued)

<u>Index of Social Mobilization/Position- Holding in External Party Strategy</u>	<u>Region</u>					
	<u>Hindi</u>		<u>West</u>		<u>East</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
<u>Low Mob.</u>						
<u>Position in^a</u>						
D Only	84.6	(13)	100.0	(1)	*	100.0 (4)
None	84.8	(33)	100.0	(2)	66.7 (3)	71.4 (7)
		(54)		(4)		(14)
Cramer's V =	.16		V = b		V = b	V = .61

NOTE: a. N = National-Level Party Organization; S = State-Level Party Organization; D = District-Level Party Organization.

only among the MPs from constituencies with a rightist-oriented opposition. Among the members from leftist- and independent-main opposition constituencies, party organizational activists were, by and large, more likely than the non-position-holders to align with Mrs. Gandhi (Table 8.21).

When the factional identifications of the MPs were arrayed against another political contextual variable, the index of non-Congress success trend in the state party systems, it was found, first of all, that the original pattern of national- or multiple-level party organizational activists being more likely to align with the Syndicate was largely maintained irrespective of the competitive strength of the Congress. There was, however, a striking tendency for the proportion of position-holding as well as non-position-holding MPs aligning with Mrs. Gandhi to increase, the higher the level of non-Congress success trend (Table 8.22).

Parliamentary Party Career

As already noted, within the CPP as a whole, while parliamentary seniority as such varied inversely with alignment with Mrs. Gandhi, ministerial status was shown to be correlated with factional loyalty to her. In addition, those holding positions within the government or simultaneously within the party and the government were more likely to align with the pro-Indira Congress than the non-position-holders and those holding positions within the party only.

TABLE 8.21

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY POSITION IN EXTERNAL PARTY ORGANIZATION,
CONTROLLING FOR SOURCE OF MAIN OPPOSITION TO CONGRESS IN CONSTITUENCY, 1967

Position-Holders in External Party Organization at	Source of Main Opposition to Congress								
	Rightist		Leftist		Regional		Independent		Total
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	% (N=)
N+S+D/N+S/S+D Levels ^a	58.3	(12)	80.0	(10)	100.0	(1)	80.0	(5)	71.0 (31)
N Level Only ^a	66.7	(3)	50.0	(2)	*	*	100.0	(1)	66.7 (6)
S Level Only ^a	100.0	(3)	100.0	(3)	*	*	100.0	(5)	100.0 (13)
D Level Only ^a	94.7	(19)	85.7	(14)	*	*	85.7	(14)	89.4 (47)
None	75.8	(62)	70.1	(67)	100.0	(3)	76.5	(51)	75.6 (193)
		(99)		(96)		(4)		(76)	(290)
Cramer's V =	.27	V = .19		V = ^b		V = .17		V = .18	

NOTES: a. N = National-Level Party Organization, S = State-Level Party Organization; D = District-Level Party Organization.

b. Too few cases to yield a meaningful statistics.

TABLE 8.22

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY POSITION IN EXTERNAL PARTY ORGANIZATION,
CONTROLLING FOR INDEX OF INDEX OF NON-CONGRESS SUCCESS TREND
IN STATE PARTY SYSTEMS, 1960s/1950s

<u>Position-Holders in External Party Organization at</u>	<u>Index of Non-Congress Success Trend</u>					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Medium</u>		<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
N+S+D/N+S/S+D Levels ^a	83.3	(6)	61.5	(13)	75.0	(12) 71.0 (31)
N Level Only ^a	100.0	(2)	100.0	(1)	33.3	(3) 66.7 (6)
S Level Only ^a	100.0	(4)	100.0	(6)	100.0	(3) 100.0 (13)
D Level Only ^a	95.8	(24)	84.6	(13)	80.0	(10) 89.4 (47)
None	81.7	(60)	70.0	(60)	75.3	(73) 75.6 (193)
		(96)		(93)		(101) (290)
Cramer's V =	.20		V = .22		V = .20	V = .18

NOTE: a. N = National-Level Party Organization; S = State-Level Party Organization; D = District-Level Party Organization.

The negative association between parliamentary seniority and loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi was more or less maintained in all regions, except the non-Hindi eastern one, where for some reason it turned positive (Table 8.23). Nor did district social mobilization show any appreciable impact on the overall relationship between parliamentary seniority and factional affiliation; within each category of district social mobilization, this relationship remained negative, though it was considerably weakened in the most mobilized districts (Table 8.24).

When region and social mobilization were simultaneously controlled, some varying, though not always easily explicable, patterns emerged. The negative association between parliamentary seniority and loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi basically remained unaltered in the least and moderately mobilized districts in all regions with enough cases to generalize. However, in the most highly mobilized districts, the relationship was shown to be negative in the Hindi and non-Hindi western regions but positive in the non-Hindi eastern and southern regions (Table 8.25).

When factional identifications were related to parliamentary seniority controlling for the index of non-Congress success trend in the state party systems, it was found that the negative association between parliamentary seniority and factional alignment with Mrs. Gandhi was strongest in states where the Congress party's competitive

TABLE 8.23

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY PARLIAMENTARY SENIORITY,
CONTROLLING FOR REGION

<u>Parliamentary Seniority</u>	<u>Region</u>						<u>Total</u>
	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>		<u>East</u>		<u>South</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%
11 Years or More	76.1	(46)	52.9	(17)	76.9	(13)	62.5
						(16)	68.8
5-10 Years	92.7	(41)	79.3	(29)	90.0	(11)	75.0
						(24)	84.9
First Elected in 1967	89.4	(47)	77.8	(18)	63.6	(11)	68.8
		(134)		(64)		(35)	
						(16)	80.6
						(56)	(292)
Gamma =	-.36		-.35		.22		-.09
							-.22

TABLE 8.24

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY PARLIAMENTARY SENIORITY,
CONTROLLING FOR INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Parliamentary Seniarity</u>	<u>Index of Social Mobilization</u>					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Medium</u>		<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
11 Years or More	65.7	(35)	60.0	(25)	78.3	68.8 (93)
5-10 Years	82.4	(24)	84.4	(32)	84.4	84.9 (106)
First Elected in 1967	71.0	<u>(31)</u> (100)	86.1	<u>(36)</u> (93)	90.0	<u>80.6</u> (292)
Gamma =	-.10		-.44		-.27	-.22

TABLE 8.25

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY PARLIAMENTARY SENIORITY, CONTROLLING
SIMULTANEOUSLY FOR REGION AND INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Index of Social Mobilization/Parliamentary Seniority (in years)</u>	<u>Region</u>					
	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N=)</u>
	<u>%</u>	<u>(N=)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N=)</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>(N=)</u>
<u>High Mob.</u>						
<u>Parl. Seniority</u>						
11 +	70.0	(10)	53.5	(15)	100.0	(2)
5 - 10	100.0	(7)	75.0	(16)	100.0	(1)
First Term	75.0	(4)	78.6	(14)	60.0	(5)
		(21)		(45)		(8)
Gamma =	-.36		-.38		1.0	.20
<u>Medium Mob.</u>						
<u>Parl. Seniority</u>						
11 +	66.7	(15)	0.0	(1)	60.0	(5)
5 - 10	100.0	(14)	66.7	(6)	83.3	(6)
First Term	88.0	(25)	100.0	(1)	80.0	(5)
		(54)		(8)		(15)
Gamma =	-.43		-1.0		-.33	-.41

TABLE 8.25 (Continued)

<u>Index of Social Mobilization/Parliamentary Seniority (in years)</u>	<u>Region</u>					
	<u>Hindi</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>East</u>	<u>South</u>		
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
<u>Low Mob.</u>						
<u>Parl. Seniority</u>						
11 +	83.3	(18)	*	*	100.0	(1) 50.0 (4)
5 - 10	84.2	(19)	100.0	(4)	100.0	(1) 75.0 (8)
First Term	94.1	(17)	*	*	0.0	(1) 100.0 (2)
		(54)		(4)		(14)
Gamma =	-.31		a		a	-.67

NOTE: a. Too few cases to yield a meaningful statistics.

strength was least threatened by a non-Congress electoral success pattern; it tended to decrease until it turned mildly positive among the MPs from states with the most threatened electoral base for the Congress (Table 8.26).

Another aspect of political career which can be measured and compared is that of position-holding within the government (federal council of ministers) and the external party organization (national/state). Although Mrs. Gandhi was able to carry the support of the majority of MPs in all categories, holding positions in the government or concurrently in the government and the party were more likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi than those holding positions in the party only or than the non-position-holders.

As Table 8.27 shows, the relationship between position-holding in the party/government and factional affiliation observed at the national level were largely maintained in all regions except for a minor departure from this pattern in the Hindi region. Nor did district social mobilization show any noticeable impact on this relationship; within each level of social mobilization the original association was largely maintained (Table 8.28). So neither the regional context nor the social development of the district appears to exercise an appreciable influence on the relationship between participation in the party organization and/or government on the one hand and factional affiliation on the other.

TABLE 8.26

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY PARLIAMENTARY SENIORITY, CONTROLLING FOR
INDEX OF NON-CONGRESS SUCCESS PATTERN IN STATE PARTY SYSTEMS, 1960s/1950s

<u>Parliamentary Seniorty</u>	<u>Index of Non-Congress Success Trend</u>					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Medium</u>		<u>Low</u>	<u>Total</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
11 years or More	87.5	(32)	67.7	(31)	50.0	68.8 (93)
5-10 years	86.2	(29)	75.5	(37)	92.5	84.9 (106)
First Elected in 1967	85.7	(35) (96)	76.9	(26) (94)	78.1	80.6 (93) (292)
Gamma =	.05		-.15		-.42	-.22

TABLE 8.27

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY POSITION IN PARTY
AND/OR GOVERNMENT, CONTROLLING FOR REGION

<u>Position-Holders in</u>	<u>Hindi</u>		<u>West</u>		<u>Region</u>		<u>South</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
Both Party & Government ^a	92.3	(13)	71.4	(7)	100.0	(4)	77.8	(9)	84.8	(33)
Party Only ^a	90.9	(44)	70.6	(17)	71.4	(7)	62.5	(16)	80.0	(85)
Government Only ^a	84.6	(13)	100.0	(3)	75.0	(4)	87.5	(8)	86.2	(29)
None	82.3	(62)	69.4	(36)	73.7	(19)	65.2	(23)	74.5	(141)
		(132)		(63)		(34)		(56)		(288)
Cramer's V =	.13		V = .14		V = .20		V = .19		V = .11	

NOTE: a. Position-holding in party organization refers to the executive committee membership at the national- and/or state-level party. Government position-holding is operationalized in terms of membership in the federal council of ministers.

TABLE 8.28

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY POSITION IN PARTY AND/OR GOVERNMENT,
CONTROLLING FOR INDEX OF DISTRICT SOCIAL MOBILIZATION

<u>Position-Holders In</u>	<u>Index of Social Mobilization</u>					
	<u>High</u>	<u>Medium</u>		<u>Low</u>		<u>Total</u>
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)
Both Party & Government ^a	76.9	(13)	84.0	(11)	100.0	(7) 84.8 (33)
Party Only ^a	66.7	(27)	81.8	(25)	75.0	(28) 80.0 (85)
Government Only ^a	83.3	(12)	87.5	(8)	85.7	(4) 86.2 (29)
None	72.3	(47)	79.3	(46)	80.6	(36) 74.5 (141)
		(99)		(90)		(75) (288)
Cramer's V =	.11	V = .13		V = .16		V = .11

NOTE: a. Position-holding in party organization refers to the executive committee membership at the national- and/or state-level party. Government position-holding is operationalized in terms of membership in the federal council of ministers.

When we compare the correlations of the MP's factional affiliation and the index of non-Congress electoral success pattern in the states, we find that, although the original relationships between career patterns in the government and the party and factional affiliation remain largely intact, the proportion of MPs aligning with Mrs. Gandhi generally tended to rise with decreasing electoral competitive strength of the Congress. This pattern is discernible in practically all categories of the MPs career modalities (Table 8.29).

TABLE 8.29

PERCENT PRO-INDIRA AMONG CPP MEMBERS BY POSITION IN PARTY AND/OR GOVERNMENT CONTROLLING
FOR INDEX OF NON-CONGRESS SUCCESS TREND IN STATE PARTY SYSTEM, 1960s/1950s

Position-Holders in	Index of Non-Congress Success Trend							
	High		Medium		Low		Total	
	%	(N=)	%	(N=)	%	(N=)		
Both Party & Government ^a	100.0	(9)	83.3	(12)	75.0	(12)	84.8	(33)
Party Only ^a	90.3	(31)	73.3	(30)	70.0	(24)	80.0	(85)
Government Only ^a	92.7	(11)	90.9	(11)	100.0	(7)	86.2	(29)
None	84.1	(44)	65.9	(41)	73.2	(56)	74.5	(141)
		(95)		(94)		(99)		(288)
Cramer's V =	.20		V = .19		V = .16		V = .11	

NOTE: a. Position-holding in party organization refers to the executive committee membership at the national and/or state level party. Government position-holding is operationalized in terms of membership in the federal council of ministers.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the course of this study of the 1969 split in the Indian National Congress, I have attempted to examine the problem from two perspectives. First, focusing at it as a macro phenomenon, a conceptual framework was developed within which one could analyse schisms in parties, especially a predominant, pragmatic, success-oriented, mass party such as the Congress. The second perspective utilized was cast at the micro level and it sought to analyse the various pressures on the decision of a segment of the Congress elites to align with one or the other of the two groups into which the party split in 1969.

To begin with party schism as a macro process, the analytical framework derived from the case of the 1969 Congress split identified three sets of variables as critical in determining whether and how a split occurs in a party such as the Congress: (1) intra-party elite conflicts, (2) social mobilization in the larger society, and (3) the nature of the party system and of the party concerned. The first two constitute the primary independent variables whose influences on party schism are mediated by the effects of the nature of the party unit and the party system of which it forms a part.

The catalyst behind the Congress split seemed to have been conflicts over power among the post-Nehru Congress elites, which, in addition to purely personal differences, also came to display elements of ideological and generational differences as well as those based on parliamentary versus extra-parliamentary organizational differentiation. But it is notable that ideological and other rationales followed rather than preceded the first signs of conflict over power among the senior party leaders. As the empirical description of the events leading to the split indicated, not only did the conflict among top leaders trigger the crisis, it also gradually drew a largely reluctant local-level leadership into the controversy. Moreover, once personal rivalry among leaders surfaced, ideological, generational, and other considerations were brought in to cloak political ambition. And the two sets competing elites within the party took rather antithetical postures in the ensuing crisis: the pro-Indira group considered it in purely "ideological" terms and the Syndicate in those of a simple "conflict for power".

In addition, competition for power between different elements of the party leadership prompted them to mobilize new bases of mass support and champion the aspirations of underprivileged groups in the society. For reasons of generational differences and in the public images of the top leaders, Mrs. Gandhi and her allies were successful in projecting themselves as the proponents of a new level of

social and political mobilization in the country, as opposed to the Syndicate, whose public image seemed to be more conservative and traditionalistic.

If the crisis originated in power conflicts among the national leaders of the party, it soon spread to mid- and lower-level elites and a very complex pattern of inter-relationships among various factions in different institutional areanas and levels of party organization was revealed. The picture, as unfolded by the Desai affair, the Presidential election, and the AICC requisition move, was one of a more conservative subcoalition within the party composed of the top Syndicate leaders in the party and government, the second-echelon "Ginger Group" leaders in the Parliament, and most of the dominant state-level Congress factions ranged against a seemingly more radical faction led by Prime Minister Gandhi and her "kitchen cabinet" colleagues, backed by the "young Turks" in the Parliament, and a few dominant, but mostly minority factions in the state Congress parties. Faced at first with a formidable array of forces against her in the party, Mrs. Gandhi, too initiatives to take the whole issue to a broader arena than the party. Through a series of tactics and policy-shifts--e.g., the demand for "conscience voting" in the Presidential election, bank nationalization, abolition of privy purses and other princely privileges, a well-timed and carefully managed snap election "de-linked" with state elections and thereby reducing the

relevance of state-level levers of power still dominated in some states by the Syndicate--Mrs. Gandhi succeeded in generating a tremendous popular upsurge in her favour. The Syndicate, initially considerably stronger, suffered a progressive depletion of support within the party until Mrs. Gandhi's faction eventually emerged as the majority faction and forced the Syndicate rump to split.

This affair, primarily one among the party elites, soon got linked up with social forces--some enduring and some more recent--in Indian politics: increasing politicization of many hitherto submerged social groups, regionism, caste and communal identities and populism. Regionalism was certainly apparent in the trend revealed in major concentrations of support for the two factions: the Syndicate was stronger in some states of the non-Hindi rimlands, Mrs. Gandhi's faction in the Hindi heartland. On the balance, however, both the factions, especially the pro-Indira Congress, cross-cut regional divisions to an extent sufficient to preclude too strong an identification with a particular region.

Moreover, Mrs. Gandhi consciously and adroitly sought to present herself as the champion of underprivileged groups, vowed to fight against the "reactionary few" to the bitter end, and, in addition to challenging the Syndicate within the party and the parliament, she took steps to mobilize public opinion against it. In this she seems to

have been successful. The first Prime Minister without any significant participation in India's anti-colonial national movement, Mrs. Gandhi also espoused the aspirations of a new generation of Indians, and by purging most of the powerful oliguard party leaders, opened up avenues of career mobility for younger leaders. By leaning heavily on the most prominent Muslim, Scheduled Caste, and Sikh Congress leaders in her "Kitchen cabinet," she made an effective appeal to India's three most significant minorities, without, however, alienating substantial Hindi support. Mrs. Gandhi's family, which has so far provided three generations of national leadership, happens to be a most cosmopolitan one, and therefore is capable of making a wider political appeal than any other "political family" in India. (Born of Hindu, Kashmiri Brahman, parents, she married a Parsee; of her two sons, the elder one is married to a Christian and the younger one to a Sikh.) And the 1971 election--"Indira's electoral landslide"--gives her some claim to labels such as "charismatic" and "parameter-altering" leadership.

Now, coming to the party and the party system, the Congress, the centerpiece of India's predominant party system, virtually represents India in miniature. Not surprisingly, the Congress has often been regarded as crucial not only to the operation of the Indian political system, but also to the understanding of society-polity interactions. Expectedly, the party and the party system also provided the crucible for

mediating the effects of elite conflicts within the party and broad changes in the larger society that eventually led to the party crisis in 1969. All the important elements of what Rajni Kothari calls the "Congress system"--Congress factions, minor opposition parties, political movements outside the party space, insitutional (parliamentary) as well as mass (extra-parliamentary) strands of political behaviour, etc.--were evident in 1969 and in important respects determined the outcome. The interplay of institutional interest groups--notably the CWC and its subcommittee CPB, the Cabinet, and CPP and its executive, the Chief Ministers' club, and the AICC--was in evidence throughout. The CWC, being the apex of the Congress power structure comprising the top leaders from the party organization and government, all other institutional interest groups initially looked upon it with deference as the body most qualified to deal authoritatively with the crises. After repeated references to this body, and after two seemingly successful resolutions of the crisis by this body, the conflict kept up erupting and eventually spread to all other institutions. With overwhelming support within the cabinet, the CPP, and the AICC, Mrs. Gandhi was eventually able to isolate the Syndicate's one-vote majority in the party's "high command" (CWC).

Congress factionalism was naturally omnipresent and was displayed at every stage of the crisis and every

arena: at the Bangalore AICC session where Kamaraj, Atulya Ghosh, and Nijalingappa of the Syndicate, along with Desai and Chavan, joined forces, and (departing from the typical consensual procedure of top-level decision-making in the Congress) confronted Mrs. Gandhi and her principal allies Jagjivan Ram and Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, with an unacceptable Presidential nominee; within the CPP, where the blocs of votes from states with varying degrees of cohesion and parliamentary groupings such as the "Ginger Group" and the "Young Turks" played major roles; in state-level Congress machines where a bewildering variety of "ministerialist" and "dissident" factions presented an extremely complex and shifting pattern of inter-relationships with the two emerging groupings. Starting out with a stronger position only within the CPP and a few states, Mrs. Gandhi mounted a great public campaign that was in some part responsible for winning over supporters of the Syndicate to her cause. Some important national-level leaders, such as Home Minister Chavan, and also many of the state-level factional leaders hastened to ride the Indira bandwagon. By the time the top Syndicate leaders were forced out of the Congress, Mrs. Gandhi was left within the party with only two other ranking Congress leaders with an autonomous power base. These were Maharashtra's Chavan and the leader of the Scheduled Castes, Jagjivan Ram. Along with these two senior colleagues, Mrs. Gandhi constituted a ruling triumvirate until the 1971 electoral

landslide established Mrs. Gandhi as the undisputed national leader and eclipsed Chavan and Ram.

Moreover, since the unprecedented Congress majority in the Parliament was won without a party organization worth its name in several states, such as, for example, Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, West Bengal, where the Pradesh Congress units were still largely controlled by the Syndicate, the electoral success was largely the product of Mrs. Gandhi's direct personal appeal to the masses. This seemed to reinvest a strong personalistic element in the Congress, which after Nehru's death had tended to be a much more impersonal mechanism.

The Congress split also illustrated--and was affected by--the interactions between the Congress factions, on the one hand, and opposition parties, on the other. As revealed by the Presidential election and the parliamentary division on the adjournment motion in which the Syndicate voted with the opposition, the opposition parties joined in the factional conflicts in the ruling party on the side of the Congress faction of their choice. With overwhelming support from the left-wing and regional non-Congress parties as well as from the bradaway "congress" parties and independents. Mrs. Gandhi was able not only to subvert the Syndicate's attempt to put a man antagonistic to her in the Rashtrapati Bhawan (President's House), but also to keep her minority government in power until a well-timed parliamentary dissolution and

mid-term election restored the predominance of the Congress Party in her own image. The merger of several opposition parties and factions as well as many independents with Mrs. Gandhi's Congress also contributed to the re-emergence of this new consensus within the Indian National Congress, without any substantial break in the historical continuity of this unique political organization.

The role of associational interest groups in the party crisis remained indirect, though through issuance of statements and, in a few cases, organization of solidary rallies, the trade unions, and groups of lawyers, teachers, doctors, students, public sector employees, small shopkeepers, peasants, etc., did demonstrate a widespread support for Mrs. Gandhi among many interest sectors, which might have influenced the calculations of party leaders.

Moving the focus of analysis to the micro level, an attempt was made to develop a paradigm of factional identification, in order to facilitate the analysis of the role of elite background factors in the affiliation of the Congress Parliamentary Party members with one of the two major groups into which the Congress split in 1969. The paradigm postulated basically two sets of independent variables--the personal background variables of the MP's and their constituency or district characteristics. The former are conceived as the sources of the more immediate socializing influences and the latter as broader contexts of socialization as well as of felt pressures of local

interests, socio-political characteristics, and so on.

The analysis of socio-political backgrounds for the Congress MPs on the personal plane revealed that although Mrs. Gandhi's faction emerged as the true inheritor of the catchall character of the pre-split Congress, some background variables were proportionately more strongly associated with alignment with Mrs. Gandhi than others. Generationally, those aligning with Mrs. Gandhi were likely to be somewhat younger than the Syndicate supporters. Among the older MPs, those participating in the national movement were slightly more likely to support her than the non-participants.

In terms of social stratification, while alignment with Mrs. Gandhi varied inversely with caste and positively with education, occupation showed a more complex pattern of relationship. In the case of the latter, the modern middle-class and lower middle-class MPs were more likely to support her than those belonging to the upper-class and traditional middle-class occupations as well as those who perceived themselves as "social workers and professional politicians". In addition, MPs belonging to non-Hindu religious minority communities were relatively more solid in their support for Mrs. Gandhi than those who were Hindus.

Though the data available did not permit a detailed mapping of attitudes and orientations of the MPs, some limited, indirect measures of attitudes showed that the pro-Indira MPs were more likely to be intellectually oriented and to have leftist or centrist ideological leanings as

compared to the pro-Syndicate ones, who were more frequently lacking in such intellectual traits as high education and publications, and, when identifiable in terms of ideological leanings, more likely to be right-wingers.

In terms of involvement in organized group activities, alignment with Mrs. Gandhi varied positively with affiliation with organized interest groups generally and with modern middle-class professional associations, industrial and non-industrial workers' unions, and minority religious associations in particular. The support for the Syndicate was proportionately greater among the MPs having no connection with organized groups; among the MPs with group involvement, the Syndicate did slightly better among those active in farmers' groups and chambers of business and commerce.

Comparison of political career patterns of the Congress MPs revealed certain notable trends characterizing the pro-Indira faction and the Syndicate. First, among the MPs who have belonged to some non-Congress parties prior to their joining the Congress, those coming from the left-wing, minority-communal, and regional parties were more likely to align with Mrs. Gandhi than those coming from right-wing parties. Second, whereas greater integration into the external party, in terms of higher status at the national and at more than one level of the extra-parliamentary party organization, was associated with the relatively lower proportionate support for Mrs. Gandhi, status at lower levels

of the external party was associated with greater support for her. Third, while parliamentary seniority as such varied inversely with alignment with Mrs. Gandhi, higher status within the parliamentary party, measured by membership in the union council of ministers and in parliamentary committees, tended to increase the probability of support for her. Finally, combined position-holding by the MPs in both the party organization and the government at the national level tended to bring higher support for the Syndicate, while position-holding in one of these two institutions in isolation or a lack of high status in either the party or the government was positively associated with affiliation with the pro-Indira Congress.

The analysis of the socio-political characteristics of the local areas of the Congress MPs in relation to their factional affiliation indicated, first of all, that in terms of ethnic environmental characteristics, the districts with higher concentration of Hindu and Muslim populations were more likely to be associated with pro-Indira factional affiliation than the more mixed ones. In addition, the MPs from depressed Hindu population districts were more likely to support Mrs. Gandhi than those from the depressed non-Hindu population districts.

In terms of the mobilizational aspects of their districts, what was hypothesized, contrary to alignment with the Congress left-wing led by Mrs. Gandhi was found to be correlated with lower levels of social mobilization in the

district. It will be recalled that this tendency also diverges from the relationships found at the personal plane, where the likelihood of affiliation with Mrs. Gandhi was shown to be greater among the more educated and modern middle-class MPs than among those with lower education and traditional middle-class occupations. Correlation of pro-Indira alignment with lower levels of district social mobilization presumably may be interpreted as the product of regional differences. For Mrs. Gandhi received a disproportionately greater support in her native Hindi region, which happens to be generally less socially mobilized, especially in comparison to the major non-Hindi states. The pattern of factional affiliation discovered in the Hindi heartland was overlaid on the overall relationship.

Now, coming to the political context, although a number of such variables were employed, the most notable influences on factional affiliation appeared to be electoral strength of the Congress and voting turnout. The weaker the competitive electoral position of the Congress, the greater the likelihood that the MPs representing such locales would go along with Mrs. Gandhi. And the lower the voting turnout, the higher the probability of the MPs from such areas aligning with Mrs. Gandhi's faction. This rather surprising finding may be accounted for by reference to the fact that higher voting turnout in India has often been found to reflect the effects of patron-client networks or "vote-banks,"

and ought therefore be more likely to be associated with the Syndicate's strength.

The analysis of the combined effects of personal and contextual background variables on factional affiliation suggested some widely varying, but not always easily explicable patterns. Focusing primarily on instances where contextual controls altered the original relationships between personal background variables and factional affiliation to reveal, the most notable trends were the following. On the whole, the most interesting and least inconsistent contextual variables were the district social mobilization and competitive electoral position of the Congress. District social mobilization showed a varying extent of influence on a number of relationships between personal background variables and factional affiliation. District social mobilization, used as a contextual control variable, generally tend to strengthen or weaken the original relationships, mostly in the expected direction. For example, the original negative association between age and loyalty to Mrs. Gandhi emerged stronger in the least mobilized districts, was slightly reduced in the moderately mobilized ones, and tended to disappear in the most mobilized ones. Similarly, the positive association of education and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi virtually disappeared in the least mobilized districts, but re-emerged weakly in the moderately mobilized ones and more strongly in the highly mobilized ones. Moreover, MPs

from more mobilized districts showed a greater incidence of involvement in organized group politics, but the effects of organized group involvement are hardly any different in the more mobilized districts than in the less mobilized ones. Further, although district social mobilization does not change the negative direction of the relationship between parliamentary seniority and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi, this relationship is considerably weaker in the most mobilized districts.

Finally, social mobilization usually did not alter the relationships between political career patterns and factional affiliation, but in a few instances, e.g., in the case of national- or multiple-level external party organizational activists, there was a consistent rise in the proportion of support for Mrs. Gandhi with the increasing level of district social mobilization. Strangely, however, this pattern was reversed among the non-position-holders in the external party organization.

Now coming to the competitive electoral position of the Congress, its impact was especially notable on the relationships of personal political career patterns and factional affiliation. For instance, the overall negative association between parliamentary seniority and alignment with Mrs. Gandhi was shown to be strongest in the states where the Congress party's electoral strength was least threatened; this relationship tended to decrease until it

turned mildly positive among the MPs from the states with the most threatened electoral base for the party.

With the type of data available and the methods of analysis, partly dictated by the nature of the data, I do not pretend to have offered a complete and definitive study, but it does reveal interesting tendencies in the factional affiliation patterns of the Congress Lok Saldra members at the time of the party split of 1969. In fact, the large disparity in strength between the two groups allows less variability. Also, had it been possible to tap the factional preferences and attitudes of MPs prior to the November 19 Lok Saldra voting, by which time Mrs. Gandhi's ascendancy had become clear, one might have had a better measure of factional preference of MPs less constrained by considerations of careers, position, etc., or the "bandwagon effect" generally.

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APPENDIX A

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

	CDIFS	RTDIFS	LTDIFS	RGLDIFS	INDDIFS
CDIFS	1.00000	-0.08692	-0.03088	0.28168	0.14496
RTDIFS	-0.08692	1.00000	0.59699	0.61636	0.36697
LTDIFS	-0.03088	0.59699	1.00000	0.56528	0.53760
RGLDIFS	0.28168	0.61636	0.56528	1.00000	0.51793
INDDIFS	0.14496	0.36697	0.53760	0.51793	1.00000

Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix

	Factor 1 (Non-Cong.)	Factor 2 (Cong.)
CDIFS	0.02608	0.76462
RTDIFS	0.75249	-0.12338
LTDIFS	0.79554	-0.07131
RGLDIFS	0.79690	0.33123
INDDIFS	0.59836	0.16579

APPENDIX B

CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

	VAR105	VAR106	VAR112	VAR123	VAR124
VAR105	1.00000	-0.24450	-0.66786	-0.76836	-0.75307
VAR106	-0.24450	1.00000	-0.14027	-0.00501	-0.09505
VAR112	-0.66786	-0.14027	1.00000	0.72515	0.95373
VAR123	-0.76836	-0.00501	0.72515	1.00000	0.80548
VAR124	-0.75307	-0.09505	0.95373	0.80548	1.00000

Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix

	Factor 1 (Indust.)	Factor 2 (Rural)
VAR105	-0.83821	0.49965
VAR106	-0.03595	-0.53763
VAR112	0.92060	0.21065
VAR123	0.83100	-0.10003
VAR124	0.99003	0.13613

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